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ABSTRACT
Optimism About Future Life Events
(February 1984)
Linda Lang-Gunn, B.A., Florida State University
M.S., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Or. Ronnie Janof f-Bulman
Optimism Is examined from a social psychological perspective,
Including the role of attribution processes, cognitive heuristics, and
motivational biases. The present study Investigated cognitive and
motivational processes that may promote and sustain optimism about the
future likelihood of experiencing negative life events. Specifically,
this study examined the effects of event severity and base-rate
Information on judgments of the probability that oneself and others
will experience specific negative life events.
It was hypothesized that event severity would have a stronger
effect on judgments about oneself than on judgments about others, and
that Individuals would selectively use base-rate Information In
judging their own likelihood of experiencing negative life events.
Judgments were made about four life events Involving marriage,
employment, crime, and health. As predicted, respondents judged
severe events to be less probable than mild events, although they did
not report that the severe events occurred less frequently In their
own actual experience.
V
Both mild and severe negative life events were regarded as less likely
to happen to oneself than to others, but the extended hypothesis that
severity would have a greater Impact on judgments regarding one's own
future outcomes received only marginal support from the data.
The relatively high estimates of population base-rates given by
respondents did not permit adequate analysis of the hypotheses
regarding the selective use of base-rate Information. Provision of
base-rate Information resulted In significantly lower judgments of
event probability for both self and other In every condition.
Judgments of event probability were also affected by sex of respondent
and event. Compared to males, females consistently gave higher
estimates of the probability of the negative events. Respondents
attributed significantly greater control over the events to themselves
than to others. A number of Issues are discussed. Including the
asymmetries In self-other judgments, evidence of judgment bias,
Illusions of control and Invulnerability, methodological
considerations, and the possible consequences and adaptlveness of
unwarranted optimism about one's own future prospects.
v1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
ABSTRACT
v
Chapter
V I. INTRODUCTION 1
Some Evidence of Optimism 2
Recollection of the past 2
Evaluations of the present 6
General life happiness 8
Specific satisfaction: Marriages & jobs 9
Expectations for the future 11
Social Psychological Perspectives 19
Explanation & prediction 20
Attributions for positive and negative outcomes. ... 21
Expectations for positive and negative outcomes. ... 30
The illusion of contingency 35
The illusion of control 42
The illusion of invulnerability 47
Cognitive heuristics 55
Availability 56
Representativeness 61
Causality heuristic 65
Hindsight effect 71
Consequences of optimism 74
Optimism: Meaning and measurement 85
Summary 91
II. METHOD 98
Overview ......... 98
Respondents 98
Design 99
Procedure ^00
Independent Variables 100
Dependent Measures
Perceived population base-rate 102
Probability judgments: Self and other 103
Judgment certainty ^03
Perceived characteristics of event 103
Perceived control: Self and other 104
Personal concern • • • • ^04
Personal experience ^04
Self descriptions ^05
v1i
Chapter
III. RESULTS 106
Overview 106
Manipulation Checks 107
Probability Judgments: Self and Other 108
Effects of severity 108
Effects of base-rate Information Ill
Selective use of base-rate Information 115
Other factors Influencing probability judgments 119
Event Likelihood 123
Judgment Certainty: Self and Other 123
Event Characteristics 128
Perceived Control: Self and Other 133
Personal Concern 137
Personal Experience 138
Self Descriptions 140
Correlational Analyses 142
Summary 148
IV. DISCUSSION 154
Factors Affecting Probability Judgments 154
Illusions of Control and Invulnerability 157
Evidence of Judgment Bias 159
Optimism and Realism 162
Methodological Considerations 163
Future Directions 166
FOOTNOTES
REFERENCE NOTES
''"'^
REFERENCES
"""^^
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Base-rate Information '««
Appendix B: Sample Questionnaire
vlll
TABLES
Table
1. Experimental Design 99
2. Life Events and Base-rates Specified 101
3. Mean Probability Estimates for Population, Self,
and Other 109
4. Mean Probability Estimates for Population, Self,
and Other as a Function of Severity and Event 110
5. Mean Difference between Probability Estimates
and Base-rate Specified as a Function of
Base-rate Information
. 113
6. Mean Difference between Probability Estimates
and Base-rate Specified as a Function of
Base-rate Information and Severity 115
7. Mean Probability Estimates as a Function of
Internal Classification, Base-rate, and Event 118
8. Mean Probability Estimates as a Function of
Sex of Respondent 120
9. Mean Certainty Ratings for Self and Other
as a Function of Event 124
10. Mean Certainty Ratings as a Function of Event
and Sex of Respondent 125
n. Mean Self Certainty Ratings as a Function of
Severity, Sex, and Base-rate 126
12. Mean Self Certainty Ratings as a Function of
Base-rate, Severity, and Event 127
13. Mean Event Ratings as a Function of Severity and Event. . . 130
14. Mean Ratings of Control as a Function of
Sex of Respondent
ix
15. Mean Ratings of Control as a Function of Event 135
16. Mean Ratings of Control as a Function of Event
and Sex of Respondent 136
17. Mean Ratings of Concern as a Function of
Severity and Event 138
18. Mean Personal Experience Ratings
as a Function of Severity and Event 139
19. Mean Self Description Ratings
as a Function of Severity 141
X
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Most people describe themselves as optimists, and there Is
considerable evidence that they are accurate In this description.
People remember more pleasant than unpleasant events In their lives,
they generally perceive most of their outcomes to be good, and they
expect the future to be positive. Research Indicates that reports of
personal happiness and personal expectations are highly positive, and
that positive outcomes are generally regarded as more likely. In
short, people seem to structure their conceptual worlds as positive,
and they are decidedly optimistic about the future.
In recent years, cognitive social psychologists have focused on
people's explanations and reactions to uncontrollable, negative life
events (e.g., Janof f-Bulman & Lang-Gunn, 1n press; Lerner & Miller,
1978; Wortman, 1976). It Is the thesis of this paper that the
perception of personal Immunity to negative life events may represent
only one aspect of a generally positive orientation toward the world.
Specifically, people underestimate their vulnerability to negative
life events, and they overestimate the likelihood of experiencing
positive events. Before examining social psychological perspectives,
some evidence of such a positive outlook on the future will be
presented. The primary focus of this paper Is on expectations for the
1
2future, but evidence of a similar orientation toward the past and the
present will also be reviewed.
Some Evidence of Optimism
Recollection of the Past
There Is abundant evidence that people believe that events In
their past have been predominantly pleasant. Early research
established that people report more pleasant than unpleasant events In
recalling events during their lifespan, or more recent experiences
(e.g., Henderson, 1911; Washburn, Glang, Ives, & Pollock, 1925). In
an early summary of scientific thought and research on selective
recall, HoUlngworth (1910) described the effect of the passage of
time on the perceived pleasantness of events:
The canonization of saints, the apotheosis of strenuous
historical characters, the obituaries of our friends, the
reminiscences of childhood, all testify In this natural and
universal habit of forgetting the bad and exalting the
good. (p. 710)
Studies by Meltzer (e.g., Meltzer & Ludwig, 1967, 1970), a
pioneer In the field of selective recall, are representative of recent
research on the recall of life experiences. For example, In an early
experiment that became a prototype for research on the selective
recall of experiences, Meltzer (1930) asked college students to record
and rate experiences from their Christmas vacations. Six weeks later,
the students were asked to recall their experiences, and Meltzer found
that recall was significantly greater for pleasant than unpleasant
3experiences. In another study, 69% of the life experiences listed by
a group of small-town workers were pleasant experiences (Meltzer &
Ludwig, 1967).
Studies of selective recall Involving shorter time Intervals,
from one day to several weeks, have also demonstrated this
overabundance of positive events. Generally, people were asked to
construct lists of events In their Immedlatepast , and In all of these
studies. Individuals listed a greater number of pleasant than
unpleasant events (Cason, 1932; Flugel, 1925; Jackson, 1973; Jerslld,
1931; Meltzer, 1930; Menzles, 1935; O'Kelly & Steckle, 1940; Steckle,
1945; Turner 8. Barlow, 1951; Wall, 1948; Waters & Leeper, 1936;
Wolgemuth, 1923). These studies, using a number of different subject
populations, have consistently demonstrated that when Individuals are
asked to recall life events, from the previous day or a lifetime, they
report more pleasant than unpleasant experiences.
In addition, research suggests that the Intensity of an event Is
sometimes an Important factor In the selective recall of experiences.
Menzles (1935), Turner and Barlow (1951), and Waters and Leeper (1936)
all reported that recall of highly pleasant or unpleasant events was
greater than recall of neutral events. More recently, Holmes (1970)
reexamined the roles of affect and Intensity In the recall of dally
experiences. For a one-week period, the participants In Holmes' study
recorded dally pleasant and unpleasant experiences, and rated the
pleasantness and Intensity of affect for each experience. One week
later, participants were asked to recall the experiences, and rate
their present affect toward the experiences originally listed.
Holmes
4(1970) found greater recall of experiences originally considered
pleasant or Intense.
In comparisons of the Initial and final affect ratings of the
events. Holmes found a greater proportion of experiences showing a
decrease In affective Intensity (I.e.. neutralization) than
experiences showing no change or an Increase In Intensity. Moreover,
originally unpleasant experiences were more likely than pleasant or
neutral experiences to become neutralized over time, and experiences
that were affectively neutralized over time were most likely to be
forgotten. In other words, unpleasant personal experiences were more
Hkely to decrease In reported Intensity and become neutral with the
passage of time, and neutral experiences tended to be forgotten.
In addition to life events, other studies have demonstrated
selective recall for pleasant stimuli using subject and
experimenter-generated lists, and a variety of different stimuli (see
Osgood, 1953, and Matlln & Stang, 1978, for reviews of the literature
on selective recall and learning). In a review of evidence regarding
language, word associations, and spew order, Matlln and Stang (1978)
concluded that positive stimuli In general are represented more
frequently and prior to negative stimuli.
Although people may not often be Inspired to generate
spontaneously lists of past events In their lives, people do engage In
retrospection. In the form of reminiscence, for example. Havlghurst
and Glasser (1972) described reminiscence as
(looking) back over our lives, recalling people and events,
thoughts and feelings. Sometimes such recall comes
unbidden, as Idle thoughts or daydreams. Sometimes we
5purposely think back, trying to remember and reconstruct.
Such retrospection, both purposive and spontaneous, may be
called reminiscence, (p. 245)
In this study, participants were not asked, specifically, to judge the
pleasantness of their reminiscences. However, in their descriptions
of the content of their reminiscences, many participants reported that
reminiscence gave them a good feeling, whereas relatively few
participants reported a bad feeling associated with reminiscence.
Moreover, Havighurst and Glasser (1972) found that the frequency and
the pleasantness of reminiscences were significantly correlated;
participants who reported frequent reminiscence tended to describe
their memories as pleasant. Similarly, in a study of reminiscence
among the elderly, McMahon and Rhudick (1967) reported that
reminiscence was associated with less depression among the aged, and
suggested that reminiscence is an adaptive response.
Matlin and Stang (1978) proposed the concept of "selective
rehearsal "--people are more likely to review and rehearse pleasant
inf ormation--and presented evidence of selective rehearsal in a verbal
learning study (Matlin & Underbill, 1978). Extension of this concept
to reminiscence suggests that more frequent reminiscence about
positive past events may account, at least in part, for the greater
recall of positive life experiences.
With nostalgia, recollections of the past may be positively
enhanced or romanticized. Stein (1974) suggested that nostalgia is a
means of coping for a person who perceives the present and the
immediate past to be unpleasant, and who has little hope for
the
future:
6And so we re-1nvent the past, defending against U 1n the
very act of Identification. For nostalgia does not seek the
way things were but the way one wishes they had been. As
the past Is thus Idealized, Interesting accomodations are
made: punishments and the arbitrary authorities one
suffered as a child, and escaped from as an adolescent, are
fondly recalled as hardships gladly endured on the way to
adulthood, (p. 20)
MatUn and Stang ( 1978) Identified daydreaming as another way In which
people may Invent a "pleasant unreality" to compensate for an
unpleasant reality.
Thus, there Is considerable evidence that selective recall
operates In people's recollections of the past: People report that
events In their lives have been predominantly pleasant. Further,
there Is some evidence that reminiscence Is generally pleasant, that
people spend more time thinking about pleasant Information, and that
unpleasant events tend to become neutralized over time and ultimately
forgotten.
Evaluations of the Present
In studies of the quality of life, as well as In many other
social and psychological studies, people are asked to report on their
general happiness, their mood, or their satisfaction with specific
aspects of their lives. Even a brief excursion Into the literature on
happiness, or a review of studies that Include measures of happiness,
mood, or satisfaction suggests that most people describe their lives
as happy.
For example, people are more likely to describe themselves
as
7"highly elated" rather than "highly gloomy" (Young, 1937), and as
"steadily cheerful" rather than "steadily depressed" (Washburn,
Harding, Simon, & Tomllnson, 1925). People report that they are above
average on a scale to measure "how well you are feeling at the present
time" (Bousfleld, 1950), and that "life In general" Is positive
(Burgess & Sales, 1971). Moreover, In comparative evaluations, people
describe themselves as "happier than most" (Goldlngs, 1954), and
"happier than others" (Fellows, 1956). People are also likely to
describe themselves as "optimists" (Laird, 1923; Watson, 1930). In a
more recent study conducted by Matlln (cited 1n Matlln & Stang, 1978),
71% of the members of a class of almost 100 students described
themselves as optimists. After reviewing the research evidence,
Goldlngs (1954) concluded:
On direct Inquiry, In the United States, happiness tends to
be avowed and feelings of unhapplness to be disavowed with
the result that, given a point of average happiness as a
referent, most people will tend to rate their own happiness
as greater than the average, (p. 46)
In studies asking Individuals to make comparative evaluations of
their happiness, the point of reference or comparison Is often
ambiguous, or very general, such as the average person In this
country, or 1n the world. Since the respondents In research are often
college students, they might reasonably judge that they are happier,
or have a better quality of life, than the hypothetical "average
person." However, when Individuals are asked to compare their
feelings with the "average feelings of the class" (Cason, 1932) or to
make dally comparisons of their mood with their own typical
mood
(Johnson, 1937), they report, on average, feeling better than the
8average feelings of the class, or better than they typically feel.
Moreover, studies of people that might be expected to report less
happiness, such as mentally or physically handicapped persons.
Indicate levels of life satisfaction that meet or exceed the levels
reported by normal control subjects (e.g., Cameron, Titus, Kostin, &
Kostin, 1973).
In many studies, happiness Is not the primary dependent measure,
and researchers are concerned with Identifying relationships between
happiness and other variables, rather than assessing the absolute
level of happiness In a population of Interest. However, a number of
large-scale demographic surveys of quality of life have been conducted
during the past two decades. In this research, level and correlates
of happiness have been of primary Interest.
General life happiness . The results of the first national sample
survey of the correlates of happiness were reported by Gurin, Veroff,
and Feld (1960). The first survey administration of this on-going
program of research on "How Americans View their Mental Health"
Included a sample of almost 2500 adults In the United States. More
than a third of the sample of respondents (35%) reported being "very
happy," 54% described themselves as "pretty happy," and 10% reported
that they were "not too happy," the lowest category of happiness
provided. Similar results were obtained In subsequent surveys (e.g.,
Bradburn & Caplovltz, 1965; Bradburn, 1969; Campbell, Converse, 8.
Rodgers, 1976; Watts & Free, 1974). In terms of demographic
correlates, these studies generally Indicate that education and Income
are positively correlated with personal happiness, and that sex Is
not
9a significant correlate; the findings regarding age are conflicting.
However, Matlln and Stang (1978) noted that even among people who
might be expected to report the least happiness, such as people with
little education and a low Income, the majority describe themselves as
"pretty happy" or "very happy."
In an ambitious cross-cultural study of personal aspirations
(Cantrll, 1965), Individuals were Interviewed and asked to Indicate on
a ten-point "ladder" scale where they presently stood from the "worst
possible life for you" to the "best possible life for you." The
average ratings ranged from a high of 6.6 by Americans, to a low of
1.6 by people In the Dominican Republic.^ However, with the
exception of people In the Philippines and the Dominican Republic,
nearly all people regarded their personal present as better than their
personal past.
Specific satisfaction: Marriages and .lobs . In addition to
overall happiness, two major components of life sati sf act1on--mar1tal
and job sati sfact1on--have received considerable attention from
researchers. The literature In each of these areas Is extensive, and
only some highlights will be presented.
In general, people report being happy with both their marriages
and their jobs. The study of "How Americans View their Mental Health"
by Gurin, Veroff, and Feld (1960), described earlier In this section,
devoted a chapter to marital happiness. Among all married
respondents, 47% reported being "very happy," 22% described their
happiness as "above average," 29% as "average," and 3% reported being
"not too happy." Similar findings were reported by Bradburn
and
10
CaplovUz (1965) and Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976).
In their analysis of job satisfaction, Gur1n, Veroff. and Feld
(1960) found that three-quarters of employed men reported satisfaction
with their jobs: 28% indicated that they were "very satisfied," and
49% reported being "satisfied." Of the remainder of the respondents,
only 8% expressed dissatisfaction; 5% were neutral, and 10% were
ambivalent. Subsequent analyses with subsamples indicated that only
31% reported that they had problems at work. In the 1972-1976 General
Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, 50%
or more of the middle and working class women, irrespective of their
labor force status (viz., housewife versus employed), reported being
"very satisfied" with the work they do, with only one exception
(Wright, 1978). Examples of similarly high levels of reported job
satisfaction abound in the literature (e.g., Meltzer, 1965; Quinn &
Shepard, 1974; Quinn 8. Staines, 1978; Staines & Quinn, 1979).
In summary, when asked. Individuals generally report high levels
of life, marital, and job happiness and satisfaction. This review, of
necessity, has been brief, but it illustrates the consistency of
results on reported happiness across a variety of research methods,
subject populations, and measurement techniques. While reported
happiness certainly varies among individuals and groups of people, it
is evident that people typically report that they are happy with their
lives in general, and with major aspects of their lives, such as their
marriages and jobs. The next section will review evidence that such
positive feelings are not restricted to individuals' assessments of
their past and present conditions, but extend to their feelings
about
the future.
Expectations for the Future
People report being quite happy with their present lives, but
there Is evidence that they expect to be even happier In the future.
In Cantrll's (1965) cross-cultural study of Individuals' aspirations,
respondents were asked not only to evaluate their lives at the time of
the Interview, but to assess their lives five years earlier and five
years In the future. Recall that, with few exceptions, people
described their personal present as better than their personal past.
On the ten-point ladder scale from "worst possible life" to "best
possible life for you," personal ratings for the future ranged from a
high of 8.4 among Cubans, to a relative low of 5.1 among Indians.
More Importantly, In every country, the average personal rating for
the future was more positive than ratings of the present: "All people
without exception expect significant Improvement in the future . . .
Hope here seems universal" (Cantril, 1965, pp. 190-191).
These results were replicated by Watts and Free (1973) in
large-scale national surveys conducted in 1971 and 1972. In both
surveys, respondents rated their present lives as better than their
pasts, and they expected their futures to be even better. In a
related question, respondents were asked to compare directly their
present lives with their lives the previous year: 46% described
themselves as better off, 41% as about the same, and only 12%
Indicated that they were worse off than the previous year.
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In addition to expressing positive expectations for the future 1n
general, people seem to have positive expectations about specific
outcomes. For example, each year since 1966, the Laboratory for
Research on Higher Education at the University of California at Los
Angeles, under the sponsorship of the American Council on Education,
has conducted a large-scale survey of freshmen entering colleges and
universities across the country. The questionnaire contains a series
of Items asking the freshmen to estimate the general likelihood that
they will experience specific outcomes, such as graduation with honors
or election to student office. A review of the responses for freshmen
nationally reveals very positive expectations for the future. For
example, among respondents to the 1977 survey, only 1.3% estimated
that there was a "very good" chance that they would drop out of
college temporarily, and only 0.7% expected to leave college
permanently; actual attrition rates are considerably higher, estimated
at between 30%-50% nationwide (Pantages & Creedon, 1978). Similarly,
only 1.8% of the entering freshmen expected to fall one or more
courses, and less than 5% expected to need extra time to complete
their degree. However, the freshmen did judge that their chances were
"very good" that they would achieve at least a "B" average (47.7%),
earn their bachelor's degree (79.9%), and a find a job after college
1n the field for which they were trained (69.9%).
It Is Interesting to note that there may be little or no
correspondence between people's expectations for their personal
futures, and their expectations for the country. Respondents
In
Cantrll's (1965) study were asked to make judgments about the past.
13
present, and future of the country, 1n addition to the evaluations of
their own lives. Among Americans, there was no relationship between
personal and national ratings for the past, present, or future.^
Noting the pessimism and alienation revealed by public opinion polls.
Watts and Free (1973) proposed that
In the United States, the country of Individualism par
excellence
, there Is a sharp distinction In people's minds
between their own personal lives and national life.
Believing that Individuals not only should but can take care
of themselves and stand on their own two feet, Americans
appear not to make a direct connection between their
Individual situations and the conditions of the
nat1on--except In the case of war or severe calamity. As a
result, they find It possible to feel that they as
Individuals can fare well, even though they perceive the
country to be faring poorly, (p. 21)
Thus, even If a feeling of general malaise about the country exists,
people seem able to maintain an expectation of a positive, or at least
Improving, personal future.
People evidence similar beliefs about other, often
uncontrollable, negative life events, such as disease, accidents, and
natural disasters: "It won't happen to me" (e.g., Janof f-Bulman &
Lang-Gunn, In press; Wolfenstein, 1957). In her classic psychological
essay on disaster, Wolfenstein (1957) observed that most people have
an attitude of denial toward remote threats, and a general feeling of
personal Immunity to negative life events. Even when people
acknowledge a threat or danger, they often persist In the belief that
It will not affect them personally.
Paradoxically, Wolfenstein (1957) noted that feelings of personal
Immunity may be especially strong when there Is nothing a person can
do to prevent or avoid an Impending danger. If precautionary measures
14
are available, the threat may be acknowledged to the extent of
exercising precautions. However, when a person does not have
precautions at his or her disposal, the threat will continue to be
denied (cf. Janis, 1951).
It is interesting to note that once a disaster or other negative
event has occurred, victims may interpret the event in a relatively
positive manner. Wolfenstein (1957) observed that a major theme of
post-disaster reactions, particularly among Americans, is the belief
that "we were lucky," in spite of what has happened: "One stresses
what one has rather than what one lacks, and compares oneself with
others who are worse off. . . . The basis for comparison is how much
worse it might have been and how much worse off others are" (pp.
182-183). Post-disaster reactions also include an enhanced awareness
of the good fortune a person has enjoyed in the past, and a confidence
in the future and one's ability to overcome the misfortune. The
feeling that "we were lucky" is usually accompanied by a feeling that
one does not have "the right" to complain if others have suffered
greater misfortune.
The acute awareness of one's fortune compared with others is also
evident in another paradox in post-disaster reactions--survi vor guilt
(Janoff-Bulman 8. Lang-Gunn, in press; Wolfenstein, 1957). Survivor
guilt has been observed in victims of disasters, and in survivors of
Hiroshima (Lifton, 1971; Nagai, 1951) and World War II concentration
camps (Chodoff. 1970; Lifton, 1967). Wolfenstein (1957), in her
discussion of the aftermath of disasters, reported that survivors
often "blame themselves for not having done enough for
those who
15
perished.
. .
the survivor feels guilty for not having died Instead of
his loved ones, or In an effort to save them" (p. 216). Thus,
although most people may expect personal Immunity to, or at least
survival of negative events, the fulfillment of their expectations may
produce feelings of guilt or self-blame.
Positive expectations for the future. Including feelings of
personal Immunity to negative outcomes, are especially evident In
health-related attitudes and behaviors. Parsons (1951) argued that
people are "motivated to underestimate the chances of their falling
111, especially seriously 111" (p. 443). Further, If people do become
111, they are unreallstlcally biased toward confidence that
"everything will be all right," and they overestimate the likelihood
of a rapid and complete recovery.
In a study by Lang-Gunn (Note 1), respondents judged themselves
to be far less likely than the "average person" to develop any of a
number of diseases. Including pneumonia, diabetes, and leukemia.
Likewise, Kirscht, Haefner, Kegeles, and Rosenstock (1966) found that
people regarded themselves as less susceptible than others to cancer,
tuberculosis, and dental disease. Such feelings of relative
Invulnerability to serious health problems may have Important
Implications, such as an Increased likelihood of taking health-related
risks.
When symptoms of Illness do occur, a person may attempt to
"normalize" the symptoms by Interpreting them within a minimally
threatening explanatory framework (Davis, 1963; Mechanic, 1972).
Attempts at normalization may persist until the symptoms subside, or
16
until the symptoms can no longer be explained within a conventional
framework, and the Individual Is forced to acknowledge the possibility
of serious Illness. Even after acknowledging the possibility of
Illness, a person may delay In seeking medical care (e.g., Antonovsky
& Hartman, 1974; Clements & Wakefield, 1972), preferring uncertainty
about the future to confirmation of serious Illness.
Even after a serious Illness has been confirmed, people may deny
the diagnosis or prognosis of the Illness. For example, research
Indicates that the parents of children who are disabled or dying have
strong tendencies to deny the prognosis. In a study of the families
of children with polio, Davis (1963) found that some parents refused
to recognize their child's handicap. Similarly, observations of the
parents of dying children suggest that It Is not uncommon for parents
to deny the prognosis, and to maintain hope and belief In discovery of
a cure until the end (e.g., Friedman, Chodoff, Mason, & Hamburg, 1977).
In a correlational study designed to demonstrate "unrealistic
optimism" about future life events, Welnstein (1980) asked students to
estimate their chances of experiencing different events compared to
the chances of their classmates. In general, the respondents judged
their own chances to be above average for positive events, and below
average for negative events. An examination of the effects of the
perceived characteristics of the events Indicated that respondents
were more likely to express optimism about negative events when the
events were perceived as controllable; for positive events, there was
no correlation between perceived controllability and optimism.
Degree
of desirability and perceived probability were positively
related to
17
optimism about positive events, but did not affect the degree of
optimism about negative events. In addition to perceived
controllability, optimism about negative events was related to
personal experience and the salience of a "stereotype" or high chance
group. Welnstein (1980) concluded that an optimistic bias will occur,
for both positive and negative outcomes, when two conditions are met:
The event Is perceived to be controllable, and people have some degree
of commitment or emotional Investment In the outcome.
Welnstein (1980) argued that unrealistic optimism may be a result
of Incomplete or Inaccurate Information about others. In a second
study, students made written lists of factors that Increase or
decrease the likelihood that specific events would happen to them, and
some students were given copies of the lists constructed by other
students. Optimism about negative events was reduced, but not
eliminated, by providing Information about the attributes and actions
of other people. For positive events, relative optimism was reduced
by the act of listing factors Influencing one's own chances; knowledge
about others did not further reduce optimism. Welnstein (1980)
concluded that enhanced awareness by an Individual about their own or
others' circumstances can reduce the degree of unrealistic optimism,
but that there are other, more persistent, sources of optimism that
cannot be eliminated by simply encouraging people to carefully
consider their comparative Judgments, or by providing them with
Information about others.
In a recent follow-up study, Welnstein and Lachendro (1982)
Investigated egocentrism as a source of unrealistic optimism.
This
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study was designed to determine whether the reduction In optimism
about negative events following exposure to lists of reasons generated
by others was a result of new Information about the risk status of
others, or simply the act of adopting the perspective of others. The
results again demonstrated an optimistic bias, and the degree of
optimism was reduced slightly by reading the risk-factor lists of
others or preparing a list from the perspective of a "typical student"
at the college. However, there was no difference In the optimism
expressed by students In the "Information" and "perspective"
conditions. Welnstein and Lachendro (1982) concluded that optimism
about oneself relative to others does not result from a lack of
Information about the attributes and actions of others, but from
egocentric tendenc1es--fa1 lure to think carefully about the
circumstances of others.
In another study of optimistic biases, Ross (Note 2) asked
respondents to make judgments about a list of Illnesses and major life
events. Group comparisons of the responses for self or
other-likelihood of experiencing each event revealed that the ratings
of the likelihood for oneself were lower than the ratings of the
likelihood for another person for each of 20 Illnesses. Ross (Note 2)
also reported negative correlations between the perceived severity of
Illness or undesi rabi 1 Ity of life events and the likelihood ratings:
As the severity of an Illness or the undesi rabi 1 Ity of a life event
Increased, the perceived likelihood of It occurring to oneself or
another person decreased. Using general estimates of the actual
prevalence of the Illnesses, positive correlations between
actual
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prevalence and self and other-1 1kel 1hood ratings were observed.
In summary, people seem to expect that their personal futures
will be positive, In general, and In terms of specific outcomes.
People expect to achieve (or experience) positive outcomes, and
consider themselves to be relatively Invulnerable to negative life
events, such as disasters and disease. Although people may not expect
to be entirely happy In the future, almost everyone believes that
their future will be better than their past and present. Moreover,
people believe that they are more likely than others to experience
positive events, and less likely to experience negative events. In
the following sections, these phenomena will be examined In terms of
sodal-psychologlcal theory and research.
Social Psychological Perspectives
Social psychologists have long been Interested In the efforts of
Individuals to make sense of the world, to Interpret and assign
meaning to events In everyday experience (e.g., Asch, 1952; Helder,
1944, 1958). From a social psychological perspective. Individuals are
assumed to be Involved, more or less continuously. In attempts to
understand the behavior and events they encounter dally, and social
psychological theory and research have Identified cognitive and
motivational processes that affect the ways In which Individuals
perceive the world and explain events In their lives. The following
sections will review theoretical formulations and empirical
evidence
that contribute to an understanding of personal
expectations and
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optimism about the future.
Explanation and Prediction
Of the many and varied judgment tasks confronting the Individual,
two tasks are especially relevant to the development of expectations
about the f uture--causal judgment and the prediction of behavior and
outcomes. In forming a causal judgment, the Individual attempts to
Identify one or more causes to which a particular effect--an action or
outcome--can be reasonably attributed. In addition to seeking causal
explanations of events, the Individual forms expectations and makes
predictions In an effort to anticipate future outcomes and events.
Clearly, these two tasks are related; explanations for an event
provide an Important basis for the prediction of unknown future events.
Until recently, the primary, and almost exclusive focus of
theoretical and empirical Inquiry has been causal judgment and other
Inferential tasks. The task of prediction, studied Intensively by
judgment researchers, has only recently begun to receive attention
from cognitive social psychologists (e.g., Ross, 1977). Fischhoff
(1976), In an early attempt to Integrate the two areas of Inquiry,
noted the need for research aimed at specifying and clarifying the
formal and psychological relationships between explanation and
prediction. Generally, researchers In both areas acknowledge the
interrelationship of explanation and prediction, perceive similarities
1n the processes underlying the two types of tasks, and regard each
task as having Important Informational consequences for
the other
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(e.g., Kelley, 1972; Welner, Freize, Kukla. Reed, Rest, 8. Rosenbaum,
1971). The following section will describe two areas of attribution
research which emphasize the consequences of an explanation for the
Individual's beliefs and expectations for the future.
Attributions for positive and negative outcomes . Social
psychological research on lay explanation and attribution has revealed
a positive orientation 1n the perception and explanation of personal
outcomes and events. Although the roles of cognitive and motivational
factors In attribution continues to be a major source of debate (e.g.,
Gunn, Note 3; Miller & Ross, 1975; Ross, 1977), research has
demonstrated numerous Instances of a positive "bias" In the
explanation of events—attributions that appear to maintain or enhance
a positive view of oneself or the world. Two areas of Inquiry, In
particular, have consistently shown an asymmetry In attribution for
positive and negative outcomes--explanat1ons for achievement outcomes,
and attributions of responsibility for misfortune.
Research on attributions for success or failure has revealed a
general tendency of Individuals to attribute success at a task to
their own personal characteristics, and to attribute failure to an
external situational or environmental factor (e.g.. Feather, 1969;
Streufert & Streufert, 1969; Welner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, &
Rosenbaum. 1971; Wortman, Costanzo, 8. Witt, 1973). In general, people
tend to perceive success as Internal and stable and, thus, as an
outcome llkelv to be repeated In the future . Failure, In contrast, 1s
perceived as external and unstable, and therefore as an outcome not
likely to recur. In addition to the positive affective consequences
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(e.g., pride) of this general pattern of attribution for achievement
outcomes, such attributions have the consequence of promoting
expectations for future success.
Research on reactions to victimization also suggests that
attributions are Influenced by an Individual's need to maintain
fundamental beliefs about the world and positive expectations for his
or her personal future. Knowledge of suffering, especially undeserved
suffering, poses a potential threat to the perception of the world as
safe and predictable. The Interpretations and attributions people
make about another's misfortune will be Influenced by their beliefs
about the world, and by the Implications for their own future of their
explanations of others' misfortune.
The "just world hypothesis" posited by Lerner and his colleagues
(Lerner, 1965, 1970, 1971; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner & Miller,
1978; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) proposes that Individuals have a
fundamental need or desire to believe In a "just" world--a relatively
stable and predictable world where people "get what they deserve and
deserve what they get." According to the just world hypothesis, the
Interpetatlons people make of events In their lives serve, at least In
part, to maintain this fundamental belief In the world as an orderly,
stable, and predictable place. By believing that those who suffer
somehow deserve their fates, the world seems more predictable and
just, and people can maintain a feeling of relative Invulnerability to
undeserved suffering themselves (cf. Walster, 1966; Wortman, 1976).
Victims are judged to deserve their fate as a consequence of their
actions or their character. That Is, the suffering Is not unjust If
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the victim Is regarded as behavlorally responsible for his or her own
suffering (e.g., having engaged 1n a careless act) or, 1f Innocent by
deed, because the victim has undesirable personal attributes.
Research evidence generally supports the just world hypothesis and Its
limiting conditions (e.g., Landy & Aronson, 1969; Lerner & Matthews,
1967; Lerner 8. Simmons, 1966; Rubin & Peplau, 1973; Shaw & Skolnick,
1971; see Lerner & Miller, 1978, for a review).
A similar hypothesis regarding observers' perceptions and
attributions about victims was advanced by Walster (1966), who
emphasized a desire for perceived control, rather than justice, as the
motivation for blaming people who experience misfortune. Walster
(1966) proposed that people do not want to believe that severe
negative events can happen at random, since this belief Implies that
they could become victims of similar, unavoidable misfortunes. Rather
than acknowledging their own vulnerability by conceding that a similar
negative event could happen to them, observers will tend to blame a
person Involved In the event:
As the magnitude of the misfortune Increases ... It
becomes more and more unpleasant to acknowledge that "this
Is the kind of a thing that could happen to anyone." . . .
If a serious accident Is seen as the consequence of an
unpredictable set of circumstances, beyond anyone's control
or anticipation, a person Is forced to concede the
catastrophe could happen to him. If, however, he decides
that the event was a predictable, controllable one. If he
decides that someone was responsible for the unpleasant
event, he should feel somewhat more able to avert such a
disaster. (Walster, 1966, p. 74)
Thus, according to Walster (1966), reactions to misfortune are
Influenced by observers' desire to view the negative event as a result
of controllable, or at least avoidable factors, so that they can avert
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the recurrence of a similar misfortune to themselves. By attributing
responsibility for a negative outcome to a person, observers can
reassure themselves that their futures will not Include similar
misfortune.
In some cases, victims may join observers In blaming their own
behavior for the misfortune. In an effort to make sense of the event,
and maintain a belief In a Just or controllable world. Like
observers, victims of misfortune may prefer to believe that they were
somehow responsible for the misfortune, than to believe that they were
singled out for misfortune In a random, arbitrary fashion (e.g.,
Bulman & Wortman, 1977). Self-blame by victims has been observed In
studies of accident, disease, and disaster victims, and Is documented
In the clinical literature ( Janof f-Bulman & Lang-Gunn, In press). In
extending the just world hypothesis to Include the reactions of
victims as well as observers, Lerner and Miller (1978) concluded that
"people will alter their conceptual system. In this case their
perception of their own worth, to Impose order and justice on random
events In their lives" (p. 1044).
An alternative motivation which may Influence observers'
reactions to victims has been proposed by Shaver (1970, 1975).
Shaver's "defensive attribution" hypothesis proposes that people are
also strongly motivated to protect their self-esteem. To maintain a
belief In a relatively safe and predictable world, people may often
blame the victim rather than attribute the misfortune to chance.
However, If observers acknowledge the possibility of being In the same
situation as the victim, blaming or derogating the victim might
Imply
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that they would also be held responsible If they were to experience a
similar misfortune. Thus, according to the defensive attribution
hypothesis, the more observers believe that they could experience a
fate similar to the victim's, the greater their motivation to
attribute the event to chance, rather than the victim, in an effort to
protect themselves from possible future blame. Shaver (1970, 1975)
suggested that when outcomes are severe, observers will prefer to
believe in an arbitrary and capricious world than to believe that they
might be blamed for a similar outcome in the future.
Identification with the victim, in terms of a perceived common
fate (Lerner & Miller, 1978) or situational similarity (Shaver, 1970),
is believed to heighten observers' feelings of vulnerability, and to
increase the likelihood of the reactions hypothesized by the just
world, control, and defensive attribution formulations. The more
likely observers perceive their own victimization to be, the more
threatening the negative event, and the greater the motivation to
preserve a belief in justice (Lerner & Miller, 1978) or
controllability (Walster, 1966), or to protect oneself from possible
future blame (Shaver, 1970). As Shaver (1975) noted, there is "a
desire on the part of the perceiver to make whatever attributions best
reduce the threat posed by the situation" (p. 110). Although the
three formulations posit different motivations that may influence an
individual's attributions about an outcome or event, they agree that
self-protective motivations may affect attributions of responsibility
for an outcome, and that the future implications of a judgment about
an outcome are Important to the individual.
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Other theoretical orientations also emphasize the Individual's
need or desire to predict and control the future. The notion that
people strive for mastery or control of their environments has been
the cornerstone of many psychological theories (e.g., de Charms, 1968;
Helder, 1958; Kelly, 1955; White, 1959), and has played a central role
In theories of attribution processes. Indeed, Kelley (1971) has
argued that the purpose of attribution, the reason people seek to
explain events. Is to understand and effectively control their
environments. Further, Kelley (1971) proposed that causal judgments
will tend to be biased toward controllable factors--factors that offer
the Individual the possibility of future control.
The role of a need or desire for personal control In attribution
processes was extensively considered by Wortman (1976). In her review
of relevant theory and research, Wortman (1976) found a substantial
amount of evidence consistent with the view that people make
attributions In order to enhance their feelings of control over the
environment. However, she noted that much of the evidence supporting
a "need for control" Is also consistent with other theoretical
frameworks, such as a need for justice or a desire for meaning and
rationality.
The research on attributions for achievement outcomes and
misfortune suggests that Individuals may generally Interpret Important
positive or negative outcomes In a manner that systematically promotes
positive expectations for the future. This may be a relatively
accurate reflection of the Individual's past experience and learning,
and an unintended product of the attribution process. That
Is,
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positive outcomes are generally Intended, and may actually occur more
frequently than negative outcomes (Kanouse 8. Hanson, 1971). Thus,
attributions that imply positive future outcomes may simply reflect
the individual's Intentions and prior experience (cf. Ickes 8. Layden,
1978; Miller & Ross, 1975).
Alternatively, attributions may be influenced by individuals'
needs or desires (Heider, 1944, 1958). Individuals may be motivated
to explain outcomes with reasons that are congruent with their views
of themselves and the world, and their wishes and expectations for the
future. Heider asserted that an attribution that "makes sense" to an
Individual must satisfy two cr1ter1a--the plausibility or rationality
of the explanation, and the "personal acceptability" of the
explanation, in terms of the Individual's needs, wishes, and values:
"From (the) possible underlying causes the one will be selected that
best fits the ideas and wishes the person has about himself and
others" (p. 172).
Implicit in these various theoretical statements is the
fundamental assumption that people desire positive outcomes. Belief
in a just or controllable world is important because it reassures the
individual that he or she can avoid negative outcomes and obtain
positive outcomes, as a result of deservingness or mastery over the
environment, for example. Thus, when confronted with knowledge of an
outcome that is important to the Individual, the person will be
motivated to understand, through a process of attribution, how or why
the particular outcome occurred. Moreover, the understanding the
individual achieves, and the specific attributions made, may be
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Influenced by the Individual's desire for positive outcomes In the
future. Attribution to factors that can be avoided or controlled
offers the Individual the possibility of future control and, thus,
determination of his or her own future outcomes.
In short, what these various theoretical orientations share Is
the often unstated assumption that people desire positive outcomes,
and that this desire may Influence the understandings and attributions
people make about events In their lives. People do not engage In
causal analysis, or make particular attributions, simply for the sake
of maintaining a belief In a just or controllable world. Ultimately,
all of these various motivations serve the same end: They maintain or
enhance the belief that one will obtain the outcomes he or she
desires. To Individuals, the significance of perceived justice In
the world, or the effective exercise of control over the environment.
Is the Implication that they will avoid negative outcomes and obtain
the outcomes they desire. In this manner, causal attributions can
promote positive expectations for the future.
The desire for positive outcomes can be viewed as simply a
restatement of the pleasure principle, or as the result of general
cognitive tendencies, such as cognitive balance. Helder's (1958)
general principle of cognitive balance Involves three main
concepts--un1t formation, sentiments, and balanced state. Briefly,
separate entitles (e.g., people, objects, outcomes) comprise a unit,
according to Helder, when they are perceived as associated or
"belonging together." Sentiments refer to a positive or negative
valuation attached to entitles. A balanced state denotes "a situation
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1n which the perceived units and experienced sentiments co-exist
without stress" (p. 176), and Is obtained, for example, when the unit
and sentiment relationships between two entitles are both positive or
both negative. Balance theory states that unit and sentiment
relationships will tend toward a balanced state.
Given that people, by definition, like positive outcomes and
dislike negative outcomes, balance theory suggests that "one will tend
to perceive positive outcomes as belonging to self but not negative
ones" (Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfleld, 1978, pp. 109-110). In
addition, the principle of cognitive balance can provide a
parsimonious account of several of the phenomena described earlier,
Including the tendency to take credit for good outcomes and deny blame
for bad ones (I.e., a change In unit relationship), and the tendency
to reinterpret negative outcomes In a positive light (I.e., a change
In sentiment). Moreover, this principle might be extended to account
In part for the selective recall of positive life experiences, and the
expectation of positive outcomes In the future. Similar
Interpretations can be derived from cognitive dissonance theory
(Festlnger, 1957).
It Is Important to note that the balance that exists when a
person desires and obtains a positive outcome presupposes a positive
attitude toward oneself (Helder, 1958). If a person has a negative
self-image, then the attainment of a positive outcome creates an
"Imbalanced" (or "unjust") state. By extension, the person with a
negative attitude toward him or herself may not have positive
expectations for the future. This Important exception will considered
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1n a later discussion of the consequences of optimism.
In summary, the attributions people make about their own or
others' outcomes often appear to systematically promote positive
expectations for the future. This asymmetry In explanations for
positive and negative outcomes may result from the direct Influence of
a person's wishes for the future on their explanations of past or
present events, or Indirectly, as the ultimate goal of various
motivations (e.g., control) that may Influence the attribution
process. Alternatively, the reinforcement of positive expectations
may be an unintended product of attributions which reflect an
Individual's Intentions and prior experience. Including perceived
associations between behaviors and outcomes.
Expectations for positive and negative outcomes . Some research
also suggests that Individuals' expectations are Influenced directly
by their wishes and desires. "Wishful thinking" occurs when the
judged likelihood of an event Increases with the perceived
desirability of the event (McGuIre, 1960). In Helder's words, "In
wishful thinking, reality, as we see It, Is assimilated to our wants"
(1958, p. 235). Studies Indicate that people tend to believe that
favorable events are more likely to occur than unfavorable events
(e.g., Irwin, 1953; Marks, 1951), and their predictions about events
often appear to coincide with their personal preferences (e.g.,
Cantrll, 1938; Lund, 1925; McGregor, 1938; McGuIre, 1960).
Studies by Marks (1951) and Irwin (1953) Indicated that people's
stated expectations are significantly affected by the desirability, as
well as the actual probability, of an outcome. In the first study.
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Marks (1951) asked children to state whether they expected to draw a
picture card from a deck of ten cards containing blank and picture
cards. The actual probability was manipulated by varying the number
of picture cards In each deck. Prior to each "game," the probability
was specified, and a picture card was defined as desirable or
undesirable, 1n terms of game points. The results revealed that
stated expectations generally Increased with actual probability, and
that desirability of the outcome had a strong effect on expectations.
Subjects tended to expect the desirable outcome, even when the actual
probability was low.
The results of the effect of outcome desirability on stated
expectations were extended to adults by Irwin (1953). In addition,
Irwin (1953) examined Individual's confidence In their stated
expectations. Again, the results revealed that the probability of the
outcome Influenced expectations, although "Irrational" responses were
observed (e.g., expecting an outcome with a probability less than
.5). The effect of outcome desirability on expectations was
replicated, although the strength of the effect was weaker among these
adult subjects. A desirable outcome (I.e., card) was expected more
frequently than an undesirable outcome, and this effect was most
pronounced when the actual probability was .5. However, contrary to
the hypothesis, the expectation of desirable outcomes was not
associated with a decrease In subjects' confidence In their
expectations. In fact, Irwin (1953) reported some evidence of
Increased confidence 1n expectations for desirable outcomes.
In a study of the relationship between belief and desire, Lund
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(1925) asked respondents to rate their belief strength, certainty, and
the desirability of thirty propositions (e.g., "Do only the good die
young?"; "Will our Republic continue to exist 100 years from now?").
The results yielded large and consistent positive correlations between
belief and desire. Lund (1925) concluded that there is a strong
emotional component to belief, and suggested that beliefs are often
"wish-realizations--we believe what we want to believe" (p. 80).
A study of the relationship between desire and predictions was
conducted by Cantril (1938). In this study, respondents were asked to
make predictive judgments about fifteen social and political events
(e.g., the likelihood of a major economic depression in the U. S.; the
outcome of the Spanish Civil War). In addition to the predictive
judgments, attitude measures were Included to investigate the role of
"wish fulfillment." The results indicated that people tended to
forecast outcomes that they desired. In his interpretation of the
results, Cantril (1938) suggested that
If no external structuration Is given to provide a frame of
reference for prediction, then a relevant Internal frame of
reference will give structure to the social stimuli and
determine the prediction. Where no external structuration
is apparent, uniformity of predictive judgments is
proportional to the similarity of the internal
structurations of the individuals involved. . . . Whenever
the prediction of a social event Is based wholly or in part
upon an internal frame of reference, objectivity is rare, if
not impossible, because of ego-involvement, (pp. 387-388)
This analysis suggests that individuals will rely on their
attitudes or desires In predicting an outcome to the extent that the
relevant, objective, external factors are unknown, ambiguous, or
complex. Moreover, individuals will make similar predictions or
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develop similar expectations when their attitudes, values, or desires
are shared. Thus, If greater consensus exists In the evaluation of
negative outcomes, for example, there may be greater uniformity In
Individuals' expectations about negative outcomes, especially when the
causes of those outcomes are relatively ambiguous.
The significance of ambiguity and uncertainty In the prediction
of future outcomes was also emphasized by McGregor (1938).
Respondents were asked to make predictions about nine events (e.g.,
whether Roosevelt would be re-elected; whether there would be a major
European war w1th1n a year), and to report their attitudes and desires
concerning the events. The results Indicated that Individuals'
desires strongly Influenced their predictions only when the outcome
was very uncertain or ambiguous. McGregor (1938) suggested that
reduced ambiguity about a situation also reduced Individuals'
opportunities to select from among the available "facts" those facts
consistent with their desires.
McGregor (1938) argued that previous studies which reported a
significant relationship between beliefs and desires Involved
ambiguous events, and thus greatly underestimated the constraint
Imposed on Individuals' beliefs by external reality: "Subjective
factors do not operate with complete freedom. They are subject to
external constraint. The Individual lives not 1n a vacuum, but In a
world of real events. . . . Regardless of our desires, we do 'face
reality' to some extent" (p. 182). However, when the stimulus
situation Is completely uncertain or unambiguous, McGregor (1938)
argued, the influence of subjective factors will be almost
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unrestricted
.
In addition to the ambiguity of the situation, McGregor (1938)
suggested that the Influence of "wishful thinking" and subjective
factors will also depend upon the Intensity of the Individual's wishes
or desires:
If his own welfare, or pride, or ethical Ideals are
Involved, we may expect the Intensity of his wishes
concerning the outcome of the situation to be greater than
when the situation and Its outcome are relatively remote
from his personal life. Importance Is a subjective
factor--the degree to which the Individual Is personally
concerned over the outcome of the situation; the extent to
which his ego Is Involved. (pp. 189-190)
Thus, McGregor (1938) proposed that the two factors determining
the relative Influence of the stimulus situation and subjective
factors are the degree of ambiguity of the stimulus situation, and the
Importance of the outcome to the Individual. Of these two factors,
McGregor (1938) argued that Importance will have a greater Impact on
predictions
:
The Influence of Importance In the determination of
prediction should not be underestimated. When the outcome
of the situation Is of vital concern to the predictor, even
a slight degree of ambiguity of the stimulus situation
provides opportunity for wishes to operate. The factor of
Importance, therefore, 1s probably the more heavily weighted
of these two determining factors, (p. 192)
In the present context, this analysis suggests that subjective
factors, such as wishes and desires, are likely to Influence
Individuals' predictions about the likelihood of experiencing specific
positive and negative outcomes. Compared to predictions of social
events or the outcomes of others. Importance, or ego-Involvement,
should be greatest when Individuals consider their own future
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outcomes. Moreover, many outcomes and life events experienced by
individuals are highly unpredictable and uncertain.
In summary, these studies Indicate that the asymmetry In
Individuals' explanations of positive and negative outcomes extends to
their expectations about future events. People appear to judge
positive events as more likely than negative events, and their
predictions about events often correspond to their wishes or desires.
However, like their explanations, people's expectations about their
own future outcomes may be Influenced by cognitive as well as
motivational factors. The anticipation of future outcomes, like the
interpretation of past outcomes, may reflect Individuals' Intentions
and prior experience, and an actual or perceived contingency between
their intentions and actions and their outcomes.
The Illusion of Contingency
Research on judgments about the relationship between events
indicates that people have difficulty assessing correlation or
covariation. People generally do not recognize randomness (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1972), and events or outcomes that occur together by chance
are often Inaccurately judged to be related. In addition, an
individual's a priori beliefs about the relationship between events
may have a significant Influence on judgments of the actual
relationship between events, even when no relationship, or a negative
relationship, exists.
Evidence that people may perceive an illusory co rrelation between
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two events was reported by Chapman (1967) and Chapman and Chapman
(1967, 1969). In an Initial study using word associations, Chapman
(1967) found that subjects overestimated the frequency of association
of pairs of related words (e.g., lion-tiger), compared to pairs of
unrelated words (e.g., lion-eggs) that occurred with the same
frequency. Chapman and Chapman (1967, 1969) extended this finding to
the task of clinical diagnosis and judgment. In an effort to
understand the persistent use of diagnostic tests that lack validity,
these investigators conducted an interesting set of experiments in
which clinically naive subjects were presented with randomly paired
clinical test responses and diagnoses for hypothetical patients. In
evaluations of the frequency with which various responses and
diagnoses were associated, subjects markedly overestimated the
co-occurrence of response-diagnosis pairs that were independently
judged to be related.
Chapman and Chapman (1967, 1969) suggested that these results
occurred because clinicians and laypersons have implicit, a priori
beliefs or hypotheses about the relationship between particular test
responses (e.g., a particular type of drawing on the Draw-A-Person
test) and specific psychological problems. Prior beliefs about the
relationship between responses and diagnoses Influenced subjects'
judgments even with repeated exposure to the materials, and with
monetary inducements for making accurate judgments. Moreover, the
illusory correlation effect occurred when the actual correlation was
negative, and subjects failed to detect correlations that were in fact
present in the test materials. The illusory correlation effect has
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been replicated using different clinical test materials (Starr &
Katkin, 1969), and with Judgments of the relationships among different
personality traits (Berman & Kenny, 1976).
Other failures of people to judge the actual degree of
relationship between two outcomes or events have been reported by
Smedslund (1963) and by Ward and Jenkins (1965). For example,
Smedslund (1963) presented nurses with symptoms and diagnoses paired
on cards, and Instructed them to determine whether a particular
symptom and diagnosis were associated. The results revealed that the
nurses' judgments were not related to the actual relationship between
the symptom and diagnosis. However, there was a substantial
correlation between the frequency with which the symptom and diagnosis
appeared together, and the number of subjects who judged that the
symptom and diagnosis were related. Apparently, In their judgments of
the relationship between symptom and diagnosis, the nurses were
Influenced only by those Instances In which the relationship was
confirmed by the presence of both the symptom and the diagnosis.
Research by Jenkins and Ward (1965) suggests that people are also
Inaccurate In judging the contingency between their own behavioral
responses and subsequent outcomes. In a series of experiments,
Jenkins and Ward (1965) Investigated subjects' judgments of
contingency between two possible responses and two outcomes.
Hypothesizing that subjects would perceive a contingency between their
responses and outcomes If one of the outcomes was more desirable and
appeared with greater frequency, the Investigators varied the relative
desirability of the outcomes ("score" or "no score" versus two neutral
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symbols), and the actual relationship between responses and outcomes
(a range from no control to perfect control). For each of the problem
sets, subjects pressed one of two response buttons for 60 trials, and
judged the degree of control they had over the outcomes. The results
revealed that the judged degree of contingency between responses and
outcomes was unrelated to the actual degree of contingency, regardless
of the relative desirability of the outcomes or the role of the
subject (actor or observer). However, subjects' judgments of
contingency, as predicted, were positively correlated with the
frequency of the desired outcome. Even when subjects had no control
and the desired outcomes occurred very infrequently, almost half of
the subjects judged that they had some control over the outcome.
These studies indicate that people make Inaccurate judgments
about the relationship between events and, more Importantly, about the
contingency between their actions and subsequent outcomes. People may
perceive a relationship where no relationship exists, and when events
(or behaviors and outcomes) do covary, people seem to disregard the
possibility that the association occurred by chance. Moreover, the
beliefs people develop about the relationship between events or
behaviors and outcomes appear to be persistent and relatively
impervious to contradictory information, including evidence of a
negative relationship, or the absence of any relationship. In short,
the co-occurrence of events, albeit by chance, is regarded as evidence
of a relationship, whereas the absence of covariation between events
does not appear to Influence people's judgments about the actual
relationship (cf. Kelley, 1967, 1971; Ross, 1977).
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Thus, 1f people sometimes obtain the outcomes they desire, they
are likely to perceive a contingency between their Intentions or
actions and the outcomes they receive, and to regard the occurrence of
the outcome as evidence of their ability to produce desired outcomes
(cf. Helder, 1958; Wortman, 1976). Moreover, Instances In which
people fall to achieve a desired outcome are not likely to Influence
an Individual's Illusion of contingency between Intentions and
outcomes, since people tend to neglect the Informational value of
non-occurrences. As a result, even the occasional attainment of
desired outcomes may promote the conviction that a person can
generally produce the outcomes he or she desires.
As noted previously, an Illusion of correlation or contingency
between a person's Intentions or actions and their outcomes provides
an alternative to motivational Interpretations for asymmetries In the
explanation of positive and negative outcomes. Including success and
failure (Miller & Ross, 1975; Ross, 1977). Success, and positive
outcomes In general, are likely to be anticipated and consistent with
an Individual's past experience (or recollection of the past). In
addition, positive outcomes are generally Intended, and are the object
of a person's plans and efforts, whereas negative outcomes are usually
unanticipated and unintended events that occur despite a person's
Intentions or actions. Based on a judged relationship between
Intentions and outcomes, and prior experience, people are likely to
attribute positive outcomes to themselves, and to explain unintended
negative outcomes In terms of situational or environmental factors.
Similar effects of Individuals' judgments of contingency between
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their responses and their outcomes have been proposed by Kelley (1967,
1971). Kelley's "covariation principle" states that Individuals will
attribute an effect (e.g., an event, outcome, behavior) to a factor
with which It covarles. This suggests that people rely on evidence of
covariation between their behavior and their outcomes to make
judgments of causality. If people change their behavior and observe a
change In the environment, they will likely attribute causality to
themselves. This analysis applies to both Intended and unintended
outcomes, although people may be less aware of changes In their
behavior that produce unintended outcomes.
Clearly, an Illusion of contingency between one's Intentions or
behaviors and one's outcomes 1s likely to promote positive
expectations for the future. To the extent that people believe that
their outcomes are determined by their Intentions and actions, they
should expect to achieve the outcomes they desire. Failure to produce
desired outcomes In the past and present Is not likely to be regarded
as evidence of the weakness or absence of a relationship between
Intentions and outcomes, but rather as not Informative or as evidence
that one simply did not try hard enough to produce the desired
outcome(s). Thus, an Illusion of contingency between one's Intentions
and outcomes would appear to give people substantial basis for
optimism about the future.
Belief In a just world also denies the operation of chance and
reflects a failure to judge a lack of contingency between behavior and
outcomes. Justice may specify a contingency between a particular
action and outcome, as well as a more general contingency between
41
one's character and actions and one's outcomes (Helder, 1958). Even
1f people acknowledge that many negative life events are beyond an
Individual's direct control to prevent or avoid, they may, as the just
world hypothesis suggests, perceive a more general contingency between
an Individual's conduct and his or her outcomes. If most people
perceive their past outcomes as generally positive, and believe that
they deserved such outcomes because they have been (or have tried to
be) a "good" person, then they likely expect future outcomes will also
depend on their general character and conduct.
Indeed, there Is some evidence to Indicate that people may
attempt to control future outcomes by engaging In "good" acts (e.g.,
Janis, 1951; Kubler-Ross, 1969). Janis (1951). for example, has
suggested that "people who are facing the prospect of Illness,
unemployment, or any extreme form of deprivation, will often attempt
to ward off the danger by making sure that they do not deserve to be
punished" (p. 169). Thus, a more general Illusion of contingency,
such as the relationships specified by the concept of justice, also
offers the Individual some measure of perceived control over future
outcomes, both positive and negative (cf. Kushner, 1981), and reduces
the need for concern or worry about negative events that might occur
at any time by chance.
In summary, research evidence suggests that people generally do
not recognize randomness, and that they perceive contingencies between
random events. People perceive relationships among unrelated events,
including their Intentions and desired outcomes that occur by
chance. Moreover, people do not generally regard failures to obtain
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desired outcomes as evidence dUconf irmlng a relationship between
their Intention or action and their outcomes. These Inaccuracies In
judgment are likely to promote a conviction that one can determine his
or her own outcomes, and this belief provides a substantial basis for
optimism about the future.
The Illusion of Control
Individuals' judgments not only reveal an "Illusion of
contingency" about events that occur together by chance, they also
evidence a belief In the ability to control, or at least Influence,
chance events. Sociological studies have provided some observational
evidence that people regard chance events as controllable. Henslln
(1967), for example, conducted a participant-observer study of
crapshooters , and noted that crapshooters believe that concentration,
effort, and confidence enhance a shooter's control over the outcome of
a dice toss. Other beliefs about throwing techniques (e.g., a hard
throw will produce high numbers) and betting strategies also revealed
a perception of control over the outcome. Similarly, Goffman (1967)
studied gambling practices and observed that Las Vegas dealers were at
risk of losing their jobs during runs of bad luck.
Experimental evidence of an "Illusion of control" was provided In
an Interesting set of studies by Langer (1975). An Illusion of
control was defined by Langer as "an expectancy of a personal success
probability Inappropriately higher than the objective probability
would warrant" (p. 313). Langer surmised that an Illusion of control
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over chance events could be induced by Introducing characteristics of
a skin situation, such as choice, familiarity. Involvement, and
competition. A series of experiments concerning behavior In chance
situations provided support for the hypotheses. For example, 1n one
study, participants In a lottery who were allowed to choose their
ticket regarded the ticket as more valuable than participants who were
given tickets. Langer (1975) concluded that aspects of skill
situations produce an inappropriate Increase in individuals'
confidence about chance outcomes. Indeed, in some studies,
participants declined the opportunity to actually Improve their
objective chances of winning by entering a different lottery.
The determinants of perceived control were also investigated
experimentally by Wortman (1975). In two studies, Wortman (1975)
varied whether subjects actually initiated the outcome, and whether
they had foreknowledge of what they hoped to attain. The results
provided strong support for the hypotheses: Subjects who "caused"
their own outcome (i.e., selected a marble representing their prize)
and knew what they hoped to attain, perceived themselves to have
greater control, choice, and responsibility for their outcome.
Wortman (1975) suggested that people can attempt to exert control only
if they know what they hope to attain (e.g., a number on dice, a
particular prize)
.
There 1s also some evidence that an illusion of control, like an
illusion of contingency (or correlation), is not likely to be
eliminated or diminished by failure to influence the outcome. The
participants in Wortman's (1975) study reported their perceptions of
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control after the outcome was known. Even when participants were
unsuccessful 1n selecting the marble that represented the preferred
prize, attempting to select a particular marble resulted In feelings
of control. Similarly, In his study of crapshooters
, Henslln (1967)
observed that "failure does not represent the 'absence of control'
but, rather, that someone's or something's control over the dice was
greater than that of the shooter's. It Is never that It was merely by
chance" (p. 325).
An Illusion of control over chance events Is evident In
Individuals' explanations of past outcomes, as well as In their
expectations for future outcomes. Attributions for positive and
negative outcomes, as noted earlier, often appear to minimize the role
of chance, and to exaggerate the role of the Individual In producing
an outcome. By eschewing chance In attributions of causality or
responsibility, misfortunes are rendered more meaningful and
avoidable, rather than arbitrary and capricious (cf. Bucher, 1957;
Drabeck & Quarantelll, 1967). In hindsight, even the victims of
misfortune may blame themselves, and exaggerate their ability to have
produced or avoided the misfortune ( Janof f-Bulman & Lang-Gunn, in
press; Wortman, 1976). Although there are few systematic studies in
which victims of misfortune have been queried directly about their
attributions of causality or responsibility for the misfortune, many
investigators have observed self-blame by the apparently Innocent
victims of disease, crime, and disaster.
In a systematic study of accident victims, Bulman and Wortman
(1977) conducted intensive interviews of 29 individuals who were
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paralyzed as a result of seemingly "freak" accidents. Despite the
apparently random nature of the accidents, a third of the respondents
blamed themselves for the accident more than any other factor (viz.,
other people, the environment, and chance), and almost two-thirds
blamed themselves at least In part for the accident that resulted In
their paralysis.
Disease victims may spontaneously express beliefs about the
relationship of their Illness to their past behavior. Bard and Oyk
(1956) observed that the unsolicited beliefs expressed by seriously
111 Individuals were "cast In terms of assigning culpability or
responsibility for the Illness" (p. 153), and concluded that
Individuals must establish a belief that explains their Illness.
Often, the Illness was Identified as the result of generalized or
specific wrong-doing In the past. Similarly, Abrams and Fineslnger
(1953) reported a marked tendency of cancer patients to explain the
cause or responsibility for the disease In terms of their own past
actions, and to express guilt. The belief that one's own actions had
a direct or Indirect Influence on the occurrence of Illness has been
observed by many researchers (e.g., Chodoff, Friedman, & Hamburg,
1964; Davis, 1963; Friedman, Chodoff, Mason, & Hamburg, 1977;
Kubler-Ross, 1969; Taylor & Levin, 1976).
Specific acts of commission or omission are also Identified by
the victims of crime. Bard and Sangrey (1979) observed that victims
of crime often seem eager to accept responsibility for their own
victimization. In hindsight, the victim may note a failure to have
exercised certain precautions, or to have responded to specific
46
features of the situation. Self-blame by the victims of rape, in
particular, has been widely observed and documented (e.g., Bryant &
Cirel, 1977; Burgess 8. Holmstrom, 1974; Medea fi. Thompson, 1974).
These observations about the victims of misfortune suggest that
individuals may emphasize the role of their own action (or inaction)
in producing a negative outcome, and may exaggerate, in retrospect,
their ability to have avoided the outcome. The unknown causes or the
complex series of circumstances that lead to many uncontrollable life
events such as disease and accidents would seem to afford the
individual considerable latitude in identifying the significant
factors involved in the occurrence of a particular outcome. In
instances in which the specific outcome will not recur (e.g.,
paralysis or terminal illness), the exaggeration of one's ability to
have prevented the misfortune may serve simply to deny the
"intolerable conclusion that no one was responsible" and that the
event "has come about impersonally and meaninglessly" (Chodoff et al.,
1964, p. 747). However, it may also promote a more general belief in
one's ability to influence future outcomes, such as recovery. In
instances in which the individual is vulnerable to a recurrence of the
misfortune (e.g., natural disasters, crime), such attributions imply
an ability to avoid future occurrences, and may be instrumental in
establishing positive expectations for the future.
Thus, in addition to failures to recognize randomness in the
relationships between events, people often fail to acknowledge the
role of chance in the occurrence of many uncontrollable, negative life
events. Experimental and observational evidence suggests that people
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have an "illusion of control" over random outcomes. Perceived control
over past and future chance outcomes appears to be enhanced by factors
such as choice, foreknowledge. Involvement, and practice. Moreover,
In their explanations of many negative life events that are generally
regarded as unforeseeable and uncontrollable, people appear to deny
the operation of chance and to exaggerate. In retrospect, their
Influence over such outcomes. Minimizing the role of chance and/or
maximizing the contribution of oneself or others In explanations of
negative life events should have the effect of promoting the belief
that a person can avoid similar misfortune In the future.
The Illusion of Invulnerability
For many controllable and chance events, the percept1on--or
1llus1on--of personal control should promote optimistic expectations
for the future. However, there are many negative events, such as
natural disasters, over which Individuals clearly have little or no
control. In their reactions to such threats, there Is some evidence
that people maintain an Illusion of Invulnerability .
In her study of reactions to disasters, Martha Wolfenstein (1957)
observed that an attitude of denial Is the usual reaction to remote
threats: "It won't happen to me." Even when Individuals acknowledge
a danger, they may frequently express no concern or worry about the
danger. Further, Wolfenstein (1957) noted that the absence of concern
Is often associated with the belief that there Is nothing that an
Individual can do about the threat. The usual reaction, then. Is an
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absence of worry, accompanied by an Implicit or explicit belief that
the threat will not materialize, or that It will not affect oneself.
The tendency to deny danger often persists In the face of a more
imminent threat:
Here we have the feeling of personal Immunity. Even when
the denial of a threatened danger occurring
. . , yields to
contrary evidence, the belief remains: It can't affect me.
The pre-dlsaster conviction seems to be: It can't happen,
but If It does I will remain Immune. (Wolfenstein, 1957,
p. 18)
Similarly, Mechanic (1972, 1978) argued that a sense of
Invulnerability protects Individuals from anxiety and fear concerning
low-risk occurrences to which everyone Is exposed, and dangers that
people are powerless to prevent. In a discussion of the effects of
fear arousal on attitude change, Janis (1967) noted that "an
endangered person will sometimes resort to a fatalistic outlook,
supertltlous rituals for warding off bad luck, and other unrealistic
forms of reassurance that foster anticipations of total
Invulnerability" (p. 191). Janis referred to the beliefs that danger
will not materialize, or will not affect the Individual personally, as
"blanket reassurances."
The denial of danger and a belief In personal Invulnerability may
appear to be extremely unrealistic and Irrational. As previously
suggested, there are a number of reasons why people may hold certain
beliefs other than for the sake of rationality. Abelson (1974) has
observed that most of these reasons, such as self-esteem or protection
against anxiety, are concerned with "systems-maintenance"- -negotiating
a complicated, unpredictable, and sometimes threatening world. An
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Illusion of Invulnerability may be a critical source of protection
from anxiety, and can be viewed as an effort to cope with
uncontrollable and unpredictable negative outcomes. Moreover, the
uncertainty of future outcomes, compared with the reality of past
events, should afford Individuals greater latitude for departures from
rationality In their beliefs.
It Is Important to distinguish between this Illusion of personal
immunity or Invulnerability and the Illusion of control. Perceived
Immunity and perceived control both provide the Individual with a
sense of safety from negative outcomes, but perceived control applies
to positive outcomes as well. Moreover, the sense of safety created
by each of these Illusions derives from two very different
processes—denial versus mastery. To exercise control--real or
niusory--over negative outcomes, an Individual must acknowledge the
threat. Wolfenstein (1957) described this paradox In the relationship
between perceived Immunity and control:
As to the feeling of Immunity, 1t may be, paradoxically,
especially strong when there Is nothing one can do to ward
off an Impending danger. If there Is something one can do
as a precaution, one may acknowledge the threat to the
extent of taking the precautionary measures at one's
disposal. Where there Is nothing one can do, denial of the
threat continues to recommend Itself as a defense against
anxiety, (p. 20)
Thus, when people perceive themselves to have some control over a
negative outcome, denial of the threat and a belief 1n personal
Immunity are not only unnecessary, but Increase the risk through
failure to exercise available precautions. Denial of the threat.
Involving a clear distortion of reality. Is likely to be an
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Individual's last defense against the prospect of danger (cf. Aronson,
1969)
.
Two Important factors affecting attitudes toward remote threats,
according to Wolfenstein (1957), are the perceived likelihood that the
threat will materialize, and judgments regarding the possibilities and
costs of remedial or preventive action. If there Is nothing an
Individual can do to Influence or avoid a remote threat, the
Individual will tend to deny the threat, even If It Is perceived as
likely to occur. In addition, there are many dangers over which the
Individual has some control that are regarded as very unlikely to
materialize. Such dangers abound In people's lives, but an Individual
cannot anticipate and exercise available precautions against all of
these remote threats:
Human life Is liable to many hazards. People are run over
In the street, automobiles collide, travelers are Injured or
killed In train wrecks or airplane crashes. In the seeming
security of one's home one may fall down stairs and break a
leg. A child playing hide and seek may close himself In an
old Ice box and suffocate. One may fall prey to disease or
something may go amiss with a vital organ--a heart attack, a
brain hemorrhage. The cocktails and cigarettes which we
enjoy may be working Irremediable Internal damage. And then
there are the more large scale dangers of fire, flood,
earthquake, tornado, and the man-made destruction unleashed
In war. As we consider such a list, Is not our first
reaction apt to be one of smiling? Yes, we will say, and as
you are walking down the street a t1le may fall from a roof
and hit you on the head. But who can worry about all these
things? (p. 3)
The Inability of an Individual to anticipate and take precautions
against all remote threats suggests one reason why, from the vantage
of hindsight, people may be able to readily Identify circumstances or
behaviors that contributed to the occurrence of a specific negative
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outcome. That U. most people probably fail to exercise precautions
against many dangers regarded as possible but unlikely to occur. The
individual may be able to influence the occurrence of several,
specific dangers, but is unable to guard against all possible threats;
denial and belief in personal immunity may be the individual's only
defense against this entire class of remote threats. As a result,
when one of these many dangers does materialize, individuals are
likely to be blamed by themselves or others for failure to foresee the
danger or to exercise the precautions available.
Denial, and the feeling of personal immunity, may contribute to
the difficulty of inducing people to heed warnings about serious risks
such as lung cancer or nuclear accidents (cf. Janis, 1967, 1974;
Robertson & Heagarty, 1975). As previously noted, people appear to
underestimate their own vulnerability to negative life events; when a
threat is acknowledged, people generally judge their own vulnerability
to be less than the vulnerability of others. For example, people rate
themselves as less susceptible to a variety of diseases (e.g., cancer,
diabetes, pneumonia) than "others" or the "average person" (Harris &
Guten, 1979; Kirscht et al., 1966; Lang-Gunn, Note 1). Similarly,
people judge their chances of being killed or injured in an automobile
accident to be less than (40%) or the same as (45%) the chances of
people like themselves (Robertson, 1977). In Weinstein's (1980)
study, students rated their chances of experiencing a variety of
negative events (e.g., divorce, cancer, being fired) as less than
their classmates' chances.
The perceived probability of actual danger may be critical in
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changing relevant attitudes and behaviors, according to Janis (1967).
When people become convinced of their personal vulnerability to a
potential danger, they are more likely to accept recommended
precautionary measures. However, when there Is little or nothing an
individual can do to avoid a danger, when an Illusion of personal
Invulnerability Is the Individual's only defense against a threat, the
experience of a personal disaster or a "near miss" can severely
challenge the Illusion. Exposure to danger can affect the
Individual's specific expectations regarding a recurrence of the
event, or the Individual's general expectations about future danger
and misfortune.
An Illusion of Invulnerability that Involves a total, rather than
a qualified, belief In Immunity may be much less resistant to
d1 sconf 1 rming evidence In the form of a personal disaster or near-miss
experience (cf. Janis, 1951). Janis (1974) observed that "narrowly
escaping from danger, losing close friends or relatives, and
witnessing maimed bodies appear to have the effect of shattering the
entire set of psychological defenses Involved In maintaining
expectations of personal Invulnerability" (p. 162). Mechanic (1978)
argued that people are generally able to maintain a relatively strong
sense of Invulnerability through coping processes and actions, even
when they are exposed to Increased risk (e.g., combat, disease).
However, Mechanic also suggested that a "near miss," such as the death
of a close friend or experiencing an automobile accident, can
"dramatically undermine one's sense of Invulnerability and may lead to
extreme anxiety and fear" (p. 258).
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Investigators have observed that symptoms of psychological
distress are frequently manifested by the Individual whose sense of
Invulnerability has been challenged by the experience of a disaster or
near miss (e.g., Janis, 1951, 1974; Grinker 8. Spiegel, 1945;
Wolfenstein, 1957). For example. In their classic account of war
neuroses and treatment during World War II, Grinker and Spiegel (1945)
observed that soldiers who had lost a sense of personal
Invulnerability tended to severely over-react to mild threats. These
men generally had high morale and confidence about their survival
abilities at the beginning of their service, but they gradually lost
this sense of personal safety, especially following narrow escapes or
other near misses. Grinker and Spiegel (1945) reported that the
pilots they studied had experienced a basic change In self-confidence
and a sense of helplessness; their ability to fly deteriorated
dramatically, and their attitude changed from "nothing terrible will
happen to me" to "something terrible Is bound to happen to me."
Similarly, feelings of vulnerability and loss of control over one's
life appear to be common reactions among victims of rape (e.g.. Bard &
Ellison, 1974; Bryant & Cirel, 1977).
Whether an Individual's sense of safety and Invulnerability Is
shattered or preserved following exposure to danger may depend upon
the nature of the disaster experience and the Individual's past
experience. Wolfenstein (1957) described the various reactions:
For the Individual who has had his Illusion of
Invulnerability shattered In undergoing the disaster there
Is apt to be an apprehension that anything may now happen to
him. He feels vulnerable; he has lost confidence In his
luck ... But for the one who retained confidence In his
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ImmunUy during the worst of the disaster, his survival may
serve to confirm his belief that nothing can happen to him
(p. 159)
The person who loses a feeling of personal Invulnerability after a
near miss may experience emotional disturbances such as acute anxiety,
excessive fear, and hypervlgllance, and may expect further
misfortune. Others may regard their survival as confirmation of their
personal Invulnerability, and may feel Increased confidence about
their ability to avoid future negative outcomes (Janis, 1951;
Wolfenstein, 1957); they may experience "a feeling of relief, of being
blessed, of being warned" (Helder, 1958, p. 141).^
The fear of recurrence Is a common reaction among people who have
experienced a disaster, and It Is often accompanied by a tendency to
relive the event (Janis, 1951; Wolfenstein, 1957). This fear Is
usually unrealistic, and Ignores the objective probability of
recurrence:
It would seem that for the disaster victim the world has
been transformed from the secure one In which he believed
such things could not happen to one where catastrophe
becomes the regular order. In his drastically altered view
a catastrophic universe has come Into being ... In
reliving the past event people are preoccupied with what
they should have done which they omitted to do. . . . there
Is apt to be the recurrent question: Is there something I
can do which will assure Immunity? (Wolfenstein, 1957, p.
153)
In summary, an attitude of denial seems to be a common reaction
to threats over which Individuals clearly have little or no control
(e.g., natural disasters). When people cannot maintain an Illusion of
control over negative outcomes, they appear to adopt an Illusion of
personal Invulnerability: "It won't happen to me." In addition,
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there are many events over which the Individual may have some measure
of control or precaution, but which are sufficiently numerous and
remote to recommend a belief In invulnerability as a general defense.
This Illusion provides the individual with a "blanket
reassurance" that he or she will not experience negative outcomes, but
it can have serious consequences when the individual ignores available
precautionary measures. Moreover, the actual experience of a disaster
or near miss may shatter an individual's Illusion of invulnerability
and lead to unrealistic, negative expectations. In general, however,
an illusion of invulnerability appears to promote positive
expectations about one's personal future, and may be resistant to
disconf 1 rming evidence in the form of a disaster or near miss
experience.
Cognitive Processes and Heuristics
The preceding formulations emphasized motivational processes
through which individuals' beliefs and expectations are Influenced by
their needs and desires. Other research has focused on the cognitive
processes Involved in making judgments about uncertain events (see
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977, for a comprehensive review).
Since an individual's expectations for the future involve judgments
about the likelihood of uncertain events, research in this area may
elucidate some of the cognitive processes Involved in judging the
likelihood of future outcomes. Research has revealed that people rely
on a limited number of cognitive heuristics, or rules of thumb, to
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make judgments about the likelihood of uncertain events. Cognitive
heuristics are useful shortcuts In making complex likelihood estimates
or predictions, but they can sometimes lead to errors or biases In
judgment that are severe and systematic. Several of these judgment
heuristics and associated biases are especially relevant to an
understanding of how people assess the likelihood of uncertain future
outcomes
.
Availability
.
One judgmental heur1st1c--ava11ab111tv --aDDl1es to
situations In which people assess the frequency of a class, or the
probability of an event, by the ease with which relevant Instances of
the event can be brought to mind. "For example, one may assess the
risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling such
occurrences among one's acquaintances" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p.
27). Use of the availability heuristic may bias estimates since some
classes or events may be more or less difficult to retrieve from
memory, to Imagine, or to associate with another event.
In the present context, the availability heuristic suggests that
people's estimates of the likelihood of experiencing specific events
will be Influenced by the ease with which they can recall or Imagine
the event. Since frequent events are probably easier to recall than
Infrequent events, availability may often be a useful and valid cue In
judgments of frequency or probability (Slovic, Fischhoff, 8.
Lichtenstein, 1977). However, when availability Is affected by
factors unrelated to likelihood, such as familiarity or emotional
salience, use of this heuristic may result In systematic biases.
Research cited earlier on the selective recall of life
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experiences suggests that use of the availability heuristic In
predicting one's future outcomes will tend to bias predictions toward
positive outcomes. To the extent that people's estimates of their
future outcomes are based on their recall of past personal
experiences, their predictions should favor positive outcomes. The
affective neutralization of negative experiences and the tendency to
forget neutral experiences (Holmes, 1970) should result In
unreallstlcally optimistic expectations for the future.
Alternatively, the emotional salience and Imaglnabi 1 Ity of events
may Influence availability and bias predictions. Many negative life
events are dramatic and salient, and thus may be more easily recalled
or Imagined (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Catastrophic events such as
natural disasters and air disasters are often vivid, sensational
events that are highly publicized by the news media. Although most
people probably have no direct experience or familiarity with
catastrophe, the ease with which they can remember or Imagine reports
of catastrophe may lead Individuals to overestimate the likelihood of
such events.
In general, recent or extreme events are likely to be "available"
and recalled with relative ease. Tversky and Kahneman (1973)
described the operation of the availability heuristic In dally
experience:
Perhaps the most obvious demonstration of availability In
real life Is the Impact of the fortuitous availability of
Incidents or scenarios. Many readers must have experienced
the temporary rise In the subjective probability of an
accident after seeing a car overturned by the side of the
road. Similarly, many must have noticed an Increase In the
subjective probability that an accident or malfunction will
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start a thermonuclear war after seeing a movie 1n which such
an occurrence was vividly portrayed. Continued
preoccupation with an outcome may Increase Its availability
and hence Its perceived likelihood. People are preoccupied
with highly desirable outcomes, such as winning the
sweepstakes, or with highly undesirable outcomes, such as an
airplane crash. Consequently, availability provides a
mechanism by which occurrences of extreme utility (or
disutility) may appear more likely than they actually are."
(p. 230)
In a series of studies of the judged frequency of various lethal
events, L1chtenste1n, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, and Combs (1978)
demonstrated that the frequencies of some lethal events are
consistently misjudged. For 41 different causes of death, respondents
made paired-comparison judgments of general likelihood (I.e.,
likelihood for a person In the United States), and judgments of the
absolute frequency. The results Indicted that the overall accuracy of
the relative and absolute frequency judgments was poor, but the
judgments were consistent, and were sensitive to the true frequency.
In general, the respondents tended to overestimate low frequency
causes of death, and to underestimate high frequency causes.
In a subsequent study, Lichtenstein et al. (1978) examined the
effects of people's direct and Indirect experience with the events,
extent of media coverage, and characteristics of the events, such as
catastrophic potential (I.e., multiple fatalities from a single
occurrence). The results Indicated that these measures of the
availability of Information about the causes of death were related to
individuals' judgments of relative and absolute frequency of the
events. In addition, personal experience and media coverage were more
strongly related to Individuals' judgments than to the true
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frequencies of the events. Few of the causes of death were judged to
be catastrophic In terms of the average number of fatalities from a
single episode. However, of the seven causes of death given
relatively high catastrophe ratings, six were among the ten most
overestimated causes of death: All accidents, motor vehicle
accidents, flood, boutulism, tornado, and fire and flames.
Examination of the newspaper coverage revealed that many of the
causes of death were not mentioned at all during the six month period.
Including relatively frequent causes such as diabetes and breast
cancer. In contrast, some rare causes of death, such as tornadoes,
were reported frequently. For example, homicide was reported more
often than suicide, although It Is considerably less frequent as a
cause of death. These Investigators suggested that the
unrepresentative media coverage of causes of death, particularly the
emphasis on sensational and unusual events, may contribute to the
tendency to overestimate the likelihood of these events.
In general, the causes of death that were overestimated tended to
be sensational or catastrophic: tornado, flood, boutulism, homicide,
motor vehicle accident, and cancer. The relatively undramatic, "quiet
killers" such as asthma, tuberculosis, diabetes, stroke, stomach
cancer, and heart disease were underestimated as causes of death.
Lichtenstein et al. (1978) concluded that these biases In the judged
frequency of lethal events probably reflected use of the availability
heuristic, and the influence of the disportlonate exposure,
memorability, or Imaglnabi 1 Ity of the events.
The results of these and other studies Indicate that Individuals'
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judgments of the absolute or relative likelihood of various events may
reflect the availability of relevant Instances, and may be biased by
factors such as emotional salience or familiarity. However, these
data do not necessarily suggest, for example, that people will tend to
overestimate their own chances of experiencing catastrophic events.
Other evidence that people neglect population base-rate Information In
favor of Individuating Information suggests that these normative
judgments are not likely to be regarded as diagnostic of an
Individual's own chances of experiencing a particular event.
In estimating their own likelihood of experiencing various events
or outcomes, people seem to rely on their own personal experience and
knowledge. A study of anxiety about Illness suggested that personal
familiarity increases fear about specific Illnesses. Levine (1962)
found that people who know a victim of a d1sease--part1cularly someone
close to them--are more likely to express fear about the disease than
people who do not know a victim. Levine (1962) concluded that
"familiarity breeds fear . . . those who have had personal experience
with an ailment are obviously more aware of its ability to cripple the
body and mind of the sufferer" (p. 31). This suggests that in the
case of highly undesirable events, both familiarity and emotional
salience may contribute to the availability of the information.
In summary, the availability heuristic provides a cognitive
mechanism by which people may overestimate the likelihood of positive
future outcomes, given the tendency to selectively recall and
reminisce about positive past experiences. In making such Judgments,
people may also be influenced by the ease with which they can recall
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relevant Instances from the experiences of theU acquaintances, and by
the familiarity or emotional salience of the events. Moreover, recall
of Instances from their own personal experience and knowledge should
tend to attentuate the Inaccuracy In judgment reported by Lichtenstein
et al. (1978), In that most Individuals probably know more people who
have suffered or died from the more frequent quiet killers than from
sensational or catastrophic events, such as tornadoes or homicide.
Representativeness
. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1973),
another judgmental heuristic that people use to make Intuitive
predictions is representativeness
. By this heuristic, people predict
the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence. For
example, "the probability that Steve is a librarian is assessed by the
degree to which he is a representative of, or similar to, the
stereotype of a librarian" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). Use
of the representativeness heuristic may result in serious errors of
judgment because similarity, or representativeness, is not influenced
by factors that should affect predictions, including the reliability
of the evidence and the prior probability, or base rate of the judged
event
.
In general, there are two types of information available to the
1ndividual--individuat1ng and base-rate Information. Individuating,
or case-specific Information, refers to evidence about the particular
case under consideration. Base-rate, or distributional Information,
refers to the distribution of outcomes In a particular situation. For
example. In assessing the likelihood that a person will develop a
particular illness, information about the person's physical
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characteristics. current health, and medical history provides
Individuating Information, whereas the relevant population statistics
would constitute base-rate Information.
In a series of studies of Intuitive prediction, Kahneman and
Tversky (1973) demonstrated use of the representativeness heuristic.
In these studies, participants neglected base-rate Information when
Individuating Information was available. Participants apparently
judged the likelihood of different outcomes (e.g., category
membership) by evaluating the representativeness of case-spedf 1c
Information, even when this Individuating Information was regarded by
the participants as Insufficient or unreliable. By neglecting the
base-rate Information, participants In these studies erroneously
predicted rare events and extreme values.
Nisbett and Borglda (1975) extended these findings and
demonstrated that people also neglect base-rate Information In making
Intuitive predictions about behavior. Respondents were provided with
Information about the behavior of subjects In previous psychological
experiments. This base-rate Information did not Influence
respondents' judgments about the behavior of particular subjects In
the original experiments, their attributions about the causes of such
behavior, nor their predictions about their own behavior In the same
situation. In their Interpretation of the results, Nisbett and
Borglda (1975) contrasted the pallid, abstract, statistical character
of base-rate Information with the concrete, vivid nature of
Individuating Information.
In the present context, use of the representativeness heuristic
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suggests that Individuals may Ignore base-rate Information In judging
the likelihood that they will experience specific outcomes, and rely
Instead on case-specific Information. For example, Individuals may
assess the probability that they will experience a heart attack by
evaluating the similarity between their own characteristics (e.g.,
relevant physical attributes and behaviors) and salient
characteristics of people who have had heart attacks. To the extent
that individuals perceive shared characteristics among people who have
experienced a particular outcome (e.g., the stereotype of heart attack
victims as overweight, middle-aged, male executives), they may assess
their own likelihood of experiencing the outcome by the
representativeness of superficial characteristics, rather than the
incidence of heart attack among a specified population.
It is Important to note that judgments about one's own future
outcomes may represent a special case. When the particular case under
consideration is oneself, individuating Information is always
available in abundance and detail (cf. Jones & Nisbett, 1971).
Moreover, base-rate information about many outcomes Is usually not
available to an individual. Given greater knowledge and Involvement,
the tendency to rely on individuating information in evaluating the
likelihood of an outcome should be enhanced. More detailed knowledge
about oneself may allow Individuals to make judgments based on the
perceived similarity of very specific or minor characteristics that
are essentially irrelevant to the outcome. Moreover, Increased
involvement may encourage individuals to seek points of similarity or
dissimilarity between their own case and the general category or
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Stereotype. For example, 1f Individuals are able to readily Identify
superficial or minute dissimilarities between themselves and their
stereotype of the person who experiences a heart attack, they may
severely underestimate their risk of experiencing a heart attack.
The representativeness heuristic Is also pertinent to the
suggestion that people may have a stereotype of the kind of person who
generally experiences positive or negative outcomes (cf. Lerner, 1965,
1970; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Use of the representativeness heuristic
may lead people to evaluate their general prospects for the future by
the degree of similarity perceived between themselves and a stereotype
of people who experience misfortune, for example. With knowledge of
themselves and a past perceived as generally positive. Individuals may
find It easy to conclude that they differ from the type of person
likely to experience misfortune, and that their future outcomes. In
general, are likely to be positive.
In summary, research Indicates that when Individuating
Information Is available, people tend to neglect base-rate Information
In making predictions about outcomes. By emphasizing the similarity
(or dissimilarity) of characteristics that may be Irrelevant to the
outcome, use of the representativeness heuristic may sometimes lead
Individuals to make Inaccurate, unrealistic predictions about their
own future outcomes. In addition, judgments about one's own future
outcomes appear to represent a special case In which use of the
representativeness heuristic may be enhanced by the availability and
detail of Individuating Information, and the Importance of the case
under consideration.
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Causality heuristic. in contrast to Kahneman and Tversky's
(1973) assertion that base-rate Information Is generally neglected In
favor of Individuating Information, Ajzen (1977) demonstrated that
Individuals' Intuitive predictions are Influenced by base-rate
Information when the base-rates have causal relevance to the outcome
under consideration. Ajzen (1977) proposed that people have Intuitive
causal theories of events, and that these theories are Invoked In the
explanation and the prediction of events. The causality heuristic Is
a judgmental strategy that relies on these Intuitive theories:
Judgment by causality can be described as follows. When
asked to make a prediction, people look for factors that
would cause the behavior or event under consideration.
Information that provides evidence concerning the presence
or absence of causal factors Is therefore likely to
Influence predictions. Other Items of Information . . .
will tend to be neglected If they have no apparent causal
significance, (p. 304)
Ajzen observed that the base-rate Information provided by
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) had no causal significance for the outcome
(e.g., the proportion of lawyers In a sample does not cause a
particular member of the sample to be a lawyer). When respondents are
provided with base-rate Information that has causal significance
(e.g., the rate of passing an examination), their predictions are
Influenced by the base-rate Information. Ajzen (1977) concluded that
people utilize Information, Including population base-rates, to the
extent that the Information can be incorporated within their Intuitive
theories of causal relationships.
Following Ajzen (1977), Tversky and Kahneman (1977) also proposed
that the Influence of Information on Intuitive predictions depends
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upon the perceived causal relevance of the Information. In studies of
the role of causal thinking In judgments under uncertainty, Tversky
and Kahneman (1977) demonstrated the greater Impact of causal data on
judgments, and provided some evidence that people tend to focus on the
causal Implications of data for the future, and to neglect the
diagnostic Implications for the past.
These Investigators also concluded that the neglect of base-rate
Information Is a more general phenomenon that Is not limited to the
use of the representativeness heuristic. When base-rate data have
causal significance, or Indicate an Increased tendency for a
particular outcome to occur, the base-rate Information should
Influence Intuitive predictions. For example, the differential
Incidence of lung cancer among men and women should. In addition to
any Individuating Information available. Influence judgments about the
likelihood of a particular person (or oneself) developing lung cancer.
There Is Indirect evidence that people use base-rate Information
about events such as Illness. One of the strongest findings reported
by Levlne (1962) In his study of anxiety about Illness was that the
perceived prevalence of a disease and personal anxiety were highly and
consistently correlated. For example, among the respondents who
believed that many people suffer from cancer, two-thirds feared cancer
"a lot." In contrast, only 42% of the respondents who believed that
relatively few people suffer from cancer expressed the same degree of
anxiety. In his Interpretation of this finding, Levlne (1962) argued
that:
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People worry about the threat a disease poses for their own
well-being (or for their Immediate families) more than they
worry about threats to the health of others. If, for
example, a person believes that his own chances of becoming
afflicted with arthritis are great, he Is more likely to be
fearful of that affliction than If he thinks there Is little
chance of his contracting It. Thus, the higher the
Incidence of a disease Is thought to be, the greater a
person believes his own chances are of becoming
af f 11cted--and, It follows, the greater his anxiety about
the disease, (p. 32)
Tversky and Kahneman (1977) argued that people generally rely on
causal schemata In explaining or predicting outcomes, and that these
schemata are often Incomplete and Imprecise, and sometimes Incorrect
(cf. Kelley, 1972, 1973). These Investigators suggested that the use
or non-use of base-rates can be best understood In terms of the role
of this Information In causal schemata. Base-rate Information which
Is not causally relevant, or conflicts with an established schema,
should have little Influence on judgments when Individuating
Information Is also available.
The Importance of causal reasoning 1s evident In the apparent
ease with which people can provide causal explanations of outcomes
they could not predict, and In the apparent difficulty of revising
causal theories or schemata In the face of contradictory evidence.
Tversky and Kaheman (1977) proposed that people will attempt to
assimilate new Information, however unexpected, with minimal change In
an existing schema.
Intuitive theories of events, or conceptions of cause and effect
relationships, offer a cognitive mechanism by which Individuals may
develop and maintain beliefs about the causes and consequences of
events, and judge the likelihood of future outcomes. Exercising
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control over some events U not sufficient for understanding or
forecasting; predictions about a broad range of events requires
generalized principles or "theories." The nature of Individuals'
theories or "assumptive worlds" was described by Parkes (1971):
Changes In the life space are Important or unimportant,
depending upon their Influence upon the assumptions which we
make about the world. ... Out of the total set of
assumptions which we build up on the basis of past
experience In carrying out our purposes we create our own
"Assumptive World". ... The assumptive world
. . .
Includes our Interpretation of the past and our expectations
of the future, our plans and our prejudices, (p. 103)
Intuitive theories represent an Individual's understanding of
themselves and the world (e.g., Epstein, 1973; Parkes, 1971), and may
Include, for example, beliefs about the causes of one's own behavior
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), the contingencies between different events,
and the relationship between one's Intentions or actions and one's
outcomes
.
The range In the nature and specificity of beliefs comprising
Individuals' Intuitive theories Is suggested by the related concept of
cognitive scripts (e.g., Abelson, 1976). A cognitive script Is
defined by Abelson as "a coherent sequence of events expected by the
Individual, Involving him either as a participant or as an observer"
(1976, p. 33). Scripts are learned by participation In, or
observation of, event sequences throughout an Individual's lifetime.
Depending on the level of complexity and abstractness , scripts can be
described as episodic, categorical, or hypothetical. Similarly,
Intuitive theories may Include specific beliefs, such as the causes of
Illness, or factors that contribute to divorce, for example, as well
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as general beliefs (or "Illusions") of contingency or control, or the
distribution of outcomes In a just world (cf. Helder. 1958).
The Influence of Individuals' a priori understandings and their
expectations on judgments was established early In research on
Impression formation (e.g.. Asch. 1946). and has been wel 1 -documented
and replicated (e.g.. Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969; Hastorf &
Cantrll, 1954; Jones & Goethals, 1971; Schneider, 1973; Zadny &
Gerard, 1974). Intuitive theories may not be Inaccurate (or even
verifiable), but they may systematically bias judgments through
selective attention to, and use of. Information (cf. Erdelyl, 1974;
Freedman & Sears, 1965; Matlln 8. Stang, 1978). Intuitive, a priori
theories may sensitize a person to certain Information, or may lead to
the neglect or rejection of Information that Is relevant but
Inconsistent (or Incompatible) with the person's understanding.
Ross and his colleagues (e.g., Ross, 1977; Ross, Lepper, &
Hubbard, 1975) have provided clear demonstrations of the difficulty of
reversing Initial perceptions or judgments. These Investigators have
proposed that two mechanisms are Involved In this "perseverance"
phenomenon--d1stort1on and autonomy. Distortion In the evaluation of
Information may lead Individuals, for example, to accept Information
that Is consistent with their Initial Impressions, but Is Irrelevant
or unreliable. As a result, when Individuals have an Impression or
belief, subsequent Information will tend to be selectively distorted
1n support of the existing conception (cf. Festlnger. 1957; Helder,
1958)
.
The second mechanism Involves the autonomy achieved by distorted
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evidence: "Once formed, an Initial Impression may not only be
enhanced by the distortion of evidence, It may ultimately be sustained
by such distortion" (Ross, 1977, p. 206). Thus, once evidence
supporting an Impression or belief has been accepted and achieves
autonomy. It can be discredited without challenging the impression:
The autonomy enjoyed by distorted Inferences may further
contribute to the perseverance of non-optimal theories
. .
The Intuitive scientist detects more support for his general
theory than is warranted and, having
. . . summarized his
findings, he is then disposed to maintain his theory in the
face of subsequent logical or empirical attacks by "citing"
the wealth of seemingly Independent support that it enjoys.
(Ross, 1977, p. 209)
Ross (1977) suggested that intuitive theories will change, albeit
slowly, in response to evidence that presents a strong or consistent
challenge.
In the present context, intuitive theories provide a basis for
future expectations in the form of an individual's explanations and
summary of past outcomes. Such theories may Include many beliefs
relevant to the likelihood of various outcomes, including general
beliefs about the nature of the world, the distribution of outcomes,
and the relationship of Intentions and actions to outcomes, as well as
beliefs about the causes of specific events. Intuitive theories may
bias an Individual's expectations and judgments about the likelihood
of specific outcomes when the individual evaluates Information In
terms of its compatibility with the theory, rather than Its relevance,
reliability, or validity.
In summary, research evidence indicates that use of Information
in making predictions will depend In part on the relationship of the
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Information to the Individual's Intuitive theories, Including beliefs
about cause and effect relationships. The concept of Intuitive
theories can Incorporate many of the Illusions discussed earlier, and
provides a cognitive mechanism by which Individuals may maintain
beliefs about the nature of the world, and develop expectations for
the future. Such a priori theories may lead to systematic biases In
Judgments or expectations by sensitizing Individuals to Information
that Is consistent (or compatible) with their theories. Irrespective
of the relevance or quality of the Information.
Hindsight effect
. Studies of the effect of outcome knowledge
suggest that. In hindsight. Individuals may revise their predictions
about the likelihood of an unexpected outcome (Fischhoff, 1975;
nschhoff 8. Beyth, 1975). When Individuals have knowledge of an
outcome and are asked to recall their original predictions, they
"remember" assigning a greater likelihood to the event. Moreover,
people are largely unaware of the changes In their perceptions
resulting from outcome knowledge. Consequently, Individuals'
Impressions of what they would have known without knowledge of the
actual outcome are biased, as are their Impressions of what they and
others did know In foresight.
Thus, once an uncertain outcome has occurred. It may be
perceived. In retrospect, as having been almost Inevitable. In their
hindsight revisions of the perceived likelihood of an outcome,
Individuals also unknowingly alter their perceptions of the relevance
of various Information about the event (Fischhoff, 1975). The wisdom
conferred by hindsight, particularly the changes In the perceived
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relevance of preceding events, was described by Wohlstetter (1962) 1n
her historical analysis of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor:
It Is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from
the Irrelevant signals. After the event, of course, a
signal Is always crystal clear. Me can now see what
disaster It was signaling since the disaster has occurred,
but before the event It 1s obscure and pregnant with
conflicting meanings, (p. 387)
Fischhoff (1975) proposed that retrospective changes In the
perceived relevance of data reflect Individuals' efforts to assimilate
knowledge of an outcome with what they know about the event. As
previously suggested, the explanation of how or why an event occurred
Is relatively easy, compared to the task of predicting future
outcomes. In hindsight. Individuals can often evaluate a sequence of
events and Identify factors consistent with the occurrence of a
particular outcome; Inconsistent Information may be reinterpreted or
Ignored. The perceived Inevitability of an outcome In hindsight, the
conviction that "I knew It would happen," reveal the relative ease
with which Individuals can Identify possible causes In retrospect.
These results Indicate one way In which Individuals may distort
Information and perceptions In an effort to assimilate unexpected
outcomes with the Intuitive theories they use to Interpret and
anticipate the world. Fischhoff (1975), In a discussion of the
Implications of the hindsight effect, noted that the Increase In the
perceived likelihood of an outcome systematically reduces the
surprlslngness of events, and minimizes learning and Improvement of
one's Intuitive theories: "The very outcome knowledge which gives us
the feeling that we understand what the past was all about may prevent
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us from learning anything from It" (pp. 298-299).
The hindsight effect may also provide some Insight Into the
tendency to blame victims. Including oneself. As previously
suggested, blaming oneself or a victim of misfortune Implies that
similar negative outcomes can be predicted, and perhaps avoided, In
the future (e.g., Janof f-Bulman & Lang-Gunn, In press; Lerner, 1970;
Wortman, 1976). Exaggeration of the degree to which a person could
have foreseen and predicted an outcome should Increase the perceived
responsibility of the victim. That Is, to the extent that an
unexpected negative outcome Is perceived. In hindsight, as the
Inevitable and foreseeable result of a person's (or one's own) actions
or other known factors, the victim In likely to be blamed, at least In
part, for the misfortune. Thus, the hindsight effect reported by
Fischhoff suggests a cognitive mechanism that may contribute to the
phenomenon of blaming the victim of misfortune.
In the present analysis, the hindsight effect suggests that
Inaccurate or unrealistic expectations will tend to "persevere." By
systematically and unknowingly minimizing the unexpected nature of
many events. Individuals fall to recognize the Inaccuracy of their
predictions, and to Improve their estimates of the likelihood of
uncertain events. As a result. Individuals are likely to maintain
unrealistic expectations about the future, and they may. In fact, deny
themselves the Increased ability to anticipate, and perhaps control,
future outcomes.
In summary, research has revealed a number of cognitive
heuristics that may Influence and systematically bias judgments about
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the likelihood of uncertain events. Like the motivational Influences
discussed earlier, these cognitive biases generally appear to promote
optimistic expectations for the future. In assessing the likelihood
of future outcomes, the biases associated with the use of cognitive
heuristics appear to contribute to a tendency to overestimate the
likelihood of positive outcomes In the future, and to underestimate
the likelihood of negative outcomes. Moreover, unrealistic
expectations may persevere, even In the face of disconf Irmatlon, since
Individuals appear to systematically and unknowingly reduce the
surprlslngness of unexpected events. Some Implications and
consequences of unrealistic optimism will be considered In the
following section.
The Consequences of Optimism
The theoretical formulations and empirical evidence reviewed In
this paper have suggested a number of factors that may tend to promote
optimistic expectations for the future. In concluding this review, 1t
Is Important to consider some possible consequences of optimism,
Including the psychological functions that may be served by optimism,
the psychological benefits of an optimistic outlook, and the
psychological effects of unrealistic optimism about the future.
Research suggests that perceived control and an expectation of
positive future outcomes are related to psychological and physical
well-being. Hopelessness has been viewed as a central component of
depression, suicide, soclopathy, and Illness (e.g.. Beck, 1963, 1967;
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Beck, Welssman, Lester, 8. Trexler, 1974; Melges 8. Bowlby, 1969;
Minkoff, Bergman, Beck, 8. Beck, 1973; Schamale, 1958). Depressed
Individuals, for example, appear to have unreallstlcally negative
attitudes toward the future, and recovery from depression Involves
Increases In hopefulness (Vatz, W1n1g, 8. Beck, 1969, cited In Matlln 8.
Stang, 1978).
Sellgman (1974, 1975) has argued that feelings of helplessness
and hopelessness are the result of prolonged experience of
non-contingency between one's behavior and outcomes. Learned
helplessness, the perception of Independence between one's actions and
outcomes. Involves the belief that one cannot Influence the occurrence
of positive and negative outcomes. Depresslves appear to have a
decreased sense of personal control and a markedly Increased sense of
vulnerability. Langer (1975) suggested that the "Illusion of control"
may be the Inverse of learned helplessness, and research Indicates
that depresslves are less Hkely than non-depress1 ves to manifest a
non-veridical "Illusion of control" (e.g.. Alloy 8« Abramson, 1979;
Golln, Terrell, 8. Johnson, 1977
;
Golln, Terrell, Weltz, 8( Drost,
1979). Thus, some types of depression may be rooted In feelings of a
loss of control over one's outcomes, and an "Illusion of control"
generally appears to be adaptive (Sellgman, 1974, 1975).
The perceived ability to prevent or avoid negative outcomes. In
particular, has generated considerable research Interest. There Is a
substantial body of empirical evidence Indicating that actual or
perceived control over averslve stimulation Is beneficial (for
reviews, see Averlll, 1973; Glass 8t Singer, 1972; Wortman 8( Brehm,
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1975). Even a non-verid1cal perception of control over an averslve
stimulus appears to reduce stress reactions. In a brief review of
this research, Lefcourt (1973) concluded:
The perception of control would seem to be a common
predictor of the response to averslve events ... the sense
of control, the Illusion that one can exercise personal
choice, has a definite and positive role In sustaining
life. (p. 424)
There Is other evidence to suggest that optimism may be
physically as well as psychologically adaptive. Feelings of hope and
optimism are being recognized as Important not only to a sense of
well-being, but In the etiology and course of physical Illness. The
significance of psychological state to disease onset Is Increasingly
being acknowledged (e.g., APA Task Force on Health Research, 1976;
Cohen, 1979). For example, Engel (1968) and Schamale (1972) have
proposed that feelings of helplessness or hopelessness following an
actual or threatened loss may contribute to the onset of disease.
Optimism and a positive state of mind are also regarded as significant
In the course of physical Illness and recovery (e.g.. Cousins, 1979;
Frank, 1975). Thus, 1n the case of physical Illness, optimism may
actually create a self-fulfllUng prophecy, decreasing the likelihood
of some serious Illnesses, or Increasing the likelihood of recovery.
In his Investigations of sudden death, Richter (1959) concluded
that "some of these Instances seem best described In terms of
hopelessness--11terally a giving up when all avenues of escape
appeared to be closed and the future holds no hope" (p. 311). Schulz
( 1976) also suggested that hope Is among the most Important
psychological mediators of life and death outcomes, and Identified
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perceived control over future outcomes as an essential component of
hope (cf. Sellgman. 1975). Similarly. Bettlehelm (1960) described the
relatively swift deaths of concentration camp Inmates who had lost
hope that they would ever leave the camp alive. Thus, evidence from a
variety of sources suggests that feelings of hopefulness about the
future, and perceived control over future outcomes, are Important to
an Individual's psychological and physical well-being.
The literature on reactions to disaster reveals the difficulty
people have coping with uncontrollable negative life events, and
maintaining a view of the world as relatively safe and oneself as
relatively Invulnerable. Janis (1951, 1974) and Mechanic (1972, 1978)
emphasized the psychological Importance of a sense of personal
Invulnerability, and described the effect of a disaster or near miss
experience as challenging, and sometimes shattering, an Individual's
feeling of Invulnerability. In his study of the survivors of
Hiroshima, Lifton (1971) described the sense of heightened
vulnerability experienced by the victims of severe negative events:
This Is usually attributed to the shattering of the Illusion
of personal Invulnerability which people tend to hold In
both ordinary and dangerous situations. But what also needs
to be emphasized Is the survivor's having experienced a
.larrinq awareness of the fact of death , as well as Its
extent and violence. Not only has any pre-existing Illusion
of Invulnerability been shattered, but he has been
disturbingly confronted with his own mortality . . . This
sense of heightened vulnerability strongly affects the
survivor's overall sense of the world around him. (p. 481)
An Illusion of personal Invulnerability, as previously suggested,
may be the Individual's final defense against the prospect of
uncontrollable negative outcomes. This Illusion appears to be a major
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source of optimism and protection against anxiety regarding remote
threats over which the Individual has little or no control. As such,
an Illusion of Invulnerability may be a psychological necessity, a
primary postulate In Individuals' theories of themselves and the
world, relatively resistant to change (cf. Eagly, 1967). Epstein
(1973) described an Individual's "self-theory" as part of a "broader
theory which he holds with respect to his entire range of significant
experience. Accordingly, there are major postulate systems for the
nature of the world, for the nature of the self, and for their
interaction " (p. 407). In the present context, an illusion of
relative invulnerability to severe negative events may be viewed as a
"higher order postulate" regarding the Interaction of oneself and the
world, fundamental to the maintenance of an individual's "theory."
The Importance and the difficulty of Integrating a disaster
experience with one's view of the world was described by Wolfenstein
(1957):
It is both frightening and offensive to our self-esteem to
suppose that our lives can be drastically altered or
disposed of altogether by the action of chance and
meaningless forces. . . . When the toll of the disaster Is
reckoned up afterwards the problem arises for many of those
affected how to fit the occurrence of such devastation and
loss Into their view of the world. The question of why such
a thing should have happened comes up repeatedly, and
answers in terms of mere physical forces (in the case of a
tornado, for Instance) often leave a sense of painful
puzzlement. Answers are sought rather in terms of a purpose
which would give meaning to what has happened, or an agency
to which responsibility and blame can be attached. (pp.
199-200)
Thus, in the aftermath of a disaster or near-miss experience, the
individual must attempt the difficult task of reconstructing a
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world-view that promotes a sense of personal safety and relative
Invulnerability, and reassures the Individual about future outcomes.
In the case of severe and unexpected outcomes, the Individual Is
likely to seek control over the possible recurrence of the outcome by
an understanding of how or why the outcome occurred (cf. Bucher, 1957;
Drabeck & Quarantelll, 1967). Helder (1958) emphasized the Importance
of causal attribution In understanding the meaning of a harmful
event: "Without attribution to causal source and Intention, (the
person) could neither avoid nor prevent, but would be at the mercy of
seemingly fickle events In the environment" (p. 257). Lazarus (1966)
also noted the Importance of control and mastery In an Individual's
cognitive appraisal of a threat, and an Individual's sense of control
over future threatening outcomes In delayed appraisals, after a
confrontation with danger: "If ... the experience Is Interpreted to
mean that his Impressions of Invulnerability are not Justified and
that he lacks control over his destiny. It may frighten him greatly"
(p. 42).
Self-blame attributions, as previously noted, provide the
Individual with a means of restoring a sense of safety regarding
future outcomes. It may be difficult to blame oneself for negative
outcomes, but It may be more threatening to view the world as a place
where severe, uncontrollable outcomes happen to people on a random
basis ( Janof f-Bulman & Lang-Gunn, In press; Lerner & Miller, 1978;
Wortman, 1976). Medea and Thompson (1974), for example, described the
need for future control expressed In the self-blame of rape victims:
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What appears to be guilt ... may be the way the woman's
mind Interprets a positive impulse, a need to be in control
Of ner life. If the woman can believe that somehow she gotherself into the situation, if she can feel that in some way
she caused it, if she can make herself responsible for it
then she's established a sort of control over the rape
.
.
*
If it happened entirely without provocation, then it could
happen again. This is too horrifying to believe, so the
victim creates an illusion of safety by declaring herself
responsible for the incident, (pp. 105-106)
Thus, optimism about the future appears to be significant in
terms of the individual's psychological and physical well-being. When
the source of that optimism, such as perceived control or
invulnerability, is challenged, individuals are likely to make
efforts, through their interpretation and explanation of the event, to
restore the source of their optimism, and to reassure themselves about
future outcomes. However, the distinction between perceived control
and an illusion of invulnerability suggests that optimism may not
always be adaptive, depending upon the source and accuracy of
individuals' expectations. Individuals' responses before and after a
severe negative event may depend, in part, on whether their
expectations are based primarily on perceived control oti on an
illusion of invulnerability.
In general, when the individual can, in fact, influence the
occurrence of a particular outcome, optimism about that outcome based
on perceived control will likely be realistic and adaptive. For
example, if individuals are optimistic that they will not develop lung
cancer because they do not smoke cigarettes, their optimism is
4
probably warranted and beneficial. Likewise, optimism based on
denial and an illusion of invulnerability is probably an accurate and
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adaptive response toward unlikely, remote threats. Events such as
natural disasters or a1r disasters are so unlikely and uncontrollable,
denial that they will happen, or happen to oneself. Is probably
realistic and adaptive for the Individual.
In contrast, minimizing one's control and maintaining an Illusion
of personal Invulnerability may be maladaptive for outcomes over which
the Individual can exert some control (e.g., lung cancer). A degree
of perceived vulnerability necessary to acknowledge a danger may be
Important In dealing effectively with realistic threats and risks.
The Individual who denies that he or she will experience a particular
outcome, who maintains that "It won't happen to me," may actually
Increase their risk by neglecting to exercise available precautions
(Janis, 1967, 1974). Moreover, the person who denies a threat and
falls to take precautions may experience more emotional distress If
the threat actually materializes.
Likewise, optimism that exaggerates the Individual's actual
control Is likely to be maladaptive. Wortman and Brehm (1975) have
argued that an accurate assessment of one's potential for control will
generally be more adaptive than an assessment which exaggerates an
Individual's perceived control. There are many life events that are
largely unpredictable or uncontrollable (e.g., natural disasters,
serious Illness), events over which the Individual cannot,
realistically, exert control. When a threat Is truly uncontrollable
and remote. It may be most adaptive for the Individual to • acknowledge
the uncontrollable nature of the event and to maintain an Illusion of
relative Invulnerability. Exaggerated notions of personal control, or
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extensive past experience with control over Important events 1n one's
life, may make It more difficult for an Individual to accept and cope
with uncontrollable outcomes when they do occur (Wortman, 1976).
Moreover, Langer (1975) suggested that an Illusion of control may
contribute to manic reactions, and noted Beck's (1967) description of
the manic patient as "optimistic about anything he undertakes. Even
when confronted with an Insoluble problem he Is confident that he will
find a solution (p. 93) .
"
In general, then, optimism based on a relatively accurate
assessment of the likelihood of specific outcomes, and an Individual's
potential for control. Is probably the most adaptive for the
Individual (cf. Wortman 8. Brehm, 1975). There Is evidence suggesting
that Individuals who have accurate expectations about a stressful
event cope better than Individuals with unrealistic expectations
(e.g., Janis, 1958). However, the preceding review has Identified
many cognitive and motivational factors that may bias Individuals'
judgments about the likelihood and controllability of outcomes, making
an accurate assessment difficult, at best.
Moreover, since Individuals rarely have complete control over
Important outcomes, some sense of personal Invulnerability toward most
negative events may be beneficial. Janis (1951) argued that a
qual If led rather than total belief In personal Immunity may be the
most favorable condition for coping with extreme events. Similarly,
In a discussion of the consequences of the denial of danger,
Wolfenstein (1957) suggested that:
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There 1s likely to be more emotional disturbance following
the event on the part of those who beforehand warded off all
anxiety, and denied the reality of the threat, than on the
part of those who were able to tolerate some anticipatory
alarm and to acknowledge that the danger could happen.
Anticipation constitutes a small-scale preliminary exposure
on the level of Imagination and can have an Inoculating
effect. By rehearsing and familiarizing oneself with the
coming event one may reduce the risk of being overwhelmed by
the experience. ... The Individual who to retain his sense
of safety must deny that anything terrible will happen has
his feeling of security shattered when danger materializes.
The person who admits that extremely dangerous events may
occur, but retains the belief that he himself will survive,
Is the one who Is apt to emerge from danger with less
disturbance, (pp. 25-26)
Thus, optimism, and an Illusion of Invulnerability qualified by
an acknowledgement of potential danger, may be the most adaptive
response to the prospect of severe negative events. Janis (1958) has
suggested that awareness and rehearsal of potential threats--the "work
of worry"--1s a form of cognitive preparation that may ultimately
enhance the Individual's ability to accept and cope with unpleasant
events, at the cost of Immediate stress reactions. In addition,
accurate Information about what to expect, and what one can do. If
anything, may benefit the Individual.
Similarly, In the cognitive model of stress and coping developed
by Lazarus (1966) and his colleagues, coping Involves cognitive
appraisals of a threat and coping options both before and after the
threat has materialized. According to this model, cognitive (or
Intrapsychic) processes. Including denial, avoidance, and detachment,
are an especially Important mode of coping when there Is little that
an Individual can do directly. This model suggests that for
uncontrollable negative outcomes, an Individual's expectations about
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future outcomes, and attributions for past outcomes, represent a
significant aspect of the coping process.
From this perspective. optimism about future outcomes,
particularly uncontrollable negative outcomes, can be regarded as a
form of "anticipatory coping." Research on coping with events such as
serious illness, natural disasters, and criminal victimization, has
focused almost exclusively on individuals' subsequent reactions, and
has sometimes noted the impact of the event on individuals' future
expectations. However, the role of individuals' prior expectations
regarding an outcome, and the relationship between their expectations
and their subsequent coping efforts (including attributions), has been
largely ignored.
In summary, there is some evidence to suggest that optimism may
be psychologically and physically adaptive, and that a sense of
relative invulnerability may be a psychological necessity in a world
full of remote threats. Optimism about negative events can be viewed
as a form of anticipatory coping, and individuals' expectations about
an outcome are likely to affect their reactions following the
experience of the outcome. The experience of severe negative events
(e.g., natural disasters) that disconfirms an individual's optimism
and violates a sense of control or invulnerability appears to produce
psychological distress and a heightened sense of vulnerability.
Efforts to cope in the aftermath of an unexpected negative outcome and
to restore optimism about the future often seem to involve a search
for meaning and attributions about the cause of the event. The most
psychologically adaptive attitude toward remote threats may be an
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Illusion of relative Invulnerability
of potential danger, and an accurate
the outcome.
qualified by an acknowledgement
assessment of one's control over
Optimism: Meaning and Measurement
Throughout this review. Issues concerning the definition and
verldlcallty of optimism have been diligently avoided, on the
assumption that readers share an understanding of the term, and In an
effort to consider a broad range of phenomena that might be regarded
as optimistic. Clearly, however, any endeavor to systematically
investigate optimism must ultimately address Issues of meaning and
measurement. Optimism Is commonly understood to denote "an
inclination to put the most favorable construction upon actions and
events or to anticipate the best possible outcome" (Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary), "an attitude characterized by hope ... and
faith In the future" (Chaplin, Dictionary of Psychology). These
popular definitions refer primarily to the re lative perceived
likelihood of positive and negative outcomes . By definition, then,
the essence of optimism is an asymmetry In the expectation of positive
and negative outcomes.
Beyond the fundamental definition of optimism as the expectation
of positive outcomes, the term "optimism" sometimes connotes an
unfounded or unrealistic expectation of positive outcomes . In this
sense, optimism approaches what is usually regarded as "wishful
thinking," expectations based on one's desires. Independent, and
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sometimes a contradiction of reality. In such Instances, an
Individual's optimism about the future may be evaluated by others as
"unwarranted" or "unrealistic." Similarly, an Individual may express
optimism with varying degrees of certainty or conviction, as In
"guardedly" or "cautiously" optimistic. Thus, optimism, per se. Is
not Inherently unrealistic or biased, but It may be regarded, In some
Instances, as unrealistic.
The degree to which an optimistic expectation Is realistic may be
evaluated In terms of the accuracy or completeness of the Information
on which the expectation Is based. For example, optimism may be
unwarranted, or unrealistic, because Its source Is Inaccurate (e.g.,
an Illusion of contingency, control, or Invulnerability), or
Inappropriate, In that It bears no relationship to the occurrence of
the outcome (e.g., desire). Optimism may also be unrealistic If 1t Is
not based, at least In part, on relevant Information available about
the likelihood of a particular outcome, Including both Individuating
Information and the actual or perceived base-rate of the outcome.
Thus, optimism about specific positive or negative outcomes may
be evaluated as unrealistic, at least In part, by the extent to which
It departs from the objective prior probability of the outcome. For
example, the Individual who expects to win the state lottery despite
the very low odds of winning may be described as unreallstlcally
optimistic. Similarly, the person who does not wear seat belts and
expects to survive an automobile accident Is unreallstlcally
optimistic. In each of these Instances, the Individual's expectations
clearly contradict the known or estimated probability of the
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particular outcome.
However, U Is usually difficult to determine whether or not a
given individual's expectations about the future are realistic. The
source of an individual's optimism may Include fundamental beliefs or
postulates that are not easily articulated or assessed. In addition,
information about the base-rate or prior probability of the outcome is
not readily available for many positive and negative life events.
Moreover, expectations should also be influenced by relevant
individuating data, and individuating information is almost always
available in making judgments about oneself.
This analysis has important implications for an understanding and
evaluation of optimism. Evidence of optimism generally derives from
the two asymmetries in judgment described in this review--the
asymmetries in expectations of positive versus negative events, and
expectations for oneself versus others. Specifically, people judge
that positive outcomes are more likely than negative outcomes, and
that they are more likely to experience positive outcomes and less
likely to experience negative outcomes than others. These comparisons
provide evidence of optimism in individuals' judgments, but they do
not necessarily demonstrate bias or distortion in judgment.
An asymmetry in the expectation of positive versus negative
outcomes may simply reflect individuals' perceptions of the actual
distribution of positive and negative outcomes (cf. Kanouse & Hanson,
1971). This perception may be an accurate reflection of the
Individual's personal history and experience, or may develop as a
product of selective recall of one's experiences (cf. Matlin 8. Stang,
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1978). Thus, differences in the judged likelihood of positive and
negative outcomes may demonstrate optimism, but not necessarily
optimism that Is unrealistic or distorted by personal motivations and
desi res
.
Similarly, asymmetries In Individuals' expectations for
themselves versus others may simply reflect differences In the
availability of relevant Individuating Information. The Individual,
as Welnstein (1980) noted, may be quite correct In asserting that his
or her chances of experiencing an outcome are greater or less than
average. The perceived or actual base-rate provides Individuals with
the best estimate of the likelihood of experiencing an outcome for an
unknown other or the "average" person, given the absence of
individuating Information. However, Individuals' judgments about
their own likelihood of experiencing an outcome may qualify the
base-rate prediction with Individuating Information In the form of
their personal knowledge and experience.
In short, differences in individuals' expectations for positive
versus negative outcomes, and for themselves versus others,
demonstrate optimism, but do not necessarily provide evidence of
systematic bias or distortion in judgments about future outcomes. The
demonstration of bias would require evidence, for example, that
individuals' judgments are systematically influenced by factors
Irrelevant to outcome likelihood, such as perceived threat or
desirability. For instance, the judgment that positive events are
more likely than negative events given equal base-rates would provide
evidence of bias. Similarly, judgments that are differentially
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Influenced by relevant information may provide evidence of
distortion. For example, the selective use or neglect of base-rate
information as a function of its favorability would provide some
evidence of bias.
An alternative approach, used by Welnstein (1980), is to
demonstrate optimistic bias in group judgments. If the average
judgment of a group is that their chances of experiencing an outcome
are greater or less than average, Welnstein (1980) argued, the
judgments are sytematical ly biased, and provide evidence of
unrealistic optimism. As previously noted, Welnstein (1980)
acknowledged that discrepancies between the perceived population
average and judgments about one's own likelihood do not provide
evidence of bias, since a given individual's likelihood may not
coincide with the population base-rate. However, the control of event
characteristics, such as desirability or base-rate, can provide tests
of bias that are not limited to group judgments, and provide
Information about some of the processes involved in judgments about
future events, rather than simply a demonstration of bias.
In the measurement of perceived likelihood or probability, it is
Important that Investigations of optimism and the differential effects
of event characteristics on judgments, obtain separate, rather than
comparative judgments of likelihood for oneself and others. In
contrast, respondents in Weinstein's (1980) study made a comparative
judgment of their chances of experiencing various outcomes compared to
other students at the college (i.e., perceived base-rate). Response
options ranged from "100% less than average" to "five times greater
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than average." Use of a comparative judgment limited this study to a
demonstration of "optimistic bias," rather than optimism, per se,
since these judgments obscure the absolute degree of optimism or
perceived likelihood. That Is, repondents may perceive their own
chances of experiencing an outcome to be greater or less than average,
but they may judge the outcome to be relatively likely or unlikely.
Moreover, the use of comparative judgments about one's own
likelihood compared to others obscures potential differences In the
relationship between event characteristics and judgments about oneself
versus others. Welnstein (1980) found that event characteristics were
differentially related to comparative judgments about positive versus
negative outcomes. The present review and analysis suggests that many
of these characteristics should also differentially affect judgments
about oneself versus others. For Instance, motivational
considerations suggest that the desirability or Importance of an event
should have a greater Influence on judgments about one's own
likelihood of experiencing an event than on judgments regarding
others. Thus, measures of comparative rather than separate judgments
of outcome likelihood for self versus others Involves a considerable
loss of Information significant to an understanding of optimism.
In summary, optimism denotes an expectation of positive outcomes
that Is not Inherently unrealistic or biased. The degree to which an
optimistic expectation Is unrealistic or unfounded generally depends
upon the accuracy and completeness of the beliefs and Information on
which the expectation Is based. Optimism may be unrealistic If It Is
based on Inaccurate beliefs (e.g., Illusion of control. Illusion of
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contingency between desire and outcome), or 1f U neglects relevant
Information about the likelihood of the outcome, Including both
base-rate and Individuating Information.
Asymmetries In expectations of positive versus negative outcomes,
and expectations for oneself versus others, demonstrate optimism, but
do not necessarily reveal bias or distortion In judgment. Bias may be
evident In discrepancies between group judgments and the perceived or
actual base-rate, or In the Influence of factors varying In relevance
to judgments of outcome likelihood. Demonstrations of optimism would
seem to require separate, absolute measures of perceived likelihood or
probability, rather than comparative judgments.
Summary
The studies reviewed In this paper provide considerable evidence
that people expect that their personal futures will be positive. In
general, and In terms of specific outcomes. The review of relevant
social psychological theory and research Identified a number of
motivational and cognitive factors that may promote optimistic
expectations for the future by leading Individuals to overestimate the
likelihood of positive outcomes and to underestimate the likelihood of
negative outcomes.
The asymmetry often observed In Individuals' explanations for
positive and negative outcomes apparently extends to their predictions
about future outcomes. This review suggests that many of the same
motivational and cognitive processes may contribute to the divergence
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1n Individuals' explanations and expectations of positive and negative
outcomes. People appear to exaggerate the relationship between their
desires. Intentions, and actions, and their past and future outcomes.
They minimize the role of chance In producing outcomes, and exaggerate
their own control. Not surprisingly, people also seem to rely heavily
on their own personal experience, through which they appear to develop
generalized beliefs or "theories" about themselves and the world.
Moreover, these theories tend to persevere, even In the face of
contradictory Information.
The operation of these various motivational and cognitive
processes In Individuals' explanations and expectations about positive
and negative outcomes may be Influenced by two characteristics unique
to judgments about oneself. First, an Individual's own past
experience and future prospects are Inherently Important, and this
Importance to the Individual may qualify the Influence of motivational
and cognitive factors. Motivations for control, safety, or wish
fulfillment, for example, may be magnified In the consideration of
one's own past and future outcomes. Second, Individuals have detailed
knowledge about themselves—their own motives. Intentions, personal
experience and history (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). The availability and
richness of this Information makes it likely to be favored over other
types of Information (e.g., normative data) In forming judgments.
In addition. Individuals' predictions about their future outcomes
may be even more susceptible to bias than their explanations of past
outcomes because of a fundamental difference In the nature of these
two judgment tasks. Uncertainty, or ambiguity, Is a key feature of
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efforts to forecast the future. In contrast, explanations about past
outcomes are constrained, to some degree, by the facts, which must be
Incorporated Into any "reasonable" or satisfactory explanation. Thus,
the uncertain nature of future events may enhance the potential
Influence of motivational and cognitive biases.
The source and degree of optimism In judgments about the
likelihood of a future event are likely to vary as a function of the
perceived characteristics of the event. This review has revealed
several event characteristics that are likely to Influence judgments
and optimism: perceived desirability or severity, perceived
likelihood (or base-rate), and the perceived controllability of the
event. In addition to these event characteristics, personal
experience or familiarity with an event appears to affect judgments
about the likelihood of experiencing an outcome.
However, despite the wealth of Indirect evidence of optimism
about the future, and the considerable body of research on how people
Judge the likelihood of uncertain events, there Is relatively little
direct evidence regarding the nature and sources of optimism about
future life events. Research on judgment processes has focused almost
exclusively on judgments about hypothetical or remote events, and have
not studied judgments about oneself, or events of Importance to the
Individual. Similarly, the early studies of "wishful thinking" (e.g.,
Cantrll, 1938; Lund, 1925; McGregor, 1938), which emphasized the roles
of ambiguity and personal Importance In the Influence of subjective
factors on predictions, generally examined judgments about remote
social events, rather than events of personal consequence to the
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Individual.
Welnsteln's (1980) research provided a demonstration of an
"optimistic bias" In comparative judgments about self and other, and
Indicated that Individuating Information about others (viz., lists of
relevant factors prepared by other students) reduced but did not
eliminate the optimism expressed In comparative judgments. However,
It Is not clear from these data whether the Individuating Information
about others affected judgments about oneself or others. Moreover,
given the relatively small, albeit significant, reduction In optimism,
Welnstein (1980) concluded that "there appear to be more persistent
sources of optimism
. . . that cannot be eliminated just by
encouraging people to think more carefully about their comparative
Judgments or by providing them with Information about others" (p.
817). Similarly, In their study of egocentrism In judgments about
negative events, Welnstein and Lachendro (1982) concluded that
optimism about oneself relative to others does not result from a lack
of Information about the attributes and actions of others.
In an effort to further establish some of the motivational and
cognitive factors that may contribute to optimistic expectations, the
present study examined the effects of event severity and Information
about population base-rates on judgments about the likelihood of
negative life events. It Is commonly observed that people expect
misfortune to happen to others, not to themselves. The present
analysis suggests that event severity and the use (or non-use) of
base-rate Information may contribute to optimistic expectations and
this asymmetry In judgments about the likelihood of future events.
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A fundamental hypothesis regarding optimism about negative life
events Is that severe negative outcomes are perceived as less llkelv
than m11d negative outcome^; To control the objective likelihood of
mild and severe events, base-rate Information was provided In some
conditions, with mild and severe events matched on the base-rates
specified. It was hypothesized that event severity (mild versus
severe) would Influence Judgments even when the perceived probability
Is controlled. That 1s, Individuals would Judge severe outcomes to
be less likely, 1n general, than mild outcomes, even under conditions
of equal base-rate. Given the personal Importance of predictions
about one's own future outcomes. It was also predicted that event
severity would have a stronger effect on Judgments about oneself than
on Judgments about others
. Thus, underestimation of the likelihood of
negative events, especially severe negative events, was predicted to
be greatest In Judgments regarding one's own future outcomes.
In addition. It was hypothesized that both mild and severe
negative outcomes would be Judged less likely to happen to oneself
than to others . Like the preceding hypothesis, this hypothesis
derived from a consideration of both cognitive and motivational
processes. Under conditions of no base-rate Information, this pattern
of results for self versus other Judgments would be a partial
replication of Welnsteln's (1980) major finding, using separate
judgments for self and other.
When base-rate Information Is provided, It was predicted that
Judgments of outcome likelihood for others would be revised In the
direction of the base-rate specified. Base-rate Information should
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affect judgments about the likelihood of future events, even when
case-spedflc (I.e., Individuating) Information Is available. To the
extent that individuating information is available, judgments should
not be expected to coincide with the population base-rate, but should
be Influenced by base-rate information.
It was hypothesized that for .judgments of their own likelihood of
experiencing various life events, individuals would selectively use
base-rate information. That is, it was predicted that individuals
would use base-rate information "objectively" to the extent that the
information is favorable and supports or enhances optimistic
expectations for the future. If the base-rate specified is more
favorable than the perceived base-rate (i.e., lower probability),
individuals would revise their judgments of their own likelihood of
experiencing the outcome. If the base-rate specified is less
favorable (i.e., higher probability) than their estimate, individuals
would reject base-rate information in judging the likelihood of their
own future outcomes.
The latter hypotheses regarding the use of base-rate information
predicted that individuals would not consistently ignore base-rate
information in making judgments about future life events. Rather,
individuals would use causally significant base-rate information to
the extent that it has no personal consequences, as in judgments about
others, or to the extent that it is consistent with their
self-interest (cf. Abelson, 1974).
This study was intended to provide further evidence of optimism
in judgments about future life events, and to elucidate some of the
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factors that Influence judgments about uncertain events. The
selective use of base-rate Information would establish a possible
mechanism by which optimistic expectations are maintained or
enhanced--the selective use of objective Information (cf. Ross,
1977). Selective use of base-rate Information may lead to large and
persistent biases In Individuals' expectations for the future. These
biases may be serious In their Implications, In terms of the
likelihood of unexpected or unrealized outcomes, and responses to
realistic risks. For example, public health efforts often rely on
success in convincing members of the population, or subgroups, that
they are "at risk."
In addition to the major hypotheses tested in the present study,
secondary measures were Included to assess judgment certainty, some
perceived characteristics of each outcome, personal concern about each
outcome, and personal experience with each outcome. These measures
were Included to explore the potentially significant relationships
between each of these variables and judgments of outcome likelihood.
For example, a measure of judgment certainty was Included In an
exploratory effort to determine whether optimism that is unrealistic
is associated with greater uncertainty. Similarly, measures of
perceived controllability were included to examine the relationship
between perceived controllability and optimism about negative life
events. This review suggests that if Individuals have an "illusion of
invulnerability," optimism will not be limited to events perceived as
controllable, contrary to Weinstein's (1980) conclusion.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Overview
The primary purpose of this study was to Investigate the effects
of the severity of an event (mild or severe) and base-rate Information
on judgments about the likelihood of negative future life events. The
respondents were asked to make judgments about the likelihood of
themselves and others experiencing each of several negative life
events. Some respondents were provided with Information specifying a
population base-rate for each event. The questionnaire contained
Items designed to measure judgment certainty, perceived
characteristics of each event (e.g., severity, predictability, and
controllability), personal concern, and personal experience with each
event
.
Respondents
The respondents were 206 students enrolled In an Introductory
psychology course at the University of Massachusetts. The respondents
received course credit for their participation In the study.
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Design
The experimental design was a mixed design, with two
between-subjects factors (severity of event, base-rate Information),
and one withln-subjects factor (events within severity condition).
The design Included two event severity conditions (m1ld versus
severe), and two base-rate Information conditions (no base-rate
Information versus base-rate Information). Both severity conditions
contained four events (see Table 1). The mild and severe versions of
each event were matched on specified base-rate.
Table 1
Experimental Design
Mild Severe
Event] - Event4 Event"! - Event4
No base-rate
information 53 51
Base-rate
information 51 51
Note . Values represent cell ns.
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Procedure
The study was conducted during a regularly scheduled class
session, and was Introduced as a study of predictions about the
future. The cover sheet with Instructions Included examples to
clarify the meaning of probability judgments. Respondents were given
a questionnaire about either mild or severe negative life events.
Events were presented In a fixed sequence, with the order of self and
other Judgments (I.e., probability estimates and certainty judgments)
counterbalanced across conditions. One-half of the questionnaires
specified a population base-rate for each event. The four versions of
the questionnaire (see Appendix) were distributed randomly.
Independent Variables
Event severity (mild versus severe) was manipulated by varying
the relative severity in the description of each event. Four life
events in the areas of marriage, health, crime, and employment were
described, with a relatively "mild" and severe version of each event
(see Table 2). For example, the mild and severe negative life events
concerning marriage were "temporary marital difficulties resulting in
a short-term separation" and "divorce," respectively.
The availability of base-rate information (no base-rate
information versus base-rate information) was manipulated by providing
population base-rate figures In the description of each event for
respondents in the base-rate information conditions. For example:
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Table 2
Life Events & Base-rates Specified
Base-Rate Severity Event
MARRIAGE
M1ld Temporary marital difficulties resulting In
35% a short-term separation
Severe Divorce
EMPLOYMENT
M1ld Required to accept a job outside chosen
20% field for a year or longer
Severe Unemployed and unable to find a job for
a year or longer
CRIME
M1ld Victim of major property crime (motor
25% vehicle or major household theft, etc.)
Severe Victim of personal crime (assault, rape,
mugging, etc.)
15% Mild
Severe
HEALTH
Curable (non-fatal) form of cancer
Terminal (fatal) form of cancer
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g1v2l£e. Figures published recently by the U. S. Department of
Hea th and Human Services indicate that 35% of married persons
will experience a divorce during their lifetime.
The base-rates specified ranged from 15% to 35% for the four events,
with the same base-rate specified for the mild and severe version of
each event (see Table 2).
The base-rates specified were estimates based on the limited
Information available, and the constraint of equal base-rates in the
mild and severe conditions. For some events, actual base-rate
Information was not readily available, and available information was
not in the form required (i.e. probability during one's lifetime).
Thus, the figures provided as actual rates were derived from
population data, but are estimates adjusted to serve as a common
base-rate In the mild and severe conditions.
Dependent Measures
All respondents were asked to complete a questionnaire containing
the following measures.
Perceived Population Base-rate
Respondents were asked first to judge the probability that the
average person in the general population would experience each event.
In the base-rate information conditions, these judgments were made
prior to receiving base-rate information. In addition, in the series
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of questions about each event, respondents were asked to Judge the
general likelihood of the event on a 7-po1nt scale ranging from "very
unlikely" to "very likely." This Item was Included as an Independent
measure of perceived likelihood.
Probability Judgments: Self and Other
For each event, respondents were asked to estimate the
probability that they would experience the event In the future, and
the probability that the average person In the class would experience
the event.
Judgment Certainty
Respondents were asked to Indicate their degree of certainty In
their probability estimates for self and other by rating their
certainty on 7-po1nt scales anchored by "completely certain" to "not
certain at all.
"
Perceived Characteristics of Event
For each event, respondents were asked to provide the following
ratings on 7-po1nt bipolar adjective scales: mild-severe,
predictable-unpredictable, Important-not Important, fair-unfair, and
threatenlng-not threatening.
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Perceived Control: Self and QthPr
To measure perceived control over each event, respondents were
asked to Indicate the extent to which they believe that they can
effectively control or prevent the occurrence of each event. Ratings
were provided on 7-po1nt scales, ranging from "no control" to
"complete control." Respondents were asked to make the same judgment
about the average person In the class.
Personal Concern
To measure personal concern about each event, respondents were
asked to Indicate the degree of their concern or worry about the
possibility of experiencing each of the four events. Ratings were
provided on 7-po1nt scales ranging from "very concerned" to "not at
all concerned."
Personal Experience
Respondents were asked to describe their experience with each
event using the following response categories: 1 = has not happened
to anyone I know; 2 = has happened to acquaintances; 3 = has
happened to close friends or relatives; 4 = has happened to me
personally. In addition, respondents reporting that acquaintances,
close friends, or relatives have experienced the event were asked to
Indicate the number of people they know who have experienced the event.
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Self Descriptions
Finally, the respondents were asked a series of questions to
assess self-perceptions of optimism and both general and relative life
satisfaction. Three Items asked respondents to rate on 7-po1nt scales
how optimistic they are, and how happy and lucky they are compared to
most people. Two Items asked the respondents about their relative
life satisfaction; specifically, respondents were asked to rate how
life has treated them, compared to the average person In the country
,
and compared to the average person In the class . Finally, three Items
to assess life satisfaction were adapted from the personal ladder
ratings of Cantrll's (1965) "self-anchoring striving scale." For
these questions, respondents were asked to Imagine the worst and best
possible life for themselves, and to rate, on 7-po1nt scales, where
they stand at the present time, where they stood five years ago , and
where they think they will stand five years from now . These three
Items-past, present, and expected future life sat1sfact1on--were
treated separately and combined, as an Index of life satisfaction.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Overview
The data were analyzed by 2 x 2 x 2 x 4 mixed design unweighted
means analyses of variance, with three between-subjects factors
(severity, base-rate, and sex of respondent) and one withln-subjects
factor (event). These analyses provided tests of the main effects for
severity, base-rate Information, sex, and event, and the Interactions
among these factors. To assess the differential effects of the
Independent variables on self versus other judgments, five-way mixed
design analyses of variance were conducted for the measures of
probability, certainty, and control, treating type of judgment (self or
other) as an additional withln-subjects factor.
Subsequent to the analyses of variance, differences among cell
means for significant effects were analyzed with the Newman-Keuls
( a = .05) and other multiple comparison procedures. Specific
Internal analyses were conducted to test the hypothesis regarding the
selective use of base-rate Information, and correlations among selected
measures were also examined.
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Manipulation Checks
The effect of order of judgments (self and other),
counterbalanced across conditions, was tested directly. For the first
and subsequent events, there were no significant differences between
self and other probability judgments as a function of order of
presentation (all £s > .25). Therefore, all subsequent analyses are
reported for conditions collapsed over order of presentation of self
and other Items,
The manipulation of event severity was confirmed by respondents'
ratings of severity and threat. There was a significant main effect
of severity for both the mild-severe rating [F ( 1
.
192) = 77.85. <
.001] and the threatenlng-not threatening rating [F (1, 193)= 60.31, ^
< .001]. Each of the events In the severe condition was Judged to be
more severe and more threatening than the corresponding event In the
mild condition (see Table 13).
As expected, base-rate Information had no significant effect on
the Initial probability judgments (I.e., perceived population
base-rates) made prior to the presentation of base-rate Information
(all p^s > .20). Base-rate Information also had no significant effect
on ratings of event likelihood [F ( 1,195) = 0.84, & > .60], but did
have significant effects on the more direct measures of self and other
probability estimates. The nature of these effects will be described
In the following section.
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Probability Judgments
Effects of Severity
The first hypothesis advanced regarding optimism about negative
life events stated that severe negative outcomes are perceived as less
likely than mild negative outcomes. For the estimates of population,
self, and other probability, a consistent, significant main effect for
event severity was obtained (see Table 3). For each of these
measures, the mild negative event was judged to have a higher
probability than the severe negative event. The magnitude of the
effect for event severity varied across the four life events, as
indicated by significant severity x event interactions for each of
these measures. However, for every probability judgment and event,
the mild version of the event was judged to be more probable than the
severe version.
The hypothesized main effect for type of judgment (self versus
other) on probability estimates was confirmed. Both mild and severe
outcomes were judged less likely to happen to oneself than to others
[F (1, 187) = 142.31, £ < .001]. That is, the average person in the
class judged themself to be significantly less likely than the
"average person in the class" to experience both the mild and the
severe negative events.
The extended hypothesis that event severity would have a stronger
effect on judgments regarding one's own future outcomes than on
judgments about others received only marginal support from the data.
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Table 3
Mean Probability Estimates for Population, Self, and Other
Probability Estimate
Condition Ponii 1 ;^ nn1 w p u 1 a L 1 u 1
1
1 r Other
Mild JC • C\J 47.76*
Severe CO .)SO 38.24
No base-rate 49.10 37.88* 48.18*
Base-rate 47.23 30.97 37 .71
Females 51 .97* 38.64* 47 .00*
Males 43.95 29.47 38.49
Event #1 52.19* 28.49* 46.07*
Event #2 55.04 39.03 47.19
Event #3 48.35 40.06 44.85
Event #4 37.03 30.05 33.88
Note. Significance levels refer to analysis of variance main
effects for each of the dependent measures.
*£ < .001
The Interaction between severity and type of judgment (self versus
other) was not significant [F ( 1 , 187) = 0.55, & > .50] over all
events (see Table 3). However, there was a significant Interaction of
severity, type of judgment (self versus other), and event [F (3,
561) = 3.63, £ < .02]. The means presented 1n Table 4 suggest that,
with the exception of Event #4 (health), severity tended to have a
greater Impact on self than other judgments, resulting In a greater
no
discrepancy between self and other probability estimates for severe
events. However. given the relatively large between-subjects
variability In probability estimates, the differential effect of
severity on self and other judgments for these events only approached
statistical significance. Orthogonal contrasts comparing the
magnitude of the severity effect between self and other judgments for
the first three events were only marginally significant [t (561) =
1.63, e. < -15]. For the fourth event, the magnitude of the severity
Table 4
Mean Probability Estimates for Population, Self, and Other
as a Function of Severity and Event
Severity
Probability Estimate
Event Population Self Other
Mild Event
Event
Event
Event
#1
#2
#3
#4
54.835
64.09c
52.II5
37.77a
32.95a
49.245
45.925
31.64a
48.755
54.77c
49.425c
38.11a
Total 52.20 39.94 47.76
Severe Event
Event
Event
Event
#1
#2
#3
#4
49.445
45.635
44.445
36.27a
24.08a
28.91a5
34.255
28.47a5
43.395
39.625
40.285
29.66a
Total 43.95 28.93 38.24
Note. Newman-Keuls comparisons were conducted separately within
severity conditions for each dependent measure. Means sharing no
common subscript differ significantly < .05).
effect was greater for other judgments than for self judgments, but
again, the observed difference was not statistically significant [t
(561) = -1.32, £ < .20].
This Interaction Is contrary to Welnsteln's (1980) unexpected
finding that ratings of the comparative likelihood of negative events
for self and other appear not to be affected by the relative severity
of the event. The presence of a significant severity x type of
judgment (self versus other) x event Interaction suggests that for at
least some events, severity may have a stronger effect on judgments
about oneself than about others. This finding In Inconsistent with
Welnsteln's (1980) failure to observe an effect of event severity on
comparative self/other judgments (I.e., no differential effect on self
and other judgments). However, given the relatively small magnitude
of this three-way 1nteract1on--espec1al ly considering the large sample
s1ze--1t Is reasonable to conclude that the enhanced Impact of
severity on self judgments Is not a very strong effect.
Effects of Base-rate Information
Prior to a discussion of the effect of base-rate Information on
judgments of probability. It Is necessary to compare the perceived
population base-rates with the population base-rate Information
provided. Contrary to expectation, respondents In the present study
gave relatively high estimates of the population base-rates for the
target events. For each of the four events, a majority of the
respondents estimated the probability for the average person In the
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general population to be higher than the base-rates specified.
Consequently. 1n the Internal analyses reported below, the provision
of base-rate Information must be viewed. In most cases, as providing
Information that Is discrepant from the respondent's Initial estimate
1n the direction of lower probability for the events. Overall,
approximately 92% of the respondents' estimates were equal to or
higher than the base-rates specified. Although the Internal analyses
reported In the evaluation of the selective use hypothesis classify
respondents' population estimates as above or below the base-rates
specified, In Interpreting the overall effects of the manipulation of
base-rate, the base-rate Information should be viewed as a generally
lower probability than respondents' Initial estimates.
The analyses of variance yielded significant and consistent
effects of base-rate information on estimates of event probability for
both self [F (1 , 189) = 12.03, & < .001] and other [F (1, 189) =
31.13, £ < .001] judgments (see Table 3). For each event and severity
condition, provision of base-rate Information produced significantly
lower estimates of event probability for both self and other (the
average person In the class). The effect of base-rate Information on
estimates of self probability did not interact with severity [F (1,
189) = 1.59, £ < .20], although for other probability there was a
tendency for base-rate Information to have a greater effect on
judgments for mild compared to severe events [F (1, 190) = 3.51, £ <
.06]. In addition, there was a significant interaction between
base-rate and type of judgment (self versus other); provision of
base-rate information led to a significantly greater decrease in
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estimates of event probability for other than for self (see Table 3).
In other words, the self-other discrepancy In probability estimates
was reduced when base-rate Information was provided.
This Interaction may result from the significantly higher Initial
estimates of other probability compared to self. In the absence of
base-rate Information. That Is, under the condition of no base-rate
Information, there was a greater discrepancy between the probability
estimates for other and the base-rate specified than between self
judgments and the base-rate. Moreover, even In the base-rate
condition, self probability estimates were still significantly lower
than estimates for other. This Interaction suggests greater change
for other than self judgments In response to the base-rate
Information. However, when these data are expressed In terms of
Table 5
Mean Difference Between Probability Estimates & Base-rate Specified
as a Function of Base-rate Information
Condition Decrease
Type of
Judgment
No Base-rate
Information
Base-rate
Information Absolute Percent
Self 14.13 7.22 6.91 48.9%
Other 24.43 13.96 10.47 42.9%
Note . The average of the base-rates specified was 23.75%.
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differences between the probability estimates and the base-rates
specified (see Table 5). It Is evident that while the absolute
decrease In the base-rate Information condition Is greater for other
judgments than self judgments, the percentage of change In the
direction of the base-rate specified was actually greater for self
judgments than for other judgments. That Is, relative to respondents
In the no base-rate condition, respondents receiving base-rate
Information evidenced a decrease of 48.9% In the discrepancy between
their self probability estimates and the base-rates specified; the
corresponding decrease for other probability estimates was 42.9%.
Thus, the observed magnitude of change In probability estimates for
other judgments may be a result of the larger Initial (I.e., no
base-rate condition) discrepancy between the estimate for other and
the base-rate specified.
The Interactive effects of base-rate Information and severity are
also evident In the percentage of change In the direction of the
base-rates specified (see Table 6). Although the absolute decrease In
probability In the base-rate condition Is greater for mild compared to
severe events, and for other compared to self judgments, the
interaction evident In these data Is reversed when viewed In terms of
the difference between respondents' estimates and the base-rates
specified. For mild events, the percentage of reduction toward the
specified base-rates was approximately 45% for both self and other
probability estimates by respondents In the base-rate Information
condition. For severe events, however, the percent of revision toward
the base-rate was greater for self (58.7%) compared to other Judgments
115
Table 6
Mean Difference Between Probabmty Estimates & Base-rate Specified
as a Function of Base-rate Information and Severity
Condition Decrease
Type of No Base-rate Base-rate
Severity Judgment Information Information Absolute Percent
M1ld Self 20.89 11 .49 9.40 45.0%
Other 30.69 16.92 13.77 44.9%
Severe Self 7.36 3.04 4.32 58.7%
Other 17.92 11.13 6.79 37.9%
Note. The average of the base-rates specified was 23.75%.
(37.9%)
.
That Is, when the Initial differences In the discrepancy
between the estimates of no base-rate control respondents and the
base-rates specified are controlled by expressing revisions as
percentage of change, the data Indicate that base-rate Information had
the greatest effect on self probability estimates for severe events.
Selective Use of Base-Rate Information
To test the selective use of base-rate Information hypothesis,
internal analyses were conducted. For these analyses, each respondent
was classified as above or below the specified base-rate for each
event on the basis of their Initial estimate of population
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probability. Since the classifications were made Independently for
each event, it was not possible to retain the within-subjects nature
of the experimental design; all internal analyses treat each
probability judgment (one self and other Judgment per event) as an
independent observation. This procedure produces more conservative
tests of hypotheses than the preceding analyses in that
between-subjects variability is not removed from the error terms.
For each of the four life events, respondents whose population
probability estimate was greater than or equal to the base-rate
specified by the experimental manipulation were classified as above
the base-rate for that event; respondents who gave population
estimates that were less than the base-rate specified were classified
into the below base-rate condition. The decision to classify as above
respondents giving a response equal to the base-rate was based on the
distribution of responses and on the assumption that such information
was at least consistent with their expectations (i.e., not
"unfavorable")
.
Based on this classification procedure, 92.0% of judgments by
respondents in the no base-rate information condition, and 92.3% of
Judgments in the base-rate condition were greater than or equal to the
base-rates specified. The percent of Judgments classified as below
the base-rate ranged from 14.2% for Event #3 (crime) to 3.5% for Event
#2 (employment). Consistent with the lower probability estimates for
severe events, there was a greater proportion of Judgments classified
as below the base-rate in the severe condition (11.9%) compared with
the mild condition (5.3%). These cell sizes did not permit analysis
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for Individual events.
Probability judgments for self and other, and perceived
population rates are presented In Table 7 for the Internal
classification and the base-rate and severity conditions. For
respondents In the above condition, estimates of probability for
themselves and the average person In the class were significantly
lower In the base-rate condition compared with the estimates of no
base-rate respondents [t (699) = 3.85, & < .001 for self estimates; t
(699) = 7.20, £ < .001 for other estimates]. Thus, respondents
receiving "favorable" Information (I.e., Information that the
population base-rate Is lower than their estimate) revised their
judgments of event probability In the direction of the base-rate
specified. It Is Interesting to note, however, that although self and
other estimates were lower In the base-rate than the no base-rate
condition, the estimates remained higher than the base-rates specified.
Data for respondents In the below condition, however, failed to
confirm the selective use hypothesis. In response to "unfavorable"
Information 1n the form of a base-rate higher than their Initial
estimate, respondents In the below condition also tended to reduce
their estimates for self and other, although these differences were
not statistically significant. It should be noted that, contrary to
expectation, respondents In the no base-rate condition whose perceived
population base-rate was lower than the base-rate specified (I.e.,
below condition) estimated the probability for self and other to be
higher, on average, than their Initial estimate of the population
probabi 1 Ity
.
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Table 7
Mean Probability Estimates
a Function of Internal Classification, Base-rate, and Severity
Classification
Severity Base-Rate n
TOTAL Above
No Base-Rate 368
Base-Rate 360
Below
No Base-Rate 32
Base-Rate 30
MILD Above
No Base-Rate 192
Base-Rate 182
Below
No Base-Rate 8
Base-Rate 12
SEVERE Above
No Base-Rate 176
Base-Rate 178
Below
No Base-Rate 24
Base-Rate 18
Probability Estimate
Population Self Other
52.03 38.97*** 49.56***
49.94 32.16 38.94
16.59 18.69 26.47
16.60 15.97 23.33
55.51 45.65*** 55.65***
52.98 35.56 41.62
20.00 23.13 31.25
17.00 25.42 27.92
48.24 31.69 42.91***
46.82 28.67 36.20
15.46 17.21* 24.88
16.33 9.67 20.28
Note . The average of the base-rates specified across the four
life events was 23.75%.
*£ < .10
**gi < .01
***£ < .001
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A similar pattern of results obtained when the data were analyzed
separately for the mild and severe conditions (see Table 7). For
respondents classified above the base-rate specified. In both the mild
and severe conditions, estimates for other probability were
significantly lower In the base-rate compared to the no base-rate
condition. For self probability estimates by respondents classified
as above, the decrease In the base-rate condition was significant only
1n the mild condition. Again, although estimates were generally lower
In the below condition for respondents given base-rate Information,
none of these differences were statistically significant.
Other Factors Influencing Probability Judgments
In addition to severity and base-rate, both sex of respondent and
event had significant effects on probability judgments. There were
significant main effects for sex of respondent on all three
probability measures: population [F (1, 194) = 26.79, £ < .001], self
[F ( 1, 189) = 23.26, & < .001], and other [F ( 1, 190) = 23.38, £ <
.001]. For each of these measures, females made significantly higher
probability estimates than males (see Table 8). In addition, there
was a significant sex x event Interaction for self probability
estimates [F (3, 567) = 2.97, £ < .04], reflecting a differential
ordering of the events by female and male respondents. For both
female and male respondents. Events #2 and #3 (employment and crime,
respectively) were judged to have a significantly higher probability
for oneself than Events #1 and #4 (marriage and health).
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Table 8
Mean Probability Estimates as a Function of Sex of Respondent
Probability
Estimate
Sex of Respondent
Female Male
Population 51 .97 43.95
Other 47.00 38.49
Self 38.64 29.47
Event #1
Event #2
Event #3
Event #4
30.79a
44. 59c
42.58c
36.60b
25.81a
32.54b
37.12b
22.42a
Note. Newman-Keuls comparisons were conducted separately for
female and male respondents. Means sharing no common subscript differ
significantly (g. < .05)
.
However, females respondents judged Event #4 (health--cancer) to have
a significantly higher self probability than Event #1
(marr1age--separat1on/d1 vorce) ; there was no significant difference In
the probability estimates for these two events by male respondents.
There were significant main effects for event and significant
severity x event Interactions on the probability estimates for
population, self, and other (see Table 4). The Interaction of
severity and event for perceived population base-rate [F (3, 582) =
11.44, £ < .001] revealed a significantly higher probability estimate
[t (194) = 7.53, a < .001] for the mild version of Event #2 (required
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to accept a job outside chosen field for a year or longer), compared
to the severe version (unemployed for a year or longer). In addition,
the higher probability estimates for mild compared to severe events
did not occur for Event #4. Apparently, respondents perceived
non-fatal and fatal forms of cancer to be equally probable for the
average person In the general population.
In addition to the severity x event Interactions previously
reported for self and for other judgments, there was a three-way
Interaction of severity, event, and type of judgment (self versus
other) on the probability estimates for self and other (see Table 3).
As noted earlier In the discussion of the effects of the severity
manipulation, this Interaction reflects the differential effect of
severity on self and other judgments within different event conditions
(see Table 4). It Is also of Interest to consider In some detail the
significant event x type of judgment Interaction [F (3, 561) = 27.03.
a < .001] which obtained In the five-way analysis of variance. Two
different sets of comparisons among the event x self-other means were
computed using the Scheffe procedure to control the experiment-wise
error rate. Similar to the findings reported for the severity x event
Interaction on the perceived population base-rate measure, palrwise
comparisons between mean self and other probability judgments within
each event revealed significant effects for type of judgment
(self-other) for the first three events, and a non-significant
self-other difference for Event #4 (health--cancer)
.
The second set of comparisons conducted to explore the event x
type of judgment Interaction evaluated the similarity In magnitude of
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the self-other difference in probability estimates between event
pairs. These comparisons indicated that the self-other difference
obtained for Event #1 (marriage) was significantly greater than the
self-other differences in the remaining three event conditions. No
significant differences in the magnitude of the self-other discrepancy
were observed among the employment, crime, and health event
conditions. In summary, these comparisons indicated that the
respondents judged their own probability of experiencing the events to
be significantly lower than the probability of "the average person in
the class" for every event except cancer. Moreover, the difference in
estimated probability for self versus other was significantly greater
for the marriage event than for the other three life events.
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Event Likelihood
Ratings of event likelihood were Included as an Independent
measure of perceived likelihood. However, this Item apparently lacked
sufficient precision to assess the effects of the experimental
manipulations. In contrast to the numerous effects of the Independent
variables on the probability measures, the analysis of variance of
event likelihood yielded only two significant effects: Main effects
for sex of respondent and for event.
The effect of sex of respondent on the event likelihood ratings
[£ (1. 195) = 20.46, £ < .001] parallelled the strong and consistent
effects of sex on the probability measures. Compared to the ratings
of their male counterparts (M = 4.34). female respondents rated the
events as significantly more likely (M = 4.96). The main effect for
event was also significant [F (3. 585) = 6.14. ^ < .001]. but
subsequent Newman-Keuls comparisons Indicated that this Item lacked
the sensitivity of the probability measures; a lower mean likelihood
rating for Event #4 provided the only significant difference among the
four life events.
Judgment Certainty: Self and Other
The analysis of respondents' ratings of the certainty with which
they made their probability estimates for self and other yielded a
number of significant effects. Main effects for event In the separate
analyses of self-certainty [F (3. 582) = 18.13. £ < .001] and
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Other-certainty [F (3. 583) = 6.99. ^ < .001], and an event x type of
judgment (self versus other) Interaction In the five-way analysis of
variance [F (3. 582) = 6.28, & < .001] were each statistically
significant. Comparisons among the event x type of judgment means
(see Table 9) using the Newman-Keuls procedure revealed that for both
self and other ratings, respondents reported significantly lower
certainty 1n their estimates about Event #4 (health--cancer) than In
their estimates about the other three events. In addition, the
ratings of self-judgment certainty for marriage and employment events
were significantly higher than self-judgment certainty for crime, and
other-judgment certainty for marriage, employment, and crime.
Mean Certainty Ratings for Self and Other as a Function of Event
Table 9
Event
Probability
Estimate 2 3 4
Self 4.72d 4. Bid 4.37c 3.89ab
Other 4.18bc 4.17bc 4.23bc 3.79a
Note . Means sharing no common subscripts are significantly
different (g. < .05) by Newman-Keuls comparison.
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Significant Interactions of sex of respondent and event were
obtained In the analysis of variance of judgment certainty for both
self [F (3, 582) = 2.85, & < .04] and other [F (3, 585) = 4.80, & <
.003] judgments. Comparisons among the means Involved In these
Interactions (see Table 10) Indicated that the lower certainty In
judgments about Event #4 (health) was primarily due to the certainty
ratings by male respondents. That Is, for male respondents only,
reported certainty In probability estimates for self and other was
significantly lower for Event #4 than for the remaining three events.
Mean Certainty Ratings as a Function of Event and Sex of Respondent
Table 10
Event
Sex Judgment 2 3 4
Females Self
Other
4.82b
4.22
*-71ab 4.18a
4.084.09
Males Self
Other
4.61b
4.14b
4.93b
4.26b
4.35b
4.27b
3.57a
3.46a
Note. Newman-Keuls comparisons were conducted separately for
each sex of respondent x type of judgment (self or other) condition.
Means sharing no common subscript differ significantly (b. < .05).
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Sex of respondent also Interacted with base-rate and event
severity on the self-certainty measure [F (1 , 194) = 4.93, ^ < .03].
As revealed in Table 11. within the base-rate condition, female
respondents reported significantly greater certainty in probability
estimates for severe compared to mild events. The severity effect was
not significant in any of the other sex x base-rate conditions. It
should also be noted that the general effect of event severity was
reversed for male compared to female respondents. That is, for males.
Judgment certainty tended to decrease for severe compared to mild
events in the base-rate condition, and increase in the no base-rate
condition. For females, judgment certainty increased for severe
Table 11
Mean Self Certainty Ratings as a Function of
Severity, Sex, and Base-rate
Severity Condition
Sex Base-rate Mild Severe
Females No Base-rate 4.65j)c 4. 37313c
Base-rate ^.ISg 4-90c
Males No Base-rate 4.263^ 4.40abc
Base-rate ^.SOgbc '^^'^ahc
Note . Means sharing no common subscripts are significantly
different < .05) by Newman-Keuls comparison.
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events In the base-rate Information condition and tended to decrease
In the no base-rate condition.
The analysis of variance of self-judgment certainty yielded a
significant base-rate x severity x event Interaction [F (3. 52) =
5.17, £ < .002]. A series of orthogonal contrasts was applied to the
base-rate x severity means separately for each event (see Table 12) In
order to assess the differential effect of these two manipulations on
self-certa1nty judgments for each event. The contrasts selected
represent a simple effects analysis for the main effects of base-rate
and severity and their Interaction separately by event (Winer, 1971,
p. 130). This comparison procedure Indicated that for the marriage
Table 12
Mean Self Certainty Ratings as a Function of
Base-rate, Severity, and Event
Event
Base-rate Severity 1 2 3.4
No Base-rate Mild 4,
.43a 4,.90 4.75a 3,•73a
Severe 5.
•18b 4..73 3.90b 3,•71a
Base-rate Mild 4,
•41a 5..10 4.10b 3,.67a
Severe 4,
.88b 4,.51 4.71a 4,.45b
Note . Contrasts were conducted separately for each of the four
event conditions.
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events, certainty was significantly higher for the severe than for the
m1ld version [t ( 194) = 2.63. a < .01]. For the employment event
(Event #2), the effect of severity was reversed with marginally higher
certainty ratings for the m1ld compared to the severe version of this
event [t (194) = 1.64, ^ < .10], For the third event, crime,
base-rate and severity Interacted such that the no base-rate/ml Id and
the base-rate/severe conditions led to greater judgment certainty than
the base-rate/ml Id and no base-rate/severe conditions [t (194) = 3.17,
E < .001]. Finally, for the fourth event, health, the Interaction of
base-rate and severity approached significance [t (194) = 1.72, & <
.10]. An additional non-orthogonal contrast Indicated that the
severe/base-rate condition produced significantly higher judgment
certainty than the other three conditions [t (194) = 3.16. ^ < .001].
In the five-way analysis of variance of certainty ratings, the
four-way Interaction of base-rate Information, severity, event, and
type of judgment (self versus other) was significant [F (3, 582) =
2.66, Q_ < .05]. This result was due to the absence of differential
effects of base-rate x severity among events for certainty of other
judgments. In contrast to the base-rate x severity effects described
above for certainty In self-judgments.
Event Characteristics
Respondents rated the events on dimensions of severity,
predictability. Importance, fairness, and threat. These data were
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analyzed with a series of four-way analyses of variance. With the
exception of the predictability measure, the analyses yielded
significant main effects for severity, event, and a significant
severity x event Interaction for each measure. On the predictability
rating, the Interaction was not significant. The severity, event, and
severity x event means for each measure are presented In Table 13.
On the severity ratings, severe events were judged to be more
severe than the m1ld events [F (1, 192) = 77.85, & < .001].
Comparisons of the severity x event means [F (3, 576) = 4.67, & <
.004] Indicated that In the mild conditions, the crime and health
events were rated as most severe; the employment event was rated least
severe, and the marriage event was Intermediate. In the severe
conditions, crime and health were rated more severe than marriage or
employment. There was a significant main effect for event [F (3,
576) = 32.63, £ < .001], and a significant severity x event
Interaction obtained due to a much larger effect of severity on the
employment event [t ( 192) = 8.79, .001].
For ratings of event predictability, severe events were rated as
less predictable than mild events [F (1 , 192) = 6.24, £ < .02]. The
significant main effect for event [F (3, 576) = 42.73, & < .001] and
subsequent comparisons revealed that the crime and health events were
perceived as significantly less predictable than the marriage and
employment events.
With respect to perceived Importance, severe events were judged
to be more Important than mild events [F (1, 194) = 10.91, & <
.002]. In the mild event conditions, health was rated as most
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Table 13
Mean Event Ratings as a Function of Severity and Event
Event
Characteristic Event
Severity
Mild Severe Total
Severity Event #1
Event #2
Event #3
Event #4
Total
4.60b
4.06a
34c
25r
5
5
4.81
5.55a
5.75a
6.3I5
6.27b
5.97
5.07
4.89
5.82
5.75
Predictability Event #1
Event #2
Event #3
Event #4
Total
3.84
3.98
4.97
5.12
4.48
3.95
4.55
5.49
5.32
4.83
3.89a
4.26a
5.23b
5.22b
Importance Event #1
Event #2
Event #3
Event #4
Total
5-29ab
5.03a
5.72bc
6.16c
5.55
5.50a
6.12b
6.10b
6.46b
6.04
5.40
5.57
5.91
6.31
Fal rness Event #1
Event #2
Event #3
Event #4
Total
3.98a
4.31a
5.80c
5.29b
4.85
4.28;
28b
04^
5.79(
5.35
4.13
4.79
5.92
5.54
Threat Event #1
Event #2
Event #3
Event #4
Total
37^
16:
5.52b
5.83b
4.97
4.76a
6.12b
6.54b
6.44b
5.96
4.56
5.12
6.02
6.13
Note. Newman-Keuls comparisons were conducted separately within
severity conditions. Means sharing no common subscript differ
significantly (& < .05)
.
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Important, employment as least Important, with crime and marriage
Intermediate 1n respondents' ratings of Importance. In the severe
event conditions, the marriage event was rated as least Important, and
no significant differences were observed among the remaining three
events. The main effect for event was significant [F (3, 582) =
21.15. .001]. In addition, the significant Interaction of severity
and event [F (3. 582) = 5.15. & < .002] revealed that event severity
had a relatively stronger effect on the perceived Importance of the
employment event [t (194) = 5.17, £ < .001], compared to the other
three life events.
On the measure of perceived fairness, again both severity [F (1.
187) = 15.82. £ < .001] and event [F (3. 561) = 81.97. £ < .001]
produced significant main effects, and a significant Interaction [F
(3. 561) = 3.54, £ < .02]. In the mild event conditions, the crime
event was rated as least fair, the marriage and employment events were
rated as most fair, and the health event was Intermediate In perceived
fairness. W1th1n the severe event conditions, crime and health were
rated as least fair, marriage as most fair, and employment was rated
Intermediate In fairness. On this measure, the effect of the severity
manipulation was significant only for the employment [t ( 187) = 4.90,
£ < .001] and health events [t (187) = 2.53, a < .02].
Severe events were also judged to be more threatening than mild
events [F (1. 193) = 60.31. & < .001]. and there were differences In
perceived threat among the events [F (3, 579) = 67.95, e. < .001].
Under the mild event conditions, the health and crime events were
perceived as significantly more threatening than the marriage or
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employment events. For the severe events, the marriage event was
rated as less threatening than the other three events. The
significant Interaction of severity and event [F (3. 579) = 14.72,
.001] reflects the much stronger effect of the severity manipulation
on the employment event [t (193) = 9.71, £ < .001], compared to the
non-significant effect of severity on the marriage event [t (193) =
1
.93, £ < .10].
Taken together, the measures of perceived event characteristics
Indicated that the severe events were rated as significantly more
severe, unpredictable. Important, unfair, and threatening than the
mild events. The effect of the severity manipulation was consistently
stronger for the employment event and weaker for the marriage event
than for either of the other two life events. Considering the events
across the two levels of severity, the crime and health events were
generally rated as more negative than the marriage and employment
events.
There were unanticipated effects of base-rate condition on two
items assessing the perceived characteristics of the events. Compared
to the ratings of respondents In the no base-rate condition,
respondents in the base-rate Information condition judged the events
to be less threatening [F (1, 193) = 5.47, £ < .02] and less unfair [F
(1, 187) = 6.46, £ < .02]. In addition, there was a significant
base-rate x severity interaction for perceived fairness [F (1, 187) =
4.81, £ < .03]. Newman-Keuls comparisons (^ < .05) revealed that
severe events in the no base-rate condition were perceived to be
significantly more unfair than mild events in the no base-rate
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condition, and than mild and severe events In the base-rate condition;
there were no significant differences among the latter means. That
1s. the provision of base-rate Information significantly reduced the
perceived unfairness of the severe events, suggesting that perceptions
of fairness may depend. In part, on the perceived likelihood of an
event.
Finally, there was a significant main effect of sex of respondent
for three of the event characteristics measures. Compared to their
male counterparts, female respondents, who consistently judged the
life events to be more probable, also perceived them to be more severe
[F (1. 192) = 7.63, £ < .005], more Important [F (1, 194) = 5.29, £ <
.03], and more threatening [F (1. 193) = 3.89, £ < .05].
Perceived Control: Self and Other
For each event, respondents were asked to Indicate the extent to
which they believe they could effectively control or prevent the
occurrence of the event, and the extent to which they believe the
average person In the class could control the event. The four-way and
five-way (Including type of judgment--self versus other) analyses of
variance yielded significant main effects and Interactions for event,
sex of respondent, and type of judgment.
The main effect for type of judgment [F ( 1 , 191) = 36.82, £ <
.001], Indicated that the average person In the class attributed
significantly greater control to themself (M = 3.81) than to the
"average person In the class" (M = 3.56). The main effect for sex of
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respondent was significant for other judgments only [F (1. 194) =
4.38, £ < .04], producing a significant sex and type of judgment
interaction [F (1. 191) = 6.32. ^ < .02] In the five-way analysis (see
Table 14). For self judgments, there was no difference between female
and male respondents In perceived control, and both females [t (191) =
2.34. £ < .02] and males [t (191) = 6.34. £ < .001] attributed
significantly greater control to themselves than to the average person
1n the class. However, compared to females respondents, males
attributed significantly less control to others.
Table 14
Mean Ratings of Control as a Function of Sex of Respondent
Sex of Respondent
Type of ~
'
Judgment Female Male Total
Self 3.81 3.80 3.81
Other 3.67 3.42 3.56
There was a significant main effect for event on ratings of
control for both self [F (3. 576) = 83.15. & < .001] and other [F
(3, 582) = 62.32. E» < .001]. and an event x type of judgment (self
versus other) Interaction [F (3. 576) = 11.63. £ < .001]. The event
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means presented In Table 15 reveal a similar pattern for both self and
other ratings of control: Perceived control was highest for marriage,
lowest for health (cancer), and Intermediate for employment and
crime. Comparisons among the means for the event x type of judgment
Interaction Indicated that compared to the average person In the
class, respondents attributed significantly greater control to
themselves for the marriage and employment events. There were no
significant differences between self and other ratings of perceived
control over the crime and health events.
Table 15
Mean Ratings of Control as a Function of Event
Event
Type of
Judgment 12 3 4
Self 4.82e 4.03c 3.71b 2.65a
Other 4.26(j 3.67b 3-&^b 2.63a
Note . Means sharing no common subscripts are significantly
different (2, < .05) by Newman-Keuls comparison.
The two-way Interaction of sex of respondent and event [F (3,
576) = 3.29, £ < .02] was significant for self ratings of control.
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and the three-way Interaction of sex. event, and type of Judgment
approached significance [F (3. 573) = 2.49. £ < .06]. Compared to the
female respondents, males attributed significantly greater control to
themselves for the employment event [t (192) = 2.23. & < .05]; there
were no significant differences between males and females In perceived
control over the remaining three events, although there was a tendency
for females to attribute greater control to themselves for the
marriage and health events (see Table 16).
For the three-way Interaction of sex. event, and type of
judgment, comparisons were conducted among the ratings of self and
other control separately for female and male respondents. These
comparisons (see Table 16) Indicated that females attributed
Table 16
Mean Ratings of Control as a Function of Event and Sex of Respondent
Event
Type of
Sex Judgment 12 3 4
Females Self
Other
Males Self
Other
4.94(j 3.80b
4.37c 3.63[j
4.68e 4.29(j
4.13d 3.72c
3.72b 2.79a
3.88b 2.79a
3.71c 2.50a
3.38b 2.45a
Note . Newman-Keuls comparisons were conducted separately for
female and male respondents. Means sharing no common subscript differ
significantly (& < .05)
.
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significantly greater control to themselves than to others for the
marriage event only. By contrast, male respondents attributed
significantly greater control to themselves than to others for all the
events-marriage, employment, and crime-except health (cancer).
Personal Concern
For the personal concern item, respondents were asked to indicate
the degree of their concern or worry about the possibility of
experiencing each of the life events. Four-way analyses of variance
of responses to this item yielded a significant main effect for event
[F (3, 582) = 12.82, & < .001], marginally significant main effects
for sex of respondent [F (1, 194) = 3.71, £ < .06] and severity [F (1,
194) = 2.90, £ < .09], and an interaction of severity and event [F (3,
582) = 3.41, £ < .02].
Not surprisingly, given their higher probability estimates and
ratings of event severity, female respondents expressed greater
concern (M = 5.03) about the events than their male counterparts
expressed (M = 4.68). Mean concern ratings as a function of severity
and event are presented in Table 17. In the mild condition,
respondents expressed significantly less concern about the marriage
and employment events, compared with the crime and health events. In
the severe condition, respondents reported significantly less concern
about the marriage event (viz., divorce), compared with the other
three life events.
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Table 17
Mean Ratings of Concern as a Function of Severity and Event
Event
Severity 1 2 3 4 Total
M1ld 4.38a 4.26a 4.96b 5.24b 4.71
Severe 4.51a 5.13b 5.14b 5.33b 5.03
Total 4.44a 4.69ab 5.05bc 5.29c
Note. Newman-Keuls comparisons were conducted separately within
severity conditions. Means sharing no common subscript differ
significantly <
.05)
.
Personal Experience
Respondents were asked to describe their experience with each
life event using response categories designed to assess the nature and
extent of respondents' personal experience with each of the events:
1 = no experience, 2 = has happened to acquaintances, 3 = has happened
to close friends or relatives, and 4 = has happened to me personally.
Multiple responses were permitted, and the highest reported level of
experience was used to establish a single scale. These data were then
analyzed by the four-way analysis of variance. The analysis yielded a
significant main effect for event [F (3, 579) = 4.74, £ < .005] and a
significant Interaction of severity and event [F (3. 579) = 11.51 ,
.001]. Despite the higher probability estimates for mild compared to
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severe events, there was no significant difference In reported
experience as a function of event severity [F (1. 193) = 0.93, ^ >
.60]. The differences among the cell means which comprise the
severity x event Interaction were evaluated with two procedures: 1)
comparisons among the event means separately within each severity
condition using Newman-Keuls tests, and 2) [t-tests between the
severity means within each event. As evident from Table 18, within
the mild event conditions, respondents reported most experience with
the crime event, and significantly less experience with the employment
and health events. Within the severe event condition, reported
personal experience was significantly lower for the employment and
crime events than for the marriage and health events. The comparisons
between the mild and severe versions of each event Indicated that the
Table 18
Mean Personal Experience Ratings as a Function of Severity and Event
Event
Severity 12 3 4 Total
Mild 2.54a5 2.37a 2.73b 2.41a 2.51
Severe 2.69b 2.29a 2.15a 2.67b 2.45
Note. Newman-Keuls comparisons were conducted separately within
severity conditions. Means sharing no common subscript differ
significantly < .05)
.
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interaction of severity and event obtained due to differential effects
of the seventy manipulation across events. For the marriage and
employment events, there was no significant difference In reported
experience between the mild and severe versions of the events. For
the crime event, the respondents reported significantly greater
experience with the m1ld version of the event [t (193) = 4.90, 2 <
.001]. For the health event, the severe version of the event
(terminal cancer) was associated with marginally greater experience [t
(193) = -2.196,
.05] than the m1ld version (non-fatal cancer).
Self Descriptions
Respondents' ratings of the self-description and life
satisfaction Items are reported In Table 19. In general, the
respondents described themselves as moderately optimistic (M = 4.96),
and somewhat more happy (M = 5.32) and lucky (M = 4.81) than most
people. When asked to evaluate the quality of their lives relative to
others, respondents reported that life has treated them somewhat
better, compared to the average person In this country (M = 5.60) and
the average person In the class (M = 5.31). For the life satisfaction
Items, respondents' average personal ratings of the past, present, and
future were all above the midpoint In terms of the worst and best
possible life, with present ratings Intermediate (M = 5.00) between
past (M = 4.65) and future ratings (M = 5.85). Like the participants
In Cantrll's (1965) cross-cultural survey, respondents In the present
study regarded the present as better than the past, and expected the
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future to be even better.
Despite their significantly higher probability estimates, females
(M
= 4.93) did not describe themselves as more pessimistic compared to
their male counterparts (M = 4.94). Moreover, females tended to give
slightly higher ratings (M = 5.93) of their expected life
Table 19
Mean Self Description Ratings as a Function of Severity
Dependent
Measure
Severity
Total Mild Severe
Happy 5.32 5 .34 5.29
Optimistic 4.96 4 .91 4.96
Lucky 4.81 4,.80 4.77
Quality of life/
Average person 1n country 5.60 5,.74 5.43*
Quality of life/
Average person In class 5.31 5..45 5.11**
Life Satisfaction
Now
Five years ago
Five years from now
Total
5.00
4.65
5.85
15.44
5.
4.
5.
15.
.09
,91
,94
,94
4.85
4.32***
5.70*
14.97****
Note . All ratings were made on scales ranging from 1 to 7.
Higher ratings Indicate optimism, happiness, and luckiness, better
quality of life, and greater life satisfaction (best possible life).
< .10 < .05 ***£ < .01 < .001
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satisfaction in the future [F (1. 195) = 2.81.
.10], compared with
male respondents (M = 5.70).
There was an unexpected main effect for event severity on several
of the life satisfaction items (see Table 19). Compared to
respondents in the severe condition, respondents in the mild condition
tended to give higher ratings of the relative quality of their lives
compared to the average person in the country [F (1, 195) = 3.55, ^ <
.06] and the average person in the class [F ( 1, 195) = 4.68, & <
.03]. In addition, respondents in the mild condition gave
significantly higher ratings than respondents in the severe condition
for their life satisfaction in the past [F (1 , 195) = 9.73, £< .003],
and the cumulative (past, present, and future) rating [F (1, 195) =
8.68, £ < .004]. This pattern was also marginally significant for
ratings of expected future satisfaction [F (1, 195) = 2.95, .08],
but there was not a significant difference between respondents in the
mild and the severe condition for ratings of their present life
satisfaction.
Correlational Analyses
To explore relationships among the dependent measures, partial
correlation coefficients were computed among selected items, adjusting
for the effects of the independent variables and their interactions.
Coefficients were computed for each of the four life events, and the
average within-event correlation was also computed.
The probability judgments for population, self, and other were
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highly mtercorrelated for each of the four events, with coefficients
ranging from
.344 to
.801 (all ^ < .001). Despite the ANOVA results
for the likelihood ratings. Judged likelihood was significantly
correlated with the three probability measures for each of the events
(all £ < .001)
.
Probability estimates for the average person In the class and
corresponding judgment certainty ratings were significantly correlated
(average r = .235. £ < .001). but estimates and certainty for self
were not significantly correlated overall (average r = .081).
However, there were significant correlations between self probability
Judgments and certainty for Event #3 (r = .294, & < .001) and Event #4
(r = .173, £ < .05). For both self and other Judgments, the
correlation between respective probability Judgments and Judgment
certainty was especially high for Event #3, crime. In addition, there
was a significant correlation (r = .398. £ < .001) between Judgments
of certainty for self and for other probability estimates.
In general, there was not a strong relationship between
probability estimates and Judgments of self and other control,
although the relationship was consistently negative: The greater the
perceived Individual control, the lower the estimated probability of
the event. For estimates of population probability, there were not
significant overall correlations with ratings of self and other
control, although the correlations for Event #2 were significant (r =
-.241, £ < .001, and r = -.175, £ < .05, for self and other control
ratings, respectively). Event #2 also yielded the only significant
correlation between probability estimates and perceived control of
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others (r = -.171, ^ < .05). Overall, there was a weak negative
relationship between judgments of probability and control for self
(average r
= -.167. ^ < .lO). due to the non-significant relationship
between these measures for Event #4 (cancer), the event perceived to
be the least controllable. The negative correlations between self
probability judgments and self-attributed control were significant for
Event #1 (r = -.254. £ < .001). Event #2 (r = -.246. 2 < -001). and
Event #3 (r = -.143. & < .05). Ratings of self and other control were
highly correlated (average r =
.731. & < .001). In addition, judgment
certainty and perceived control for self were positively related
overall (r = .166. ^ < .05), and for each of the Individual life
events except crime. Certainty and control judgments regarding others
were not significantly correlated.
Expressed concern was not generally related to probability and
likelihood judgments, but there was a consistent, significant positive
relationship between concern and each of the probability/likelihood
measures for Event #3--cr1me. For Event #4. cancer, concern was
positively correlated with self probability estimates (r = .202, & <
.01), and negatively correlated with the difference In judged
probability for self and other. That Is, the lower the magnitude of
difference In the perceived probability for oneself versus the average
person In the class, the greater concern expressed. The relationship
between concern and ratings of control for both self and other was
generally weak, but consistently negative. For self and other control
ratings, respectively, the average withln-event correlations with
concern were -.163 (& < .05) and -.133 (£ < .05). and this association
145
was strongest for Event #4 (r -
-.228. ^ < .01 and r =
-.208. ^ <
.01).
There were few consistent patterns among the correlations between
the probability judgments and the event characteristics ratings,
although the direction of association was generally negative. For the
population estimates, there were negative correlations with each of
the five event characteristics, but only for Event #4-cancer. That
Is. the more severe, unpredictable. Important, unfair, and threatening
respondents perceived cancer to be. the lower their estimates of the
probability of cancer In the general population. The self probability
estimates were negatively correlated with each of the five event
characteristics for Event #1: The more negatively respondents rated
marital difficulties, the lower their estimate of the probability that
they would personally experience marital difficulties.
For the crime event, ratings of severity were positively
correlated with the three probability judgments--populat1on (r = .140,
& < .05). self (r = .183. & < .01). and other (r = .253. q_ < .001).
In addition, perceived likelihood and severity ratings were positively
correlated for each of the four events (average r = .205, & < .001).
The magnitude of the difference between self and other
probability judgments was positively correlated with the perceived
Importance of each of the four life events (average r =.151, 2. < -05);
the more Important respondents perceived each of the events, the
greater the difference In their probability estimates for themselves
versus others. For Event #1, marital difficulties, severity and
fairness ratings also yielded positive correlations: The more severe
U6
and unfair the event was perceived to be. the greater the difference
1n estimated probability between self and other. For Event #2,
employment, perceived threat was also associated with a greater
difference 1n estimated self versus other probabilities.
Certainty about self and other probability estimates was
consistently related to the perceived predictability of the four
events: The more unpredictable an event was perceived to be, the
lower the certainty about both self (r =
-.197. £ < .01) and other (r
= -.137. 2< .05) probability judgments.
There were positive correlations between concern and perceived
severity (average r = .171. ^ < .05) and threat (average r = .223. & <
.01) for each of the four life events . In general, ratings of the
other event characteristics were also positively related to concern,
with the exception of predictability, which was related to concern
only for Event #4, cancer. In addition, perceived Importance and
fairness were not related to concern about Event #1, marital
difficulties.
Predictability was correlated with ratings of control for self
and other for Event #4: Greater perceived predictability of cancer
was associated with greater perceived control by oneself (r = -.206, 2.
<
.01) and others (r = -.194, £ < .01). Across the four life events
and the five event characteristics ratings, there were no other
consistent relationships with self and other control ratings.
Not surprisingly, the five event characteristics were highly
intercorrelated . Generally, across the four events, there were
significant positive correlations among the ratings of severity.
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Importance, unfairness, and threat. The fifth rating, predictability,
was correlated with the other measures only for Event #4. cancer.
Analysis of the personal experience measure yielded modest but
significant positive correlations between the personal experience
index and the three probability judgments, with the strongest
relationship between reported level of personal experience and seU
probability estimates (average r = .218, £ < .01). For population
probability estimates, the average correlation was .173 (£ < .05). and
the correlation was nonsignificant for Event #4, cancer. In addition,
for Event #1—marital difficulties— the relationships between personal
experience and both self and other probability estimates were not
statistically significant. With the exception of weak correlations on
Isolated measures, there was no relationship between personal
experience and judgment certainty, perceived control, concern, or
event characteristics ratings.
There were also no consistent, significant relationships between
the self-description Items (I.e., optimism, relative quality of life,
etc.) and the probability and likelihood judgments. Likewise, there
was no consistent pattern of relationships between the
self-description Items and the ratings of control and certainty, with
one exception: The self-description Items were positively related to
certainty about self probability estimates regarding Event #1, marital
difficulties. The correlations ranged from .108 (& < .10) for
expected future satisfaction, to .219 (£ < .01) for quality of life
relative to others In the class.
Concern was negatively correlated with many of the
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self-description Items for Event #2. employment; higher ratings of
optimism (r = -.140. £ < .05). quality of life relative to others In
the country (r = -.172. & < .05) and the class (r =
-.143. ^ < .05),
and present (r = -.157. £ < .05) and expected future life satisfaction
(r = -.256, £ < .001) were associated with less concern about
employment difficulties. In addition, expected life satisfaction In
the future was negatively correlated with concern about each of the
events (average r =
-.183, g_ < .01) except cancer.
The personal description Items were also highly Intercorrelated
.
with the exception of ratings of past life satisfaction. For example,
self ratings of optimism were positively correlated with ratings for
happy (r = .498. 2 < -001). lucky (r = .249. & < .001), quality of
life relative to the average person 1n the country (r = .333, £ <
.001) and the class (r = .313, £ < .001), present life satisfaction (r
= .320, £ < .001), and expected future life satisfaction (r = .312, &
< .001). Among the life satisfaction Hems, present life satisfaction
was highly correlated with both past (r = .453, ^ < .001) and expected
future satisfaction (r = .434. ^ < .001). but the correlation between
past and future satisfaction, albeit significant for three of the four
events, was considerably lower 1n magnitude (average r_ = .141, 2. <
.05)
.
Summary
The major findings of the present study may be summarized as
follows
:
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1) The experimental manipulation of event severity appeared to
be very effective; each of the events In the severe condition was
judged to be more severe and more threatening than the corresponding
event In the mild condition. There was no effect for the order In
which the self and other judgments were made, and no significant
effect of base-rate Information on respondents' Initial probability
estimates (I.e.. perceived population base-rates).
2) As predicted, severe events were judged to be less probable
then mild events, and both m1ld and severe events were judged to be
less likely to happen to oneself than others. The effect of severity
on probability judgments varied across the four life events, with the
greatest difference occurring for the employment event, and the
smallest difference for the health event (cancer).
The extended hypothesis that event severity would have a stronger
effect on judgments regarding one's own future outcomes received only
marginal support In the present study. The predicted Interaction
between severity and type of judgment (self versus other) was not
significant. However, a significant Interaction of severity, type of
judgment, and event indicated that, with the exception of Event #4
(health--cancer)
,
severity tended to have a greater impact on self
than other judgments.
3) Contrary to expectation, respondents in the present study
gave relatively high estimates of population base-rates. For each of
the four life events, a majority of the respondents estimated the
probability for the average person in the general population to be
higher than the base-rate specified. The provision of base-rate
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Information resulted in significantly lower estimates of event
probability for both self and other judgments In every event and
severity condition. The absolute reduction In probability estimates
resulting from the provision of base-rate Information was
significantly greater for other than for self judgments. However,
when compared to the discrepancy between judgments made without
base-rate Information and the base-rate specified, the percentage of
change toward the base-rate was greater for self than other judgments.
Analysis of the probability estimates In terms of percentage of
change toward the base-rates specified also revealed Interactive
effects of base-rate Information and severity. Compared to the no
base-rate Information condition, the percentage of change 1n the
base-rate condition was equivalent for self and other judgments about
mild events. However, for severe events, the percent of change In the
base-rate condition was greater for self than other judgments.
4) An Internal analysis of respondents classified as above or
below the specified base-rates provided, at best, only partial support
for the selective use hypothesis. As predicted, for respondents
classified as above the designated base-rates, provision of base-rate
Information led to significant reductions In probability estimates for
both self and other. However, contrary to prediction, a similar, but
non-significant reduction In probability estimates for both self and
other also occurred within the below base-rate classification group.
This apparent contradiction of the selective use hypothesis must be
qualified due to the ambiguous nature of the below base-rate
classification category. Since (a) fewer than 10% of respondents were
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Classified as below the base-rates specified, and (b) those
respondents classified as below base-rate were actually quite close to
the base-rates specified, the Internal analysis cannot be considered
to represent a stringent test of the selective use hypothesis.
5) Sex of respondent, event, and the joint effects of severity
and event also affected judgments of event probability. Over all
experimental conditions, females estimated event probability for self,
other, and the population to be higher than did males. Males and
females also differed somewhat In their ordering of the event
probabilities. Main effects for event and the Interaction of event
and severity on probability estimates Indicated that the marriage and
health events were generally rated as lower 1n probability than the
employment and crime events, and that the effect of severity on
ratings of event probability was strongest for the employment event
and non-significant for the health event. Self-other differences In
probability estimates were strongest for the marriage event and,
again, not significant for the health event.
6) Analyses of ratings of judgment certainty Indicated highest
certainty for judgments of self probability for marriage and
employment, and lowest certainty for judgments of other probability
for health; the latter effect was particularly true for male
respondents. A three-way Interaction of sex, severity, and base-rate
revealed that, when provided with base-rate Information, females were
significantly more certain of their self-probability judgments for
severe than for mild events. The effects of base-rate and severity on
certainty of self judgments also varied across events: Severity
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increased certainty for marriage, severity decreased certainty for
employment, and base-rate and severity had Interactive effects on
judgment certainty for the crime and health events.
7) Respondents' ratings of event characteristics revealed that
the severe events were generally rated as more severe, unpredictable.
Important, unfair, and threatening than the m1ld events. In general,
the crime and health events were regarded as more negative than the
marriage and employment events. The provision of base-rate
Information led to lower ratings of threat for both mild and severe
events and lower ratings of unfairness for severe events. Female
respondents rated the events as more severe. Important, and
threatening than did males.
8) On the measure of perceived control, respondents attributed
significantly greater control to themselves than to others, and
females attributed greater control to others than did males. For the
Individual life events, the self-other difference In perceived control
was significant for the marriage and employment events only. There
was an Interaction of sex of respondent and type of judgment which
varied across event: Females attributed greater control to self than
to other for the marriage event only; males attributed greater control
to self than to other for all events except health (cancer).
9) The personal concern expressed by respondents varied with
severity and event: The marriage event evoked the least concern In
both mild and severe conditions, and reported concern was also
relatively low for the mild employment event. In addition, female
respondents tended to report greater personal concern than males.
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10) Despite their higher probability estimates for mild events,
respondents did not report greater experience with mild compared to
severe events. The analysis of amount of personal experience with the
Individual life events Indicated that for mild events, respondents
reported greatest experience with the crime event (property crime).
For severe events, marriage (divorce) and health (terminal cancer)
were associated with the greatest degree of personal experience.
Comparing the m1ld and severe versions of each event, there were no
significant differences 1n reported experience for the marriage and
employment events, but respondents reported greater experience with
property crime compared to personal crime, and marginally greater
experience with fatal compared to non-fatal forms of cancer.
11) In response to the self-description and life satisfaction
Items, the participants generally described themselves In moderately
positive terms with respect to optimism, happiness, and luck, and
described their lives as somewhat better than the lives of the average
person In the country and In the class. In addition, respondents
reported their current life situation to be better than the past; and
expected the future to be even better. Respondents In the mild event
conditions gave somewhat more positive ratings of the quality of their
lives than respondents In the severe event conditions. Female
respondents, despite their relatively "pessimistic" probability
estimates, did not describe themselves as more pessimistic compared to
their male counterparts.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The present paper has described several cognitive and
motivational processes that may contribute to optimism about future
life events. This study was conducted to test hypotheses derived from
a variety of theoretical perspectives, involving both cognitive and
motivational considerations. In the following discussion, the
hypotheses will be considered in light of the present findings, and
the implications of the results for an understanding of optimism will
be discussed. Finally, methodological issues will be considered, as
well as potential directions for future research.
Factors Affecting Probability Judgments
To investigate the contribution of cognitive errors and motivational
biases to optimistic expectations, the present study examined the
effects of event severity and information about population base-rates
on judgments about the likelihood of experiencing negative life
events. In addition, this research was designed to Investigate
self-other differences in expectations about future negative life
events
.
154
155
Data from this study provide strong evidence of an asymmetry In
expectations for self and others, consistent with earlier research
(e.g.. Harris 8. Guten. 1979; Kirscht et al.. 1966; Lang-Gunn. Note 1;
Welnsteln. 1980). The average person In the study judged themself to
be significantly less likely than the "average person In the class" to
experience both the mild and severe life events. As expected, self
and other judgments, and the magnitude of the discrepancy, varied for
the Individual life events. In addition, there were consistent
effects of event severity and the provision of base-rate information
on respondents' judgments.
As predicted, severe negative life events were judged to be less
likely than mild negative life events, even in the base-rate
information condition, in which equal population base-rates were
specified for the mild and severe version of each event. However, the
reports of personal experience with each event do not support the
position that the effects of severity on expectations reflect the
actual or perceived likelihood or distribution of mild and severe life
events, rather than motivational bias. That is, although the
respondents judged the severe events to have a lower probability than
the mild events, they did not report that the severe events occurred
less frequently in their own actual experience.
The hypothesis that event severity would have a stronger effect
on judgments about oneself than on judgments about others received
only marginal support. This prediction, based on a motivational
interpretation, was also disconfirmed In Weinstein's (1980) research
using comparative self-other judgments. However, data from the
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present study provided some evidence, albeit weak, that severity had a
greater Impact on self than other judgments for each of the life
events except cancer.
The hypotheses regarding the selective use of base-rate
Information received somewhat mixed support In the present study. The
Internal analysis was of limited usefulness In evaluating the
selective use hypothesis because of the unexpectedly high estimates of
perceived population base-rates given by the respondents. Although
the judgments of respondents above the base-rates specified are
consistent with the selective use hypothesis, they are also consistent
with an Information-processing Interpretation. There were too few
judgments below the specified base-rates, judgments critical to an
evaluation of the selective use hypothesis, to assess the use of
base-rate Information that Is "unfavorable" or Inconsistent with one's
self-interest.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the selective use of base-rate
Information was provided by the analysis of probability estimates In
terms of the percentage of change In the base-rate Information
condition toward the base-rates specified. Compared to the no
base-rate Information condition, the percentage of change In the
base-rate condition was greater for self than other judgments.
Moreover, this difference was the result of a greater percentage of
change 1n self probability estimates In response to base-rate
information about severe events.
In addition to the factors hypothesized to affect estimates of
the probability of future life events, sex of respondent also had
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consistent effects on respondents' estimates. For every probability
estimate and event likelihood judgment, females judged the negative
life events to be more likely, compared to their male counterparts.
This sex difference was not anticipated, and there are at least
several possible Interpretations. First, there may be differences In
the Interpretation and understanding of the concept of probability by
males and females, although the difference also occurred on the event
likelihood rating. Alternatively, the high probability estimates of
females may reflect the operation of the availability heuristic In
that a) females expressed greater concern about the life events, and
may have thought about them more frequently than the male respondents,
and b) females perceived the events to be more severe. Important, and
threatening, and the greater emotional salience of the events for
females may have led to higher estimates.
Illusions of Control and Invulnerability
In addition to ascribing reduced risk to themselves compared to
others for negative life events, respondents attributed significantly
greater control to themselves than to others. The contribution of
perceived control to the asymmetry In expectations for self and other
Is evident In the present study. The only life event In this study
for which self-other differences In estimated probability were not
s1gn1 f 1cant--health (cancer)—was also the only event for which there
was not a significant self-other difference In perceived control.
Further evidence of an "Illusion of control" was provided by the
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judgments regarding the marrUge event, especially for female
respondents. Differences between self probability estimates and
estimates for the population and the average person were greatest for
the marriage event. Perceived personal control was greater for
marriage compared to the other events, and significantly greater for
self than other. In addition, among the severe events, respondents
reported the least concern or worry about divorce, despite a high
degree of personal experience with this event. In short, the marriage
event, especially divorce, was clearly an event for which respondents
believed they were uniquely exempt from risk and able to exert control.
In contrast, there was little evidence of optimism about
uncontrollable life events, and little support 1n the present study
for an Illusion of Invulnerability as a major source of optimism. The
health event (cancer) was judged to be the most threatening and
Important, and among the most severe, unpredictable, and unfair of the
life events. The estimated probability, while the lowest of the four
events, was still relatively high (37% for the population, 34% for
others, 30% for self), and respondents perceived cancer to be the
least controllable of the events. However, the belief that there was
little one could do to control or prevent cancer was apparently not
associated with a belief In personal Invulnerability, given the
absence of a self-other difference In estimated probability. Nor was
there an absence of reported concern or worry about cancer. Indeed,
contrary to the pattern associated with an Illusion of Invulnerability
about uncontrollable events (Wolfenstein, 1957), cancer was not only
perceived to be the least controllable of the events. It evoked the
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greatest concern or worry among respondents.
The perceived lack of control over cancer, and lack of control
unique to oneself, is interesting in view of research on the
attributions of actual cancer victims. It is not uncommon, as
previously noted, for victims to formulate explanations for their
misfortune, including explanations involving self-blame (e.g.,
Janoff-Bulman & Lang-Gunn, in press). Differences in the perceived or
implied control in individuals' explanations versus predictions about
cancer may reflect the hindsight effect (Fischhoff, 1975), and the
magnitude of the event, which may compel the individual to explain the
event in terms of their own contribution.
Evidence of Judgment Bias
The asymmetry in expectations for the future for oneself and
similar others does not, in itself, demonstrate bias. However, data
from the present study do reveal sources of bias in individuals'
predictions about the future. First, respondents' judgments were
influenced by event severity, a factor logically irrelevant to outcome
likelihood, but motivational ly important. The respondents judged
severe negative events to be less likely than mild negative events
even when the base-rates were specified as equal, and despite the same
degree of personal experience reported for the mild and severe events.
Second, respondents' use of the information about population
base-rates reflects some bias in their predictions. Although the
respondents did not ignore the base-rate information, they also did
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not fully use the Information, and they used It differentially In
making predictions about themselves and their classmates. In the
base-rate condition, the relative judged likelihood of the events for
the general population, oneself, and the average person 1n the class
suggests that respondents did not replace their estimates of the
population base-rates with the base-rates specified. Respondents
reduced their probability estimates for themselves and their average
classmate In response to the base-rate Information, but their
estimates were higher than the population base-rates specified.
Respondents' failure to maintain the relative perceived likelihood for
the population, self, and other suggests that they may have
assimilated the base-rates specified with their Initial estimates,
rather than replacing their Initial population estimates.
There are several possible explanations for this limited use of
the population base-rate Information by respondents In the present
study. First, respondents may not have fully accepted the Information
since. In most Instances, It was discrepant with their estimates.
However, since the Information was attributed to legitimate sources,
was "favorable," and was obviously not rejected by the respondents, 1t
Is not clear why they did not fully use the Information. Second, the
act of making Initial estimates of population base-rates may have
limited respondents' use of the base-rates specified because of the
perseverance of their Initial estimates (cf. Ross, 1977), or
self-presentation. That Is. once respondents made their Initial
estimates, they may have resisted changing their Initial Impressions
because the Information was Inconsistent, or because they did not want
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to acknowledge that their estimates were erroneous.
The results of this study also demonstrate the differential
Influence of population base-rate Information on predictions about
oneself versus others and, to a lesser degree, on predictions about
m1ld versus severe events. Even with Individuating Information
available about oneself, the base-rate Information should be equally
relevant to judgments about oneself and others. However, respondents
In the present study did not simply adjust their self and other
estimates In response to Information about the population base-rates;
the base-rate Information had a differential Impact on self and other
judgments. In addition, for self estimates, there was some evidence
that the generally "favorable" base-rate Information had a greater
Influence on predictions about severe compared to mild events.
There was little evidence that respondents relied on the
availability heuristic In making their predictions. Reported personal
experience with m1ld and severe events did not correspond to the
greater judged likelihood of mild events. Moreover, the severe events
were judged less likely despite their greater emotional salience In
terms of perceived threat and Importance to the respondents.
However, availability does provide a possible explanation for
respondents' generally high probability estimates. The negative life
events used In this study were selected precisely because they are
relatively familiar "real-life" events for which most people are at
risk. Consequently, most people. Including the respondents, know
others who have personally experienced each the events, and are
exposed to Information about the nature and frequency of the events by
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the news media. Thus, the familiarity of the events may promote the
perception that they occur more frequently than they actually occur,
and may lead Individuals to overestimate the probability of these
events.
Optimism and Realism
The differences in predictions for oneself versus others may
demonstrate an "optimistic bias" in expectations for the future
(Weinstein, 1980), but the absolute probability judgments cannot be
described as highly optimistic. The lowest probability estimates
given by the respondents, estimates of their own future likelihood of
experiencing the events, ranged from 28% - 40% for the four negative
life events. It is difficult to evaluate the absolute level of
respondents' predictions without estimates of the actual probability
of experiencing each of the events during one's lifetime, but the
estimates do appear to be relatively high, and not especially
optimistic
.
The relative optimism in individuals' predictions for themselves
versus others was demonstrated by Weinstein (1980) and replicated In
the present study. Weinstein (1980) described the asymmetry in
expectations for self versus others as an error in judgment he labeled
"unrealistic optimism." It is Important to note, however, that while
the difference in self-other expectations appears to represent an
error in judgment and to be unrealistic, it may be very adaptive for
the Individual. There was little evidence that the relative optimism
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Of Individuals' expectations was based on an Illusion of
Invulnerability; Instead, Individuals appeared to exaggerate their
personal control relative to others. An Illusion of control over
negative life events, although Inaccurate, may encourage the
Individual to make every reasonable effort to prevent the undesirable
outcome. Moreover, there was no evidence that Individuals denied that
the events could happen to themselves and others:
The Individual who to retain his sense of safety must deny
that anything terrible will happen has his feeling of
security shattered when danger materializes. The person who
admits that extremely dangerous events may occur, but
retains the belief that he himself will survive. Is the one
who Is apt to emerge from danger with less disturbance.
(Wolfenstein, 1957, pp. 25-26)
Thus, the "unrealistic optimism" displayed In respondents' self and
other judgments about the likelihood of experiencing negative life
events may be the most adaptive response to the uncertain prospect of
experiencing many possible negative life events. Their efforts to
exert control over negative life events may actually reduce their
risk, and acknowledgment of the threat may enable an Individual to
better cope with the negative life events that they do experience.
Methodological Considerations
The questionnaire and data collection methods used In the present
study were designed to assess the degree to which unrealistic optimism
contributes to Individuals' judgments of the probabilities that
negative life events would happen to themselves and to others. In
this section of the discussion, consideration will be given to some of
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the methodological Issues raised by the results and some alternative
strategies for future research will be described.
As mentioned earlier, the research by Welnstein and his
associates (Welnstein, 1980; Welnstein 8. Lachendro, 1982) used
comparative Judgments of event likelihood for oneself versus others.
In the present study, the estimates of event probability, as well as
other related measures, were Independent for self and other
Judgments. This feature of the study appears to be an Improvement
over the comparative Judgment approach In that It allowed evaluation
of the absolute levels of probabilities given for self and other, and
the differential effects of the experimental factors on self versus
other Judgments. Further, through separate measurement of self and
other Judgments, It was possible to determine that, given differential
effects for self and other for a particular independent variable, the
effect was due to changes present on one measure but absent on the
other, or to a different pattern, direction, or rate of change on one
measure compared to the other.
A second feature of the methodology of the present study which
warrants further discussion is the decision to use familiar, real-life
events which pose some potential threat to the future well-being of
the respondents. Given that the hypotheses relating to unrealistic
optimism are, at least in part, based on motivational constructs, it
would appear necessary to test those hypotheses within the context of
stimulus events which represent a real, albeit remote, threat to the
respondents and, thus, may be likely to arouse the motives in question.
The unexpectedly high probability estimates given by the
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respondents In this study posed some significant problems for the
analysis of selective use of base-rate Information, and could limit
the range of experimental manipulations of base-rate Information In
future research which used a similar methodology. As Indicated
earlier, the high estimates given by the respondents may have been
due, 1n part, to the frequent media coverage and personal experience
with the type of events Included In the study. Therefore. It should
be possible to reduce the overall level of probability estimates by
selecting less familiar or available events. However, use of
relatively unfamiliar events, while affording greater flexibility In
the manipulation of base-rates, could reduce the motivational
relevance of the events and, therefore, their usefulness In evaluating
motivational hypotheses. Another approach would be to attempt to
anchor the respondents' judgments by providing a variety of examples
of familiar events with their associated probabilities as part of the
Introductory comments and directions Included at the beginning of the
questionnaire. By using this approach. It should be possible to
retain the experimental realism afforded by the familiar events.
However, as previously noted, for many life events, actual
probabilities during one's lifetime are difficult to estimate.
Alternatively, if the hypotheses do not Involve the direction of
change In judgments, these problems could be avoided simply by the use
of a control group.
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Future Directions
The present study suggests a number of different directions for
future research. Optimism has received very little attention In
psychology, and much more research is needed to establish the sources
of optimism, the mechanisms by which individuals maintain optimistic
expectations, and the psychological and behavioral consequences of
optiml sm.
In the present study, it was proposed that the selective use of
information, including relevant base-rate information, may be one
mechanism which allows individuals to maintain relatively optimistic
expectations for the future. Weinstein's ( 1980, Study 2; Weinstein 8.
Lachendro, 1982) research Involving the use of individuating
Information about others is consistent with this hypothesis.
Individuals who received information in the form of reasons listed by
others, reasons comparable in nature and number to their own, should
have concluded that their chances were about the same as those of
their classmates. Instead, they still maintained that they were more
likely than their classmates to experience the positive events, and
less likely to experience the negative events. However, evaluation of
the selective use of base-rate Information requires additional study.
Research is needed to determine the conditions under which relevant
information has less impact than it logically should have on relative
expectations for oneself versus others. For example, as an extension
of the present study, would the individuals in Weinstein's (1980)
research have used the individuating Information to a greater degree
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U U were consistent wUh their expectation that their futures would
be more positive than their classmates'?
Similarly, In the context of the present study, It would be
possible to vary systematically the base-rate specified for each
event. Manipulating the degree of discrepancy between the base-rate
specified and respondents' untutored estimates may reveal differential
tolerances for discrepant Information for self versus other, positive
versus negative events, and mild versus severe events.
Future research on the asymmetry In expectations for oneself
versus others might also examine the contribution of perceived
similarity between oneself and the "other" person. The classmates In
the present study and Welnsteln's research were presumably perceived
as very similar by the respondents. Although the asymmetry In
self-other expectations occurred with these similar others. It may be
greater for less similar others, as the general population estimates
by respondents In this study suggest. It may also be possible to
reduce the discrepancy In self versus other expectations by Increasing
perceived similarity.
Moreover, Individuals' estimates for others may be affected by
the nature of the target person. For example, respondents In the
present study may have reduced their probability estimates If they had
made judgments about an actual person In the class, rather than a
hypothetical "average person 1n the class." Alternatively, they may
have Increased their estimates, since Judgments about a specific other
person would Involve at least minimal Information about the person's
physical attributes, as well as other Inferred characteristics.
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Information which could be used to justify a discrepancy between one's
own chances and the chances of the other person. Similarly, the
greater anonymity of a hypothetical member of a large group (e.g.,
"average person In the general population") may encourage relative
optimism about oneself.
Additional research Is also needed to Investigate Illusions of
control and of Invulnerability as sources of optimism. Why do people
believe that they are more able than others to effectively control or
prevent negative life events? Do people believe that they are
uniquely able to control or prevent these events, or that they will
exert the effort to control the events, and others will not? Is
perceived control a source of optimism about the future, or a
consequence of It? That Is. do Individuals believe that they are less
likely to experience negative life events because they are better able
to control the events, or do they judge the events as less likely to
happen to themselves In an effort to enhance their feelings of control?
Both the present study and Welnsteln's (1980) research suggest
that optimism relative to others requires that the event be perceived
as controllable. Are there conditions which promote optimism about
uncontrollable life events? Do Individuals have an illusion of
Invulnerability about some uncontrollable events? For example. If a
remote threat that Individuals believe they can prevent actually
materializes, will they tend to maintain their optimism and the belief
that It won't happen to them by relying Instead on an Illusion of
Invulnerabi 1 Ity?
It would be of considerable Interest to study optimism about
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specific events, and the judgment processes Involved, over time. In
addition to revealing changes In optimism and sources of optimism as a
threat becomes Imminent, this approach could help to Illuminate the
psychological relationship between prediction and explanation. For
example, the occurrence of a positive outcome or the non-occurrence of
a negative outcome might be expected to reinforce an Individual's
optimistic expectations and belief In their own control over the
event. Similarly. It would be of Interest to Investigate the
explanations of Individuals confronted with an unexpected negative
event or the absence of an expected positive event. How do
Individuals expectations affect their ability to cope with
unanticipated outcomes, and their subsequent explanations for those
events?
Further, what are the behavioral Implications of a tendency to
perceive oneself as less vulnerable than others to negative life
events? Does greater perceived control encourage the Individual to
exercise the available means of controlling or preventing negative
events, or does It promote a false sense of security and Increase risk
through failure to take available precautions? Does an optimistic
bias and an illusion of control hinder an Individual's response to
realistic threats or unexpected disappointments, or the ability to
cope with uncontrollable events?
Finally, future research should also be expanded to Include a
wider sample of life events varying on other relevant dimensions. In
addition, it would be valuable to study optimism among different
subject populations. For example, does optimism decline with age, or
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wUh the experience of negative
also Include different measures
such as denial
.
life events? Future research should
of optimism and related processes,
FOOTNOTES
In addition to the thirteen countries in this study, the
Kibbutzim of Israel were included as a separate sample. Kibbutz
members gave the highest personal rating, 7.0.
2
In some countries, particularly countries that had experienced
recent radical political change or were in the process of achieving
national independence, Cantril (1965) found a high correlation between
personal and national ratings.
3
It is interesting to consider the emotional consequences of a
"near success": "When a person almost obtains what he desires or
almost loses what he is enjoying, emotional nuances occur. A near
success leads to exasperation, heightened frustration, the feeling of
being teased, of being unfortunate.
. . . Consider the following
situation. If someone holds number 5304 in a lottery and he learns
that 5305 is the winning number, this near-success is probably harder
to bear than if there is no winning number anywhere near his own"
(Heider, 1958, pp. 141-142).
4
However, perceived control may induce stress when the
individual believes that there are actions he or she could take to
produce or avoid an outcome, but does not take those actions (cf.
Bandura, 1977).
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Base-Rate Information
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Base-Rate Information
MARRIAGE
Huma?"s7rll?:ri^'dUa;:"thaV
'l/'ot ^ \ health and
temoorarv m^M+Ji H^fft 35/. f married persons will exoer lpnrp
duMrt^jeirVuVt^^'J ^^^^"^^-^" ^^^'"^^"^ ^" ^ short-term-^^
HnJlT^'.^""'^!'!!?^
recently by the U. S. Department of Health anduman Services Indicate that 35% of married persons will .J^ \lnrt Idivorce during their llfptimo ^ experie ce a
EMPLOYMENT
Figures released recently by the U. S. Department of Labor Indicate
Kc ' . 'r?.!
^Q'^' empln ved persons mna .rrpp tjobs outside their chosen fields for a year orln^;;^ ~ ^
Figures released recently by the U. S. Department of Labor Indicate
sometime du ring their lives. 20% of employed persons become
unemployed and are unable to find a 1ob for a year or Tonger
CRIME
Recent estimates released by the National Criminal Justice Service
Indicate that, sometime during their lives. 25% of Americans will be
victims of a malor property crime (motor vehicle or malor household
theft, etc.) .
Recent estimates released by the National Criminal Justice Service
Indicate that, sometime during their lives. 25% of Americans will be
victims of a personal crime (assault, rape, mugging, etc.) .
HEALTH
Estimates published recently by the National Center for Health
Statistics Indicate that 15% of Americans will develop a curable
(non-fatal) form of cancer during their lifetimes .
Estimates published recently by the National Center for Health
Statistics Indicate that 15% of Americans will develop a terminal
(fatal) form of cancer during their lifetimes .
APPENDIX B
Sample Questionnaire
Base-rate/Severe Condltl
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life jvyt/.^"7nfhirq'ilVt1o'nn^^^^ til 1 ^K^^.^t^l^".^ ^^^^^ ^^tureown judgment of the livlffhood th^f ^.nor^lil ^l^^^ Provide your
are interested only In vou? hpiiof c ^^t^^^^*^ events will happen. Me
right or wrong answers beliefs and expectations: there are no
&{im°"thaf 'Ihe'^'evrn^ 'w^l^P^ordr' ^^n'^^^Vi". ^"k ^^^"'J ^heexample, to give vour estiLtt Mf asked, for
person 'in the United ^t^+oc ,^l?i probability that the average
or her lifetime The ornh;,hni^ ^ particular event in h?s
country wi 1 1 exber ence the pJph^ f^^^^ average individual in the
You would indicate a prediction of 20% as follows:
The probability that the average person in the country willwin a lottery or raffle in his or her lifetime is ^ % .
'a^\tp/orPf;ff^r"i?l ltlll^rffe1im\^^. ^^^h^il^ aVso^titaS^fSj?
JfobabVmy o^f aS'eJen't?'^^'' ' ^'"'''^ guideline for estimating the
^0% Definitely will not happen
20% Very unlikely
40% Somewhat unlikely
fO% As likely to happen as to not happen
60% Somewhat likely
80% Very likely
100% Definitely will happen
nt ^'^}^'^ estimate can be any value between (and including)
0/. - 100%, and will probably fall somewhere between the numbers and
categories on this chart For example, if you think an event is more
than "somewhat likelv" but less than ''very likely," your probability
estimate might be 72%. j. j k j
Please read and answer each question in the order in which it
appears. We realize that predictions about future events are often
difficult to make, but please try to answer every question. Remember,
there are no right or wrong answers; we are interested only in your
beliefs and expectations.
** THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY **
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% Event #1 : Divorce
% Event #2: Unemployed and unable to find a job for a
year or longer
% Event #3: Victim of a personal crime (assault, rape,
mugging, etc.)
% Event #4: Terminal (fatal) form of cancer
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EVENT #1 : Divorce
1- In general, how VlkebL do you think this event is? (Circle number)
Very
Very
""^^•^ely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 likely
2. What do you think is the probability that you will personallvexperience this event during your lifetime? ^
y
3. How certain are you of your probability estimate for yourself ?
•^^^ Completely
certain 12 3 4 5 6 7 certain
4 What do you think is the probability that the average person intrm class will experience this event during their lifetime? ~%
5. How certain are you of your probability estimate for the average
person in this class ? ^
Not at all Completely
certain 12 3 4 5 6 7 certain
6. Please rate this event on the following dimensions. (Circle the
number which best represents your perception of the event)
Mild
Unpredictable
Important
Unfair
Threatening
2 3 4 5 6 7 Severe
2 3 4 5 6 7 Predictable
2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Important
2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair
2 3 4 5 6 7 Non-threatening
7. To what extent do you think that you can effectively control or
prevent the occurrence of this event?
No Complete
Control 12 3 4 5 6 7 Control
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EVENT #1 (Continued)
r'.n V*^"* ^° ^^^""^ that the average person In this cla..can effectively control, or prevent the occuTFif^^oftMl i^eKt^ -
—
his ev nt?
r«,.+ ^? . Complete
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Control
9. How concerned or worried are you about the possibility that thisevent may occur to you ?
i^ uM u xn m
, ^^'l Not at allConcerned 12 3 4 5 6 7 Concerned
.
How would you describe your experience with this event?(Circle all that apply)
1) has not happened to anyone I know
2) has happened to acquaintances How many?
3) has happened to close friends or relatives.
. . !how many'
4) has happened to me personally
EVENT #2: Unemployed and unable to find a .1ob for a year or longer
1. In general, how likely do you think this event Is?
Very Very
unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 likely
2. What do you think Is the probability that you will personally
experience this event during your lifetime? %
3. How certain are you of your probability estimate for yourself ?
Not at all Completely
certain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 certain
4. What do you think Is the probabi 1 Ity that the average person 1_n
this class will experience this event during their lifetime? %
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EVENT #2 (Continued)
^"yffili;:,'"" °' ^^""^""^^^ the average
Not at all , . ,
"^t^^" 12 3 4 5 6 7 llTtlT'
t v.^^^^^! S^^^ 0" t^ie following dimensions (Circle th^number which best represents your perception of the event)
M1ld 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unpredictable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Severe
Predictable
Important 12 3 4 5 6 7 Not Important
Unfair 12 3 4 5 6 7 Fair
Threatening 12 3 4 5 6 7 Non-threatening
7. To what extent do you think that mi can effectively control orprevent the occurrence of this event?
No Complete
Control 12 3 4 5 6 7 Control
8. To what extent do you think that the average person In this class
can effectively control or prevent the occurrence of this event?
No Complete
Control 12 3 4 5 6 7 Control
9. How concerned or worried are you about the possibility that this
event may occur to you ?
Very Not at all
Concerned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concerned
10. How would you describe your experience with this event?
(Circle all that apply)
1) has not happened to anyone I know
2) has happened to acquaintances How many?
3) has happened to close friends or relatives. . . .How many?
4) has happened to me personally
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EVENT #3: Victim of a personal cr ime (assault r.po,
^
1. In general, how likely
,
do you think this event Is?
^^''y Verv
unlikely 12 3 4 5 6 7 likely
2 What do you think Is the probability that you will oersonallvexperience this event during your lifetime?
_%
P y
3. How certain are you of your probability estimate for yourself ?
^V]^ Completelycertain 12 3 4 5 6 7 certain
4_ What do you think Is the probability that the average person Inthis class. w1 n experience this event during their lifetime? "%
5. How certain are you of your probability estimate for the average
person In this class ? ^
Not at all Completely
certain 12 3 4 5 6 7 certain
6. Please rate this event on the following dimensions. (Circle the
number which best represents your perception of the event)
M1ld 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unpredictable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unfair 12 3 4 5 6 7
Threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Severe
Predictable
Not Important
Fair
Non-threatening
7. To what extent do you think that you can effectively control or
prevent the occurrence of this event?
No Complete
Control 12 3 4 5 6 7 Control
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EVENT #3 (Continued)
^.^"^^"^^^o you think that the average person 1n this clas.can effectively control or prevent the occuTTi^^^oflhU i^e^
Nn
P^„. T . Complete12 3 4 5 6 7 Control
9. How concerned or worried are you about the possibility that thisevent may occur to you ?
'u i ui x n
,
V^^y
,
Not at all
Concerned 12 3 4 5 6 7 Concerned
10. How would you describe your experience with this event?(Circle all that apply)
1) has not happened to anyone I know
2) has happened to acquaintances How many?
3) has happened to close friends or relatives.
.
'. !how many?
4) has happened to me personally "
EVENT #4: Terminal (fatal) form of cancer
1. In general, how likely do you think this event is?
Very Very
unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 likely
2. What do you think is the probability that you will personally
experience this event during your lifetime? %
3. How certain are you of your probability estimate for yourself ?
Not at all Completely
certain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 certain
4. What do you think is the probability that the average person in
this class will experience this event during their lifetime? %
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EVENT #4 (Continued)
Im^liWi^l'" P-babnny estimate for the averaae
Not at all
certain
7
Completely
certain
^'
u*"^.*®
^^^^ ^^^"^ °" following dimensions (Circle thenumber which best represents your perception of the event)
M1ld 1
Unpredictable 1
Important 1
Unfair 1
Threatening 1
2 3 4 5 6 7 Severe
2 3 4 5 6 7 Predictable
2 3 4 5 6 7 Not Important
2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair
2 3 4 5 6 7 Non-threatening
7. To what extent do you think that you can effectively control or
prevent the occurrence of this event?
No Complete
Control 12 3 4 5 6 7 Control
8. To what extent do you think that the average person In this class
can effectively control or prevent the occurrence of this event?
No Complete
Control 12 3 4 5 6 7 Control
9. How concerned or worried are you about the possibility that this
event may occur to you ?
Very Not at all
Concerned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concerned
10. How would you describe your experience with this event?
(Circle all that apply)
1) has not happened to anyone I know
2) has happened to acquaintances How many?
3) has happened to close friends or relatives. . . .How many?
4) has happened to me personally
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General Background Information
1
.
Your age;
2. Your sex: female ^male
3. In general, how would you describe yourself?
"^'MlT^^^f . o Less happy thanmost people 12 3 4 5 6 7 most people
Pessimistic 12 3 4 5 6 7 Optimistic
More lucky than Less lucky than
most people 12 3 4 5 6 7 most people
4. Compared to the average person In this country , how would you say
life has treated you?
Worse 12 3 4 5 6 7 Better
5. Compared to the average person in this class , how would you say
life has treated you?
Worse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Better
6. Try to Imagine the best and the worst possible life for yourself
Where do you feel you personally stand at the present time?
Worst possible Best possible
life for me 12 3 4 5 6 7 life for me
Where would you say you stood five years ago ?
Worst possible Best possible
life for me 12 3 4 5 6 7 life for me
Where do you think you will be five years from now ?
Worst possible Best possible
life for me 12 3 4 5 6 7 life for me


